A Message from Attorney General Bob Ferguson


This manual provides you information about our state’s Sunshine Laws. I am committed to enhancing transparency in government. Open government is vital to a free and informed society, and this updated guide will help both public officials and the people they serve understand our state’s open government laws.

This 2016 edition modernizes the prior manual interpreting those laws. The manual includes summaries of and links to relevant statutes, court decisions, formal Attorney General Opinions, and Public Records Act Model Rules.

My office produced this manual with the assistance of attorneys representing media and requesters, and local and state government organizations. If you have questions or comments about the contents of this manual, please contact Nancy Krier, the Assistant Attorney General for Open Government at nancyk1@atg.wa.gov.

My office is a resource for you regarding the state’s Public Records Act and the Open Public Meetings Act. Please explore our website for training and other open government information at http://www.atg.wa.gov/open-government.

Thank you for your interest in open, transparent government.

Bob Ferguson
Washington State Attorney General
government laws as of the last update in 2016. The manual was previously updated in 2015.
Readers should be aware that court decisions issued or statutes enacted after the last revised date of
the manual or a particular chapter may impact the law as summarized here.

The manual has a table of contents, introduction, and three chapters:

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The manual provides links to cited statutes, cases, Attorney General’s Opinions and rules. More
information on open government is available at the Attorney General’s Office Open Government
Web page, the Washington Coalition for Open Government, the Municipal Research and Services
Center, and other sources.

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Introduction

Introduction last revised: October 31, 2016

The purpose of this Open Government Resource Manual is to provide summary information about the Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56 RCW and the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA), chapter 42.30 RCW. These laws are often called “sunshine laws.” This manual is a resource for members of the public and state and local agencies. Referenced statutes, cases and rules are linked. Click on the links to read more information, including the full language of the statutes. This manual is only an overview of some of the provisions of these two laws and is not legal advice. This manual also provides some hypothetical case examples, based on certain facts. If the facts are different, or if the laws or court precedents have changed since this manual was prepared, the analysis in a hypothetical may not apply. This manual also references Attorney General’s Office non-binding Model Rules, which are linked and are also available on the Attorney General’s website. This manual is not an Attorney General Opinion, but several formal opinions are referenced and linked.

Remember: Laws change and courts can issue decisions explaining the PRA and OPMA. In the case of a difference between this manual and statutes or court decisions, the laws and judicial opinions govern.

Notes:

On July 1, 2006, the PRA was moved from chapter 42.17 RCW to chapter 42.56 RCW. Therefore, this manual uses the current chapter 42.56 RCW citations. Some of the cases and older Attorney General Opinions cited in this manual use the former citations in chapter 42.17 RCW. A recodification conversion chart is available on the Attorney General’s website.

And, as described above, links are provided to the referenced court decisions. Decisions include direct links to a copy provided by the Municipal Research and Services Center or online copies. State court decisions are also available on the Washington State Judicial Opinions Website. You can search for decisions on the courts’ website by party names, terms, citations, and judge. Recent opinions (“slip opinions”) are also available on the courts’ website here.

Finally, this manual discusses records and meetings of state and local agencies. Courts are not subject to the Open Public Meetings Act or Public Records Act, and access to court records is governed by court rules and Article I, Section 10 of the Washington State Constitution. The relevant rules are on the Washington State Courts website. See, for example, General Rule (GR) 31 (Access to Court Records) and General Rule (GR) 31.1 (Access to Administrative Records). Records of the Washington State Legislature are defined at RCW 42.56.010(3) and RCW 40.14.100. Discussion of court and legislative records is outside the scope of this manual.
Chapter 1
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT – GENERAL AND PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS

Chapter last revised: October 28, 2016

1.1 The Public Records Act (PRA) is Interpreted in Favor of Disclosure

The PRA was enacted by initiative to provide the people with broad rights of access to public records. The PRA declares that it must be "liberally construed" to promote the public policy of open government:

The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies that serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may maintain control over the instruments that they have created. This chapter shall be liberally construed to promote this public policy and to assure that the public interest will be fully protected. In the event of a conflict between [the PRA] and any other act, the provisions of [the PRA] shall govern. RCW 42.56.030.

Courts shall take into account the policy of this chapter that free and open examination of public records is in the public interest, even though such examination may cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public officials or others. RCW 42.56.550(3).

Courts interpret the PRA liberally to promote the purpose of informing people about governmental decisions and promote government accountability. WAC 44-14-01003 (summarizing how PRA is interpreted by courts).

1.2 “Public Record” Is Defined Broadly

The definition of a public record (other than a record of the Legislature) contains three elements. RCW 42.56.010(3) and (4); WAC 44-14-03001. First, the record must be a "writing," which is broadly defined in RCW 42.56.010(4) to include any recording of any communication, image or sound. A writing includes not only conventional documents, but also videos, photos, and electronic records including emails and computer data.

Second, the writing must relate to the conduct of government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary function. Virtually every document a government agency has relates in some way to the conduct of government business or functions. “Proprietary” refers to where an agency function is similar to a private business function or venture.

Third, the writing must be prepared, owned, used or retained by the agency. West v. Thurston County, (2012); Nissen v. Pierce County (2015). A writing may include data compiled for the issuance of a report (as well as the report itself), even though the agency had not intended to make the
underlying data public. *Yacobellis v. City of Bellingham* (1989); see also *O’Neill v. City of Shoreline* (2010) (agency must produce non-exempt metadata when it is requested). An agency need not possess a record for it to be a “public record.” *Concerned Ratepayers v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1* (1999) (records held by out-of-state private vendor were “public records” because they were “used” by agency); see also *Forbes v. City of Gold Bar* (2012); *O’Neill v. City of Shoreline* (2010) (agency records on city officials’ personal computers subject to PRA); *Nissen v. Pierce County* (2015) (agency records on personal cell phones). Although this element is broad, it is not limitless. Compare *1983 Att’y Gen. Op. No. 9* (list of customers of public utility district is a public record) with *1989 Att’y Gen. Op. No. 11* (registry of municipal bondholders is not public record because it was compiled by trust company and never prepared, possessed or used by county).

The PRA applies only to "public records." *Oliver v. Harborview Med. Ctr.* (1980); *Nissen v. Pierce County* (2015). The definition of “public record” is to be liberally construed to promote full access to public records. *Id.*

**Case Example:** A public agency hires a consultant to help resolve a specific problem. The consultant prepares a report and transmits the report to the agency. After reviewing the report and before receiving a public records request for the report, the agency returns all copies to the consultant. Is the report a public record?

**Resolution:** Yes, because the agency “used” the report. A record outside the possession of the agency can be a “public record.” The agency should require the consultant to return the report to the agency for public records processing (reviewing for exempt information, redacting, copying, etc.). See *Concerned Ratepayers v. PUD No. 1*, (1999).

### 1.3 The PRA Applies to State and Local Agencies

As noted above, only the records of an "agency" are covered by the PRA. The PRA’s definition of "agency" is broad and covers all state agencies and all local agencies. *RCW 42.56.010(1); WAC 44-14-01001*. Courts have interpreted that definition to include a city’s design and development department (*Overlake Fund v. City of Bellevue* (1991)); a county prosecutor’s office (*Dawson v. Daly* (1993)); a city’s parks department (*Yacobellis v. City of Bellingham* (1989)); and a public hospital district (*Cornu-Labat v. Hospital Dist. No. 2 of Grant County* (2013)). Some non-government agencies (such as an association of counties) that perform governmental or quasi-governmental functions can be considered the functional equivalent of an “agency” if they meet certain criteria. *2002 Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2; Telford v. Thurston County Board of Commissioners* (1999); *Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care Control Shelter* (1999). If the non-governmental entity does not satisfy the criteria demonstrating it is the functional equivalent of a public agency, the entity is not subject to the PRA. *Woodland Park Zoo v. Fortgang* (2016). Under the exceptional circumstances of one case, certain records of a contractor acting as the functional equivalent of a public employee were subject to a PRA request. *Cedar Grove Composting Incorporated v. City of Marysville* (2015). Whether a group of public agencies operating together by agreement can be sued as separate legal entity under the PRA can be a mixed question of law and fact. *Worthington v. WestNet* (2014).
The PRA applies in a more limited form to the Washington State Legislature. Information about accessing legislative documents is available here.

The PRA does not apply to court case files; but those files are available through common law rights of access and court rules. *Nast v. Michels* (1986); see also *Cowles Publishing Co. v. Murphy* (1981); *Yakima County v. Yakima Herald-Republic* (2011) and *City of Federal Way v. Koenig* (2009). However, one court of appeals held that a request for judge’s oaths to the superior court administrator was a disclosure request to be answered under the PRA. *Smith v. Okanogan County* (2000). Records held by entities that are part of the judicial branch of government are also not subject to the PRA. *West v. Washington State Association of District and Municipal Court Judges* (2016). Records that are held by other agencies (non-judicial entities), even if they relate to court activities, are available under the PRA from those agencies unless they are subject to a protective order. See, e.g., *Morgan v. Federal Way* (2009) and *Yakima County v. Yakima Herald-Republic* (2011). As noted, court rules govern access to court case files and administrative records. The Washington State Courts website has more information. See General Rule (GR) 31 and General Rule (GR) 31.1 and these links on the court’s website.

1.4 An Agency’s PRA Processes Must Assist Requesters

A. General PRA Procedures

The PRA requires agencies to implement several procedures for processing PRA requests. They include:

- Appointing a public records officer and making that information available to the public. RCW 42.56.580.
- Adopting procedures for handling PRA requests. RCW 42.56.040.
- Publishing a list of exemptions to and prohibitions from disclosure. RCW 42.56.070.
- Maintaining an index of records, with certain exceptions. RCW 42.56.070.
- Adopting a PRA copying fee schedule. RCW 42.56.070; RCW 42.56.120.
- Providing a review procedure for denial of records. RCW 42.56.520.

Agencies are to establish procedures to assist records requesters. RCW 42.56.040; RCW 42.56.580; RCW 42.56.070(1); RCW 42.56.100; *Resident Action Council v. Seattle Housing Authority* (2013). A state agency is required to adopt rules to assist the public in obtaining information about that agency, and local agencies must make that information available at the central office. RCW 42.56.040. See also WAC 44-14-01002. The Attorney General’s Office provides Model Rules for agencies to consider adopting for their procedures. See Ch. 44-14 WAC (last revised 2007).

These PRA rules must provide for the “fullest assistance to” requesters and the ”most timely possible action” on requests. RCW 42.56.100; *Resident Action Council v. Seattle Housing Authority* (2013). An agency may not use its rules to create an exemption or other basis to withhold a record. *Hearst Corp.*
v. Hoppe (1978). Agencies should have reasonable practices to allow them to promptly locate and produce requested documents if they are reasonably identifiable.

B. Public Records Officers

Agencies are required to appoint a public records officer and make the officer’s contact information publicly available. RCW 42.56.580. A list of state agency public records officers is available at the Office of the Code Reviser. WAC 44-14-020. The officer serves as the point of contact for a PRA request. The public records officer may have other persons assist in responding to requests. WAC 44-14-02002.

1.5 Agencies Must Retain Records Once Disclosure is Requested

Other state laws require state and local agencies to retain certain records for varying lengths of time depending on the content. See generally chapter 40.14 RCW, state and local government retention schedules, and WAC 44-14-03005. An agency is not liable under the PRA for not producing records that did not exist at the time of the request. Kozol v. Department of Corrections (2016). The PRA does not require production of records destroyed in accordance with state records retention schedules. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Wash v. McCarthy (2009). The fact that records do not exist because an agency inadvertently lost them before any request for their disclosure does not constitute a PRA violation. West v. Department of Natural Resources (2011). However, if an agency keeps a record longer than required — that is, if the agency still possesses a record that it could have lawfully destroyed under a retention schedule — the record is still a “public record” subject to disclosure. RCW 42.56.010(3) (“public record” includes writing “retained” by agency).

RCW 42.56.100 also addresses the situation when a record scheduled for destruction is the subject of a pending request. The agency must suspend any planned destruction and retain requested records until the public records request is resolved. RCW 42.56.100 requires agencies to adopt and enforce reasonable rules to protect public records from damage or disorganization. Chapter 40.14 RCW governs records retention by public agencies.

1.6 The PRA Imposes Some Requirements on Requesters

The Attorney General’s Model Rules for public records provide detailed information on the public records request process. See chapter 44-14 WAC.

A. Purpose of Request

A person making a public records request is not required to give a reason for the request, unless the request is for lists of individuals. Dawson v. Daly (1993); Yacobellis v. City of Bellingham (1992). An agency may ask if a request for “lists of individuals” is “for commercial purposes.” RCW 42.56.070(9). See also 1988 Att’y Gen. Op. No. 12 (access to list of individuals may be conditioned upon non-commercial use). The limitation on commercial-use requests has three elements: (1) “list of
individuals,” (2) for a “commercial purpose,” and (3) disclosure is not “specifically authorized or directed by law.” The word "individuals" refers to “natural persons - as opposed to business entities, committees, or groups." 1975 Att’y Gen. Op. No. 15. A “list of individuals” can have other fields in it (such as addresses) and still be a “list of individuals.” 1980 Att’y Gen. Op. No. 1. “Commercial purpose” has its ordinary meaning and includes a business activity by any form of business enterprise intended to generate profits, revenue or financial benefit. SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. State (2016) (interpreting what is a commercial purpose). An agency has an obligation to avoid disclosing lists of individuals for commercial purposes and may require a requester to sign a declaration describing the purpose of the request and stating that he or she will not use records listing individuals for a commercial purpose. Merely requiring the requester to affirm the request is not made for commercial purpose may not be enough depending on the circumstances and the agency may have an obligation to investigate depending on the nature of the request. Id.; . see also 1988 Att’y Gen. Op. No. 12. An example of a disclosure “specifically authorized or directed by law” is RCW 84.40.020, which requires a county assessor’s real property tax rolls to be available for public inspection. 1980 Att’y Gen. Op. No. 1.

B. Identity of Requester

RCW 42.56.080 provides that agencies may not distinguish between requesters and must make records available to “any person.” However, the PRA recognizes that other statutes may limit which persons may receive records. RCW 42.56.080. For example, an agency may need to determine whether a particular requester is authorized to receive requested health care records pursuant to RCW 70.02.030. Also, a court order (including an injunction under RCW 42.56.565 or RCW 71.09.120(3) barring an inmate or sexually violent predator from receiving a record) may restrict an agency from releasing records to particular persons. RCW 42.56.080; WAC 44-14-04003(1). Or, an agency may need to know the identity of a requester asking for a list of individuals to verify the lack of a prohibited commercial purpose. RCW 42.56.070(9); RCW 42.56.080; SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. State (2016). For requests falling within the 2016 law, an agency may need to know the identity of a person requesting a body worn camera recording. RCW 42.56.080 (as amended in 2016); RCW 42.56.240 (as amended in 2016). Therefore, depending upon the records requested and the laws that govern those records, sometimes an agency may consider the identity of a requester or need more information from a requester.

C. Form of Request

No particular form of public records request is required by the PRA. See RCW 42.56.080; RCW 42.56.100; Hangartner v. City of Seattle (2004); WAC 44-14-03006. However, a request must provide “fair notice” to the agency that it is a PRA request. Wood v. Lowe (2000); Germeau v. Mason County (2012). It must provide notice that it is a request made under the PRA, although it need not cite the PRA statute. Hangartner v. City of Seattle (2004); see also WAC 44-14-04002(1). A party seeking public records under the PRA must, "at a minimum, provide notice that the request is made pursuant to the [PRA] and identify the documents with reasonable clarity to allow the agency to locate them.”
The PRA specifically allows persons to make requests by mail (RCW 42.56.100), which includes email under current technology and practices.

Oral requests are not prohibited by the PRA, but they can be problematic. A written request is advisable for several reasons. It confirms the date on which the record is requested. It also clarifies what is being requested. Identification of the requesting party, with address and telephone number, will also facilitate a request for clarification by the agency of any ambiguous request or allow the agency to determine if a person has the right to a record that would normally be exempt. See WAC 44-14-03006. For these reasons, if a requester makes an oral request, an agency may need to follow up to confirm the request in writing.

Many agencies use public records requests forms, and make those forms available on their websites or at their offices. These forms typically identify what information the agency needs in order to process a request and search for records at that agency and thus can help expedite the request process. An agency’s rules for submitting public records requests must be reasonable and provide the fullest assistance to a requester. RCW 42.56.100.

Some laws outside the PRA require written requests for certain types of records.

D. “Identifiable Records” Requirement

To obtain records under the PRA, a requester must ask for existing "identifiable public records." RCW 42.56.080; WAC 44-14-04002(2).

A record must exist at the time of a request to be subject to required disclosure. A requester cannot have a “standing” request for records that may be available in the future. Sargent v. Seattle Police Dep’t (2011). An agency is not required to create a record to respond to a PRA request. Smith v. Okanogan County (2000); Fisher Broadcasting v. Seattle (2014); Benton County v. Zink (2015). However, electronic databases may present unique issues. For example, there is not always a simple answer to when an agency is producing an existing document as compared to creating a new record. Fisher Broadcasting v. Seattle (2014). An agency needs to look at the specific facts of each case. Fisher Broadcasting v. Seattle (2014). An agency does not have broad duties to respond to questions, do research, or give information that is not an identifiable public record. Limstrom v. Ladenburg (2002).

A requester satisfies the "identifiable record" requirement when he or she provides a "reasonable description" of the record enabling the agency to locate the requested records. Bonamy v. City of Seattle (1998); Hangartner v. City of Seattle (2004); Wright v. State (2013); WAC 44-14-04002. The request must be for identifiable records or classes of records, so the agency can search for potentially responsive records. Fisher Broadcasting v. Seattle (2014). A public records request must identify the records sought with “reasonable clarity.” Wright v. State (2013).
However, the requester need not identify the record with precision. A requester is not required to use the exact name of the record in a PRA request.

An agency has a duty that its procedures provide the “fullest assistance” to inquirers, RCW 42.56.100, which may include assisting persons to fairly identify the documents requested. Agencies can ask a requester to clarify an unclear request. RCW 42.56.520.

**Case Example:** A person sends an email to an agency asking how it handles employment discrimination claims. A second person requests a copy of the agency’s policy for handling employment discrimination claims. Which of these requests is for “identifiable public records”?

**Resolution:** The second request is a request of “identifiable records” (the written policy). The first request is not for “identifiable records” but rather for information; therefore, the agency is not obligated to respond to the first request under the Public Records Act.

**E. Submitting PRA Requests**

Requesters should send their PRA requests to the agency that has the records they seek. An agency can adopt rules explaining that requests are to be directed to a specific person (such as the public records officer) or to a specific address, provided that the requester has notice of the requirement. See RCW 42.56.040; RCW 42.56.070(1); RCW 42.56.100; Parmelee v. Clarke (2008). This process ensures that the request is received in a manner that enables the agency to timely respond and to give the fullest assistance to a requester.

A requester should review the agency’s procedures to see what agency address to use to submit the request. The request should be submitted to the agency’s public records officer to promote the promptest response.

**1.7 Agencies Have Duties in Responding to Requests**

An overview of an agency’s duties to process and respond to requests is available in WAC 44-14-04003 and WAC 44-14-04004, respectively.

**A. Initial Response Within Five Business Days**

An agency must respond to a request for public records within five business days of receipt of the request. RCW 42.56.520. Under RCW 1.12.040, the time allowed excludes the day of receipt from the computation. The initial response to the request must do at least one of the following: (1) produce the requested records by making them available for inspection at agency offices or by mailing or emailing copies to the requester; (2) provide an Internet address and link on the agency’s website to the requested records; (3) acknowledge receipt of the request and give a reasonable estimate of the time needed; or, 4) deny all or part of the request in writing. RCW 42.56.520. Each type of initial response is discussed below.
A request for voluminous records does not excuse an agency’s initial response within five business days, even if it may take longer to produce the records.  Zink v. City of Mesa (2007) (requiring strict compliance). See discussion in Chapter 1.7D below regarding estimates of time for further response. While the PRA requires a written response only for denials of records (see also RCW 42.56.210(3)), agencies should nevertheless respond (or confirm a verbal response) in writing (by email or letter) in order to have a contemporaneous record of the response in case of a dispute. Also, if an agency does not find responsive records, it should explain, in at least general terms, the places searched. Neighborhood Alliance v. Spokane County (2011); see also Fisher Broadcasting v. Seattle (2014) (agency should show it attempted to be helpful).

Under case law, the failure to respond within the five business days is a violation of the PRA and entitles the requester to seek an award of attorneys' fees and statutory penalties. West v. Department of Natural Resources (2011).

B. Adequate Search

An agency must conduct an adequate search for requested records. Neighborhood Alliance v. Spokane County (2011); Fisher Broadcasting v. Seattle (2014); Block v. City of Gold Bar (2015); Kozol v. Department of Corrections (2016). The search must be reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents. Id. See also Nissen v. Pierce County (2015) (searches for agency employees’ relevant records on non-agency devices).

An agency is not required to go outside its own records in its search. Limstrom v. Ladenburg (2002); Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Wash. v. McCarthy (2009). As noted, a requester must identify the documents with sufficient clarity to allow the agency to locate them. Hangartner v. City of Seattle (2004); Hobbs v. State (2014). An agency can ask a requester to clarify the request to assist in the search.

C. Producing Records

The PRA states broadly that an agency shall make available for inspection and copying all public records, unless a specific exemption or other statute applies. RCW 42.56.070(1). (The exemptions from disclosure are discussed below in Chapter 2). A requester has a right to inspect and copy records, but is not required to do both. WAC 44-14-07001(4). For example, a person may choose to inspect all public records on a certain subject but ask for a copy of only some of the records inspected. Also, a requester may ask for copies of records without first inspecting the records at agency offices.

Agencies can produce records in installments over time. RCW 42.56.550(6). However, even though some of the records requested may be readily available, the agency is not required to respond to a request in piecemeal fashion. Ockerman v. King County Dept. of Dev. & Envtl. Servs. (2000).
1. **Internet Link**

Records can be made available for inspection and copying by providing a link to the records on the agency’s website although, if the requester cannot access records through the Internet, the agency must provide either copies or access to the records from an agency computer. [RCW 42.56.520](#). ("When an agency has made records available on its website, members of the public with computer access should be encouraged to preserve taxpayer resources by accessing those records online.") Agencies are encouraged to make commonly requested records available on agency websites. Laws of 2010 c. 69 (see notes following [RCW 42.56.520](#)).

2. **Inspection at Agency Offices**

Public records must be made available for inspection and copying at agency offices during the normal business hours of the agency for at least 30 hours per week (except in weeks that include state legal holidays) unless the requester and the agency agree on a different time. [RCW 42.56.090](#). The agency’s customary business hours must be posted on the agency’s website and also made known to the public by other means. *Id.*

There is no charge for inspecting records at an agency office. [RCW 42.56.070](#); [WAC 44-14-07001(1)](#). Requesters who choose to inspect records at agency offices may ask to bring in their own copying equipment, which an agency may allow if its business is not disrupted and if redaction of records is not needed. Typically if copies are requested during an inspection, an agency promptly processes the request for copies and notifies the requester when the documents are ready. If the amount of requested documents is not voluminous, and if staff resources permit, the agency often may copy the documents while the requester waits. Use of an agency’s copying facilities should not "unreasonably disrupt the operations of the agency." [RCW 42.56.080](#).

3. **Charging for Records**

Under the PRA, no one may be charged a fee for the inspection of public records. [RCW 42.56.070](#); [WAC 44-14-07001(1)](#). Consequently, no agency may charge a person for the time to search for records for inspection.

A requester can ask the agency to make copies of requested records and the agency can charge for the copies. The PRA sets out the parameters for agency copying charges at [RCW 42.56.120](#), [RCW 42.56.070](#) and [RCW 42.56.130](#). Effective June 9, 2016, charges for the costs involved in producing and redacting copies of certain body worn camera recordings are governed by [RCW 42.56.240](#). See further details of such recordings in [Chapter 2.2D5](#). Other laws outside the PRA may set copying charges that supersede those in the PRA. [RCW 42.56.130](#).

While the PRA does not require an agency to make a copy of a record available electronically when an electronic copy is requested, the agency is to consider if it is reasonable and feasible to do so as part of providing the fullest assistance to requesters. *Mitchell v. Department of Corrections* (2011).

Expenses for copying records must be limited to "actual" costs of copying as set by the agency. RCW 42.56.070(7) allows for costs to include actual per page costs or “other costs” directly incident to copying records. RCW 42.56.120 provides that a reasonable charge may be assessed for providing copies of public records and use of agency equipment, not to exceed the amount necessary to reimburse the agency. These costs may include the paper, ink, storage media (such as a CD) and cost per page for the use of copying equipment, together with staff salary expense incurred in copying. The costs may include scanning fees. WAC 44-14-05002, WAC 44-14-07003. The agency may also charge the actual cost of postage and any shipping or mailing container. General administrative or overhead charges may not be included in copying costs.

If an agency has not calculated its actual copying cost per page, it is limited to a charge of 15 cents per page. RCW 42.56.120; WAC 44-14-07001(2). An agency can use an outside vendor to make the copies and assess those copying costs to the requester. *Benton County v. Zink* (2016); WAC 44-14-07001(5). An agency is not required to charge a fee for copying records but may waive its fees either on its own initiative or at the invitation of the requester. WAC 44-14-07005.

An agency may require a deposit of up to 10 percent of the estimated cost before copying records. RCW 42.56.120. Records may be provided in installments, and an agency may assess copying charges per installment. RCW 42.56.120. If an installment of records is not paid for or inspected, the agency need not continue its response to the request. RCW 42.56.120.

Agency charges for copies and other costs are to be published by the agency, and those are often in a “fee schedule”. RCW 42.56.070(7).

**Case Example:** A person requests the opportunity to inspect and copy certain documents from an agency. The agency responds that some of the information in the records is exempt. The agency offers to allow inspection of redacted documents (with the exempt information deleted) if the requester will pay the costs of copying the redacted documents and the cost of the employee who must locate, redact and copy the documents. Is the agency’s offer consistent with RCW 42.56.120 and .070(7) and (8)?

**Resolution:** No agency may charge for the right to inspect a document. Accordingly, it cannot ask the requester to pay the costs of locating and redacting records to make them available for inspection. An agency may charge for copies in accordance with its fee schedule, and the fees are limited to staff costs incurred in making copies, plus mailing/delivery costs.

**D. Reasonable Time Estimate**

The PRA recognizes that an agency may need more than five business days to complete a request. *Forbes v. City of Gold Bar* (2012); *Hobbs v. State* (2014). In those situations, the agency must
estimate the additional time needed to respond based upon time needed to: (1) clarify a request; (2) “locate and assemble” records to respond to the request; (3) contact a third party affected by the request; or (4) determine whether any records are covered by an exemption and should not be disclosed in whole or in part. RCW 42.56.520. See also WAC 44-14-04002 and WAC 44-14-04003. Each basis for needing additional time is discussed below.

The PRA does not require an agency to provide a written explanation of its time estimate. Ockerman v. King County Dept. of Dev. & Envtl. Servs (2000). An agency may extend its initial estimate of time when more time is needed than first anticipated. Andrews v. Wash. State Patrol (2014). The “operative” word for the estimate of time is “reasonable.” Forbes v. City of Gold Bar (2012).

To provide a "reasonable" estimate, an agency should not use the same estimate for every request. WAC 44-14-04003. An agency should roughly calculate the time it will take to respond to the request and send estimates of varying lengths, as appropriate for different requests. Id. There is no standard amount of time for fulfilling a request so reasonable estimates should vary. Id.

The PRA authorizes lawsuits challenging the reasonableness of an agency’s time estimate. RCW 42.56.550(2). The burden of proof is on the agency to show that its estimate was reasonable. Id. When a person prevails against an agency in an action seeking the right to receive a response to a public records request within a reasonable time, that person is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in the action. RCW 42.56.550(4).

1. Requesting Clarification

An agency may need additional time to clarify the request if the request cannot be understood or does not ask for identifiable records. An agency may also need time to clarify by confirming the identity of a requester or to obtain other information from the requester in order to comply with laws or court orders governing access to the requested records. Clarification of the intent of the request may be needed if the request is for a prohibited commercial purpose. SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. State (2016).

The purpose of the PRA is best served by communications between agencies and requesters. Hobbs v. State (2014); WAC 44-14-04003(3). A requester’s failure to clarify a request excuses the agency from responding to the unclarified request. RCW 42.56.520; see also White v. Skagit County and Island County (2015).

2. Locating and Assembling Records

An agency may need additional time to locate and assemble records. And, the PRA recognizes that agencies have essential functions in addition to providing public records. RCW 42.56.100; WAC 44-14-04001; Zink v. City of Mesa (2007). The Model Rules comment at WAC 44-14-04001 (cited in Forbes v. City of Gold Bar (2012)) describes in part:
Requesters should keep in mind that all agencies have essential functions in addition to providing public records. Agencies also have greatly differing resources. The act recognizes that agency public records procedures should prevent "excessive interference" with the other "essential functions" of the agency. [RCW 42.56.100]. Therefore, while providing public records is an essential function of an agency, it is not required to abandon its other, nonpublic records functions. Agencies without a full-time public records officer may assign staff part-time to fulfill records requests, provided the agency is providing the "fullest assistance" and the "most timely possible" action on the request. The proper level of staffing for public records requests will vary among agencies, considering the complexity and number of requests to that agency, agency resources, and the agency’s other functions.

A court reviewing an agency’s estimate of time for assembling records may consider “the circumstances” related to the request. Bartz v. Department of Corrections (2013). For example, the Bartz court considered the volume of potentially responsive records that needed to be reviewed, the agency’s need to seek clarification, the agency’s reasonable explanation for the timeframe, and the fact the agency provided records in installments. The court in Ockerman v. King County Dept. of Dev. & Envtl. Servs. (2000) considered that the records were in multiple locations and were being used by the prosecutor’s office in litigation. The court in Forbes v. City of Gold Bar (2012) described the city’s response as “reasonable in light of the difficulty the city had in retrieving the information and the efforts it expended to recover the information,” and referenced the Model Rules. The court in West v. Department of Licensing (2014) considered that the request was “complex and broad.” And the court in Andrews v. Wash. State Patrol (2014) said an agency may extend its time estimate if locating records takes more time than initially anticipated. However, while an agency may provide a reasonable estimate of time to produce requested records, an agency cannot use the estimated date as an excuse to withhold records that are no longer exempt (for example, when investigations are completed earlier than estimated). Wade’s Eastside Gun Shop v. Department of Labor and Industries (2016).

3. Contacting Third Parties

An agency may need additional time to contact third parties. The PRA permits agencies to notify third parties about a PRA request in order to allow them to seek a court order restricting disclosure of the requested records. RCW 42.56.540; Doe v. Washington State Patrol (2016). RCW 42.56.540 gives agencies the “option” of notifying persons named in a record or to whom a record pertains, that the record has been requested, unless the law requires such notice. An agency may give such persons a “reasonable” amount of time (a “realistic opportunity”) to obtain an injunction against producing records before complying with a request for non-exempt records. Wade’s Eastside Gun Shop v. Department of Labor and Industries (2016). An agency should notify affected third parties promptly after identifying that they may have an interest in the disclosure of requested records so the agency does not create unnecessary delay. Wade’s Eastside Gun Shop v. Department of Labor and Industries (2016); see also WAC 44-14-04003(11) (describing that the practice of many agencies is to give a 10-day deadline for a person to obtain an injunction restricting disclosure). If no court order is obtained during the allotted time, the agency must produce the records.
4. Reviewing for Exempt Content

An agency may need additional time to review records for exempt content. Agencies are not relieved of their duties to respond to requests for public records because an exemption applies. RCW 42.56.210. An agency must determine if all or only part of a record is exempt. If only part of a record is exempt, an agency must withhold or redact only the exempt information and disclose the rest of the document. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe (1978); see also WAC 44-14-04004(4)(b)(i). If an entire document is exempt or if redaction is not required under RCW 42.56.210(1) or other laws, an agency must still provide the requester the basis for the exemption. (See more detailed discussion of exemptions in Chapter 2).

E. Denials

When denying access to records in whole or in part, agencies must do so in writing and specify the reasons for the denial. RCW 42.56.520; RCW 42.56.210(3). The written response must identify the specific statutes relied upon by the agency to withhold the record or part of a record from production and must briefly explain how the exemptions apply to the records requested. RCW 42.56.210(3); City of Lakewood v. Koenig (2014); see also White v. Skagit County and Island County (2015).

In order to comply with the PRA and to create an adequate record for a reviewing court, the agency's denial must identify any individual records withheld in their entirety. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. University of Wash. (1994) (PAWS II); see also WAC 44-14-04004(4)(b)(ii). If challenged, an agency is not limited by the grounds in its initial written denial and it may argue additional reasons for nondisclosure on judicial review. PAWS II.

F. No Liability for Good Faith Response

A good faith decision by a public agency to comply with the PRA and release a public record relieves the agency or any public official or employee from liability arising from the disclosure. RCW 42.56.060. This immunity applies to claims by third parties for damages arising from the release of the records. For example, a third party named in a public record cannot successfully sue a public agency under the PRA for a good faith release of that record on the basis that the disclosure violated the subject's privacy. There may be rights to sue under other statutes which may impose confidentiality requirements for certain types of records. The protection from liability by RCW 42.56.060 does not apply to the failure to disclose information that should have been disclosed. In that situation, a court may award penalties and attorneys' fees under RCW 42.56.550(4) to a prevailing party even if the agency acts in good faith. Amren v. City of Kalama (1997).
1.8 Agency Decisions May Be Reviewed Internally and In Court

A. Review by Agency of Its Own Denial

Agencies must establish procedures to promptly review decisions denying access to records in whole or in part. **RCW 42.56.520.** Final agency action that grants a requester the right to seek judicial review is deemed complete at the end of the second business day after an agency’s denial of the right to inspect any portion of a record. This means that a requester may file a court case two business days after the initial denial regardless of whether the agency has completed its internal review. **WAC 44-14-08001; WAC 44-14-08004.** A requester should consult an agency’s rules or procedures describing its internal reviews. And, a requester and an agency can agree to extend the time to permit an internal review. Note that an agency may cure a PRA violation by voluntarily remediying an alleged problem while the request remains open and the agency is actively engaging in efforts to fully respond to the request, so it is in the requester’s interest to promptly communicate concerns about an agency’s response. **Hobbs v. State** (2014).

B. Attorney General Review of Denial by State Agency

A requester may ask the Attorney General to review a state agency’s claim that a record is exempt from disclosure. **RCW 42.56.530.** The Office of the Attorney General will respond in writing whether the record is exempt. The right of review by the Attorney General does not extend to a delay in producing records or failure to respond to the request. **RCW 42.56.530** does not allow the Attorney General to formally review denials of requests by local agencies; however, the Attorney General’s Office may provide information and technical assistance under **RCW 42.56.155.** The review is nonbinding and a requester is not required to seek review before going to court.

C. Third-Party Action to Prevent Disclosure

A third party who is named in a record, or who is the subject of a record, may seek an injunction to prevent the production of a record. **RCW 42.56.540; Doe v. Washington State Patrol** (2016). An agency may also seek a judicial determination on whether a record should be disclosed. **Soter v. Cowles Publishing Co.** (2007). The action to prevent disclosure may be filed in the superior court where that party resides or where the record is kept. **Id.** The requester is a necessary (required) party. **Burt v. Department of Corrections** (2010).


Additional procedures may apply to injunctions regarding public records requests from inmates or sexually violent predators. **RCW 42.56.565; RCW 71.09.120(3).**
D. Filing Suit to Enforce the PRA

A records requester may go to court to obtain the requested records, or to challenge a response to a request or the reasonableness of an agency’s estimate of the time to provide the records. RCW 42.56.550; see generally WAC 44-14-04004(4) and -08004(5). Note that an agency may cure a PRA violation by voluntarily remedying an alleged problem while the request remains open and the agency is actively engaging in efforts to fully respond to the request. Therefore, prior to going to court it is in the requester’s interest to promptly communicate with an agency if a requester has concerns about the agency’s action or inaction. Hobbs v. State (2014).

A person who has been finally denied the opportunity to inspect or copy a record requested under the PRA may file a lawsuit in the superior court of the county in which a record is kept (or, if the case is against a county, in the adjoining county). RCW 42.56.550. See also WAC 44-14-08004. The agency has the burden to prove that a specific exemption applies to the record or part of the record withheld from disclosure. Id.; Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe (1978). A court will interpret exemptions narrowly and in favor of disclosure, RCW 42.56.030, and will order the disclosure of a non-exempt record “even though such examination may cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public officials or others” (language now codified at RCW 42.56.550(3)).

A person may also go to superior court and ask a judge to determine whether the agency’s estimate of time to provide the records is “reasonable.” RCW 42.56.550(2). The burden of proof is on the agency to prove its estimate is “reasonable.” Id. See also WAC 44-14-08004(4).

The court’s review of the agency’s decision is de novo (meaning that the court reviews the matter on its own, without regard to the decision of the agency). RCW 42.56.550(3).

The procedure for judicial review is set forth in RCW 42.56.550. Procedures may include a “show cause” hearing, but cases under the PRA may also be resolved through summary judgment. Spokane Research and Defense Fund v. City of Spokane (“Spokane Research IV”) (2005). The court’s rules will also govern the proceedings. More information about PRA court procedures is in RCW 42.56.550 and the Model Rules at WAC 44-14-08004. Court procedures are also described in the court’s Civil Rules. Some courts have adopted local rules for PRA proceedings. See, e.g., Thurston County Local Rule 16. And, a brochure on the courts’ website explains civil proceedings in superior court for parties unrepresented by attorneys (self-represented persons or “pro se” parties).

Requesters must start these PRA actions against agencies within a year of when the agency claims an exemption or when it last produces records on an installment basis. RCW 42.56.550(6). Under Belenski v. Jefferson County (2016), the one-year statute of limitations begins on an agency’s final, definitive response to a public records request and applies to all possible agency responses under the PRA. See also Rental Housing Association of Puget Sound v. City of Des Moines (2009); Klinkert v. Washington State Criminal Justice Commission (2015); and, White v. City of Lakewood (2016). In Belenski the State Supreme Court also described that the one-year statute of limitations could be
“equitably tolled” (not run) if the facts show there was a dishonest response by an agency that intentionally withholds presumably disclosable records.

An agency may file a lawsuit to seek a court determination of its obligations under the PRA. Benton County v. Zink (2016).

E. Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Daily Penalty

A party who “prevails” against an agency in a lawsuit seeking either to disclose a record or to receive an appropriate response within a reasonable time is entitled to recover costs and reasonable attorneys' fees (with the exception of actions involving disclosure of body worn camera recordings governed by the procedures in RCW 42.56.240 as amended in 2016). RCW 42.56.550(4). In addition, the court may award a statutory penalty of up to $100 for each day that the agency denied the requester the right to inspect or get a copy of a public record (with the exception of actions involving disclosure of body worn camera recordings governed by the procedures in RCW 42.56.240 as amended in 2016). Id. The daily penalty range is $0 to $100. See also WAC 44-14-08004(7). Penalties may not be awarded to an inmate unless the court finds the agency acted in bad faith. RCW 42.56.565.

A requester is the "prevailing party" if the final court hearing the matter determines that the record or portion of a record “should have been disclosed on request,” Spokane Research & Defense Fund v. City of Spokane (“Spokane Research IV”) (2005), or that some other violation of the PRA occurred. Doe I v. Washington State Patrol (1996). The requester also prevails if the agency “voluntarily” provides the records improperly withheld after being sued. The award of reasonable attorneys' fees incurred to a prevailing party is mandatory (with the exception of actions involving disclosure of body worn camera recordings governed by the procedures in RCW 42.56.240 as amended in 2016), although the amount is within the court's discretion. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. University of Wash. (1994); Doe I v. Washington State Patrol (1996); Lindberg v. Kitsap Cy. (1996); Amren v. City of Kalama (1997). A pro se party (a non-attorney representing himself or herself) is not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. Mitchell v. Department of Corrections (2011).

Penalties are not mandatory and can be awarded and computed within the court’s discretion. RCW 42.56.550(4); Wade’s Eastside Gun Shop v. Department of Labor and Industries (2016). A court is to consider a nonexclusive list of factors when assessing a penalty. Yousoufian v. Office of Ron Sims (2004); Neighborhood Alliance v. Spokane County (2011). There are factors that can increase (aggravate) a penalty and factors that can decrease (mitigate) a penalty.

1.9 Other PRA Provisions

Other provisions of the PRA include:

- **Training.** Public records officers and elected local and elected statewide officials must receive PRA training within 90 days of assuming their duties, and must receive refresher
training no later than four years later. **RCW 42.56.152.** The Attorney General’s Office has an Open Government Training Web page with more resources and information.

- **Exemptions.** Chapter 2 of this manual describes public records exemptions. An agency must publish and maintain a list of exemptions applicable to its records. **RCW 42.56.070(2).**

- **Indexing.** There are certain records indexing requirements, and the requirements depend upon whether the agency is a state or local agency. **RCW 42.56.070.** The requirement to keep indices of public records set forth in **RCW 42.56.070(3) is excused if a local agency makes an affirmative finding that maintaining such an index would be “unduly burdensome.”** **RCW 42.56.070(4).** A state agency must have a rule on its system for indexing certain types of records as listed in **RCW 42.56.070(5),** including records it indexed before 1990. A public record may be “relied on, used, or cited as precedent by an agency against a party” only if that record has been included in an index available to the public or if the affected party has timely actual or constructive notice of that record. **RCW 42.56.070(6).** See also **WAC 44-14-03003.**

- **Data Breaches.** **RCW 42.56.590** provides procedures for notice of security breaches of data with personal information.

- **Attorney General’s Office Assistance.** The Attorney General’s Office may provide Model Rules, as well as other information, technical assistance, and training. **RCW 42.56.155; RCW 42.56.570.**

**Chapter 2**  
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT – EXEMPTIONS  

*Chapter last revised: October 31, 2016*

**2.1 Exemptions Permit Withholding or Redaction of Records**

Records must be produced upon request unless a law “exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records.” **RCW 42.56.070(1).** These laws are called “exemptions.” The PRA and other statutes provide hundreds of very specific exemptions. If an exemption applies to all or part of a record, the exempt content can be withheld or deleted (redacted). Many court cases interpret these exemptions, and new exemptions can be created or modified each year by the Legislature. For a list of these exemptions, see the linked table prepared by the Office of the Code Reviser (see the list under “Schedule of Review,” then select the most recent year). The Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee (“Sunshine Committee”) is charged with reviewing exemptions in state law and making recommendations for changes. **RCW 42.56.140.** A full treatment of all exemptions is beyond the scope of this Open Government Resource Manual. Instead, this Chapter provides general guidance on exemptions and summarizes many of the ones most frequently encountered by requesters and agencies.
A. Application of Exemptions

The PRA requires exemptions to be narrowly construed to promote the public policy of disclosure. 

RCW 42.56.030. An agency can refuse inspection and copying of public records based on exemptions found either in the PRA or in an "other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific information or records." RCW 42.56.070(1). References to some statutes outside the PRA are made within the PRA and others stand alone. A record or portion of a record must fit squarely within a specific exemption in order to be withheld; otherwise, the withholding is invalid. An exemption will not be inferred or presumed. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y. v. Univ. of Wash (1994) ("PAWS II"). The "other statutes" provision does not allow a court "to imply exemptions but only allows specific exemptions to stand." Brouillet v. Cowles Publishing Co (1990) (cited in PAWS II).

With limited exceptions, an agency must redact and produce the remaining parts of the records if exempt information exempt under the PRA can be effectively deleted or if the exemption is found by a court to be "clearly unnecessary to protect any individual’s right of privacy or any vital governmental function.” RCW 42.56.210(1); Resident Action Council v. Seattle Housing Authority (2013). The existence of records withheld as exempt records must be disclosed to the requester. Sanders v. State (2010) (citing to PAWS II). See Chapter 1.7E.


Exemptions under the PRA have been classified by the Washington Supreme Court as being of two primary types: categorical, meaning that a particular type of information or record is exempt; and conditional, meaning that exempting a record depends on the effect on a privacy right or government interest. Resident Action Council v. Seattle Housing Authority (2013). Categorical exemptions create a presumption that the record is generally exempt which can be overcome if a court finds the exemption is “clearly unnecessary” to protect privacy rights or government interests. RCW 42.56.210(2); Resident Action Council v. Seattle Housing Authority (2013).

Exemptions within the PRA can be "permissive rather than mandatory." 1980 Att’y Gen. Op. No. 1; Doe v. Washington State Patrol (2016). Therefore, an agency has the discretion to disclose an exempt record under the PRA. For records subject to “other statutes,” however, an agency may be required to withhold records if the statute prohibits disclosure. Doe v. Washington State Patrol (2016). In addition, there are categories of requests where disclosure is prohibited unless certain conditions are met and where an agency has no discretion to disclose the record. For example, agencies may not produce lists of individuals in response to requests made for commercial purposes under RCW 42.56.070(9) as addressed above in Chapter 1.6A.

Other statutes incorporated into the PRA use a variety of terms such as “confidential,” “privileged,” “not discoverable or admissible,” or “shall not be disclosed,” to create exemptions. “Other statutes”
can be found in state laws, federal laws and regulations, and court rules and need not address the PRA. See, e.g., *Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. University of Wash* (1994) ("PAWS II") (other state laws); *O'Connor v. DSHS* (2001) (court rules); *Ameriquest v. Office of the Attorney General* (2013)(federal laws and rules). If another statute does not conflict with the PRA and either exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific public records in their entirety; then the records may be withheld despite the redaction requirements in *RCW 42.56.210*(1). *Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. University of Wash* (1994) ("PAWS II"). Other statutes outside the PRA typically prohibit disclosure and may impose penalties if the prohibition is violated. See, for example, Chapter 70.02 RCW (Health Care Information Act), Chapter 13.50 RCW (Juvenile Records Act), *RCW 82.32.330* (state excise tax records), and *RCW 74.04.060* (public assistance records). To qualify as an “other statute,” the law outside the PRA must make it clear that the information is exempt or that an agency is prohibited from producing a record. When a law states only what “must” or “may” be disclosed by an agency, an exemption for information not referenced is not inferred or implied. *Doe v. Washington State Patrol* (2016). While some other statutes provide an “alternative method” outside the PRA to produce records, it is not necessary to do so in order to qualify as an “other statute” under *RCW 42.56.070*(1). *Fisher Broadcasting v. City of Seattle* (2014).

The Washington State Constitution grants the Governor a qualified gubernatorial privilege in response to a PRA request for policymaking communications with advisors. *Freedom Foundation v. Gregoire* (2013). The state constitution also exempts entirely from production copies of ballots because redaction would not eliminate the risk of identifying voters which would contravene constitutional, statutory and regulatory protections for ballot secrecy, as the courts held in *White v. Skagit County and Island County* (2015); and *White v. Clark County* (2015).

The descriptions of exemptions below address both exemptions found in the PRA as well as “other statute” exemptions related to the records addressed. This Chapter does not address all exemptions in detail but instead focuses on those that are most frequently applied or have been interpreted by the courts.

**B. No Stand-Alone "Privacy" Exemption**

The PRA does not have a stand-alone “privacy” exemption. The PRA has a description of when privacy is invaded, described at *RCW 42.56.050*, but that statute is not an exemption. *RCW 42.56.050* expressly states that it does not, by itself, “create any right of privacy beyond those rights that are specified in this chapter as express exemptions from the public's right to inspect, examine, or copy public records.” *RCW 42.56.050* also explains that, when an exemption within the PRA protects “privacy,” it allows withholding only if disclosure: (1) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public. This two-part test requires proof of both elements. *King County v. Sheehan* (2002).

An agency exempting information from a record must do so based upon some statute other than *RCW 42.56.050* (See Chapter 2.1A above). Some exemptions incorporate privacy as one of the
elements that must be met for the exemption to apply, and when they do, an agency then looks to what constitutes an invasion of privacy under RCW 42.56.050, RCW 42.56.230(3), RCW 42.56.230(4), and RCW 42.56.240(1). For example, personal information in agency employee files is exempt if disclosure would violate the employee's right to "privacy." RCW 42.56.230(3). The Washington Supreme Court has found that privacy is a guiding principle for the creation and application of certain exemptions, observing that “PRA’s exemptions are provided solely to protect relevant privacy rights or vital government interest that sometimes outweigh the PRA’s broad policy in favor of disclosing records.” Resident Action Council v. Seattle Housing Authority (2013). When records are exempt in their entirety under a statute, the issue of whether an identified individual’s right to privacy would be violated need not be addressed. Planned Parenthood v. Bloedow (2015). In Predisik v. Spokane School District No. 81 (2015), a case involving public employees, the Supreme Court further explained that a person has a right to privacy under the PRA only in matters concerning the person’s “private life.” In Does v. King County (2015), the court found that individuals did not have a right to privacy when they were captured on surveillance video of a public area.

2.2 There Are Several Types of Exemptions

A. Exemptions of General Applicability

1. Deliberative Process and Drafts: RCW 42.56.280

Preliminary drafts or recommendations, notes and intra-agency communications may be withheld by an agency if they pertain to the agency’s deliberative process and show the exchange of opinions within an agency before it reaches a decision or takes an action. The purpose of this exemption limits its scope. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. University of Wash., (1994)(“PAWS II”); Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe (1978). Its purpose is to "protect the give and take of deliberations necessary to formulation of agency policy." Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe (1978); Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. University of Wash., (1994) (“PAWS II”). This exemption only protects records during a limited window of time while the action is “pending,” and the withheld records are no longer exempt after final action is taken.

The test to determine whether a record is covered by this exemption has been summarized by the Washington Supreme Court as follows:

In order to rely on this exemption, an agency must show that the records contain predecisional opinions or recommendations of subordinates expressed as part of a deliberative process; that disclosure would be injurious to the deliberative or consultative function of the process; that disclosure would inhibit the flow of recommendations, observations, and opinions; and finally, that the materials covered by the exemption reflect policy recommendations and opinions and not raw factual data on which a decision is based.
PAWS II. It is not, however, required that documents be prepared by subordinates to be exempt.


The exemption applies only to documents that are part of the deliberative or policy-making process; records about implementing policy are not covered. Cowles Publishing v. City of Spokane (1993). For this reason, inter-agency (as opposed to intra-agency) discussions probably are not covered by this exemption. Columbian Publishing Co. v. City of Vancouver (1983).

Matters that are factual, or that are assumed to be factual for discussion purposes, must be disclosed. Brouillet v. Cowles Publishing Co (1990); Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe (1978) (description of a taxpayer's home by a field assessor treated as fact by agency appraisers). Thus, unless disclosure of the records would reveal or expose the deliberative process, as distinct from the facts used to make a decision, the exemption does not apply. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe (1978).

Additionally, under this statute, records are not exempt if “publicly cited in connection with an agency action.” Therefore, an evaluation of a real property site requested by a city attorney was not exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process exemption where it was cited as the basis for a final action. Overlake Fund v. City of Bellevue (1991). Subjective evaluations are not exempt under this exemption if they are treated as raw factual data and not subject to further deliberation and consideration. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. University of Wash (1994) (“PAWS II”); Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe (1978).

Importantly, once the policies or recommendations are implemented, those recommendations, drafts, and opinions cease to be protected under this exemption. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. University of Wash (1994) (“PAWS II”).

2. Litigation and Legal Information

a. “Controversy” Exemption: RCW 42.56.290

This provision exempts records related to a controversy involving the agency as a party in a lawsuit where records would not be available to other parties under the court rules. A “controversy” covered by this exemption includes threatened, actual, or completed litigation. Dawson v. Daly (1993).

If an agency is a party to a controversy, the agency may withhold records that normally would be privileged under litigation discovery rules (commonly called the “work product” doctrine). A document is work product if an attorney prepares it in confidence and in anticipation of litigation or it is prepared by another at the attorney’s request. For example, a study of the economic viability of hotels of various sizes, commissioned by a city attorney’s office to determine the city's potential liability for a constitutional takings claim, qualified as work product and was insulated from
disclosure. *Overlake Fund v. City of Bellevue* (1993). Notes of interviews conducted by an investigator at the attorney’s direction are protected if the records are relevant to and reasonably connected to an anticipated lawsuit even if the controversy is not identified in the records and the lawsuit has not yet been filed. See *Soter v. Cowles Publishing Co.* (2007) and see generally Public Records: The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine – Guidance on Recurring Issues (Washington State Attorney General’s Office) (Dec. 1, 2004).

b. Attorney/Client Privileged Records: **RCW 5.60.060(2)**

In addition to the PRA exemption for records related to a controversy, information in records may be exempt from production if it constitutes privileged attorney-client communications. The Washington Supreme Court in *Hangartner v. City of Seattle* (2004) ruled that RCW 5.60.060(2), the statute codifying the common law attorney-client privilege, is an “other statute” exemption under RCW 42.56.070(1). Accordingly, records or portions of records covered by the attorney-client privilege are exempt under the PRA. See generally WAC 44-14-06002(3). This privilege protects communications and advice between attorneys and their clients but not records prepared for reasons other than communicating with an attorney. See *Morgan v. City of Federal Way* (2009) and *Sanders v. State* (2010).

c. Mediation Communications: **RCW 42.56.600**

Communications in the context of mediation that are privileged under chapter 7.07 RCW are exempt from production. RCW 7.07.070 states that mediation communications are confidential as agreed by the parties or as covered by other laws.

3. Security and Terrorism: **RCW 42.56.420**

RCW 42.56.420 exempts records based on the impact disclosure may have on physical or information security. This statute exempts the following categories of records:

1. Records designed to respond to criminal terrorist acts, when release could significantly disrupt the conduct of government and are substantially likely to threaten public safety including vulnerability assessments and plans and records exempt under federal law

2. Vulnerability assessments and emergency or escape response plans at correctional facilities or secure treatment facilities for civilly committed sexually violent predators

3. Comprehensive safe school plans

4. Information about the infrastructure and security of computer and telecommunications networks that, if released, would increase risk to their confidentiality, integrity or availability

5. System security and emergency preparedness plans for transportation systems
(6) Personally identifiable and security information of employees of private cloud service providers which have entered into Criminal Justice Information Systems (CJIS) agreements (added in 2016).

In *Northwest Gas Association v. Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission* (2007), the Court of Appeals interpreted subsection (1) of this statute to exempt pipeline shapefile data because the information was initially collected and then maintained to prevent, mitigate or respond to criminal terrorist acts. However, in *Does v. King County* (2015), the Court of Appeals rejected a claim of exemption for campus surveillance videos under the same subsection because the university did not meet the burden of showing a substantial likelihood of threatening public safety. The university had alleged that disclosure would allow others to evade its security system or commit similar crimes in the future.

**B. Personal Information**

"Personal information" is information that is "peculiar or proper to private concerns." *Lindeman v. Kelso School Dist. No. 458* (2007). Although the PRA is intended to enable citizens to retain sovereignty over government and to demand full access to information relating to our government's activities, the PRA was “not intended to make it easier for the public to obtain personal information about individuals who have become subject to government action due to personal factors.... Such personal information generally has no bearing on how our government operates.” *Lindeman; DeLong v. Parmelee* (2010). “Personal information” has a different meaning than “privacy.” *Lindeman*. Some exemptions list what is “personal information” and some exemptions also include invasion of “privacy” as a required element. The discussion of “invasion of privacy” is in Chapter 2.1B.

1. **Student, Institutional Residents, and Public Assistance Records:**  
   **RCW 42.56.230(1)**

This exemption covers “personal information” held by agencies in files kept for public assistance or public health clients, students, and residents of public institutions. Although a record may include information about such persons, the information might not satisfy all the provisions of the exemption and thus that information would not be exempt from production. For example, a surveillance video recorded on a school bus was not considered to be “personal information” maintained in a student file and was found to not be exempt under this provision. *Lindeman v. Kelso School Dist. No. 458* (2007). As an exception to this exemption, in *Oliver v. Harborview Med. Ctr.* (1980), a patient was allowed copies of her own medical records. (Note that since the decision in *Oliver*, disclosure of health care records is now addressed in specific statutes at RCW 42.56.360 and the statutes listed there include chapter 70.02 RCW. See more detailed discussion of health care records in Chapter 2.2F).
2. Child Information: **RCW 42.56.230(2)**

Personal information of children is exempt from production when held in licensed child care files of the Department of Early Learning and by any other public or nonprofit program serving or applying to children or students, including parks and recreation and after-school programs, except that emergency contact information can be produced in emergency situations. For family members or guardians of these children, their personal information is exempt if they have the same last name as the child or if they live at the same address and the disclosure would reveal exempt personal information of the child. For exemptions applying to other records of children, see Chapter 2.2G1 below.

3. Personal Information of Public Employees: **RCW 42.56.230(3)**
   (See Chapter 2.2C below)

4. Taxpayer Information: **RCW 42.56.230(4)**

This exemption applies to various categories of information about taxpayers, including property, sales and excise tax, and incorporates the prohibitions in RCW 84.08.210, RCW 82.32.330, RCW 84.40.020, RCW 84.40.340, or a city B&O tax ordinance authorized under RCW 35.102.145. The most common prohibition applied here is RCW 82.32.330, which provides that tax returns (filed with the Department of Revenue) and other tax information about a specific or identifiable taxpayer are confidential and may not be disclosed, subject to specific exceptions. In RCW 42.56.210(1), the PRA provides that information exempt under these laws is not subject to redaction, meaning that the information can be withheld in its entirety. The law in RCW 82.32.330(3)(k) also prohibits the Department of Revenue from disclosing lists of tax payers for a commercial purpose.

In addition, information is exempt if it would violate the taxpayer’s right to privacy or cause unfair competitive disadvantage. See *Van Buren v. Miller* (1979) (information relied upon by the assessor to make valuation is not private); *Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe* (1978). In *Hoppe v. King County* (2011), the Court of Appeals affirmed that, when these tax exemptions apply, redaction of identifying information from these records cannot make these documents disclosable and would not prevent the competitive disadvantage to taxpayers if the records were released. Significant potential penalties apply to the improper release of taxpayer information in RCW 82.32.330(6), including loss of ability to hold public employment in Washington state for two years.

5. Financial Information: **RCW 42.56.230(5)**

This exemption for banking and financial information is designed to limit the risk of identity theft and protects account numbers and information such as social security numbers, taxpayer identification numbers, drivers’ license numbers and other information listed in the definition of financial information in RCW 9.35.005(1). Disclosure can occur if required by other law. Note that
unauthorized release of some of these identifiers by an agency is considered a security breach under RCW 42.56.590, imposing notification and other obligations on an agency.

6. Small Loan Information: **RCW 42.56.230(6)**

This exemption protects personal and financial information about borrowers held in the Department of Financial Institutions database that licensed lenders consult to determine if they are eligible to receive a small loan.

7. Vehicle Licensing Applications: **RCW 42.56.230(7)**

Records provided by applicants for driver’s licenses or state identicards to prove identity and other factors is protected from disclosure, as is information that shows a person failed to register with the selective service. Vehicle and boat registration or licensing records are exempt if they reveal that a person serves as an undercover law enforcement officer or conducts other types of confidential investigations.

8. Industrial Insurance Structured Settlements: **RCW 42.56.230(8)**

All information related to these agreements is exempt from production under the PRA, except for final orders from the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals.

9. Emergency Systems: **RCW 42.56.230(9)**

In 2015, the Legislature added a provision to exempt database information voluntarily submitted by individuals that becomes part of enhanced 911 emergency communication or notification databases. Use and disclosure of this information is permitted as provided in RCW 38.52.575 and RCW 38.52.577 for various listed operational purposes. Subjects of the information or their authorized representatives may be given access to or copies of their own information.

C. Public Employee Records

1. Exemption of Personal Information: **RCW 42.56.230(3)**

Personal information of employees is exempt if it violates their right to privacy as defined in RCW 42.56.050. What is determined to be personal information of public employees continues to evolve through case law. The test to determine if the right to privacy is violated requires a showing that the information about an employee would be “highly offensive” if disclosed and is not of “legitimate” public concern. Therefore, the application of this exemption can vary depending on the circumstances involved. See *Predisk v. Spokane School District No. 81* (2015) (privacy right under PRA depends upon the types of facts disclosed and is not amenable to a bright-line rule). The exemption includes records in files for current and former employees, whether held by an employing agency or other agency, such as a retirement system. *Seattle Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 27 v.*
Hollister (1987); Belenski v. Jefferson County (2015)(former employee records). Courts have analyzed what is “personal information” of public employees in the following areas:

a. **Employees’ Public Conduct**: Disclosure of police officer’s involvement at a bachelor party/strip show at a private club was not highly offensive because the conduct occurred in front of more than 40 people. *Spokane Police Guild v. State Liquor Control Bd.* (1989). Misconduct on the job and off-duty actions that “bear on ability to perform” public office are “not private, intimate, personal details” of a state patrol officer’s life, but are of public concern. *Cowles Pub’g Co. v. State Patrol* (1988).

b. **Employees’ Emails and Text Messages**: Emails and text messages involving public agency business clearly are public records subject to disclosure. However, the “personal information exemption” may apply to information within those emails that would be highly offensive and of no legitimate public interest if released. Even if the content of some employee emails is exempt because it is personal and unrelated to government operations and solely related to the employee’s personal life, information about the number of personal emails sent and the time spent transmitting them is of public concern and should be disclosed. *Tiberino v. Spokane County* (2000). Text messages sent and received from a government employee’s private cell phone are public records if they satisfy the definition of “public record” at RCW 42.56.010(3). *Nissen v. Pierce County* (2015).

c. **Employee Performance Evaluations**: Courts have held disclosure of an employee's performance evaluations with no discussion of specific incidents of misconduct is presumed to be highly offensive and of no legitimate concern to the public. *Dawson v. Daly* (1993); *Brown v. Seattle Public Schools* (1993). Disclosure of this information between a public employee and supervisor normally serves no legitimate public interest and would impair the candidness of evaluations and employee morale if made public to anyone upon request. However, the performance evaluation of a city manager - the city's chief executive officer, its leader, and a public figure - was not exempt because it was of legitimate concern to the public. *Spokane Research & Defense Fund v. City of Spokane* (2000).

d. **Personnel Complaints and Investigations**: Multiple court opinions have addressed the disclosure of personnel investigations. If the misconduct is substantiated or disciplinary action has been taken, these records are to be disclosed because they are of legitimate interest to the public, even if embarrassing to the employee. See *Brouillet v. Cowles Publishing Co* (1990)(records of teacher certificate revocation records are of legitimate public interest); *Morgan v. Federal Way* (2009)(investigated and substantiated allegations of inappropriate behavior by a municipal court judge in dealing with others are of “substantial” public interest). In *Bellevue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist.* (2008), the Washington Supreme Court confirmed that teachers have no right to privacy in complaints of sexual misconduct that are substantiated or when disciplinary action is taken. The *Bellevue John Does* decision also held that disclosing “letters of direction” discussing alleged misconduct that was not substantiated is not “highly offensive” to the employee if
identifying information is redacted. Unsubstantiated allegations are considered “personal information” that can be exempt from production if the standard of the “right to privacy” in RCW 42.56.050 is met.

The Washington Supreme Court further addressed the issue of the extent to which unsubstantiated allegations can be disclosed in Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup (2011). In that case, the requester asked for the records regarding an investigation of sexual misconduct by a police officer by name. The court held that the unsubstantiated allegation of such misconduct was “personal information” and release would be “highly offensive” if released, but that the public’s legitimate concern in the investigation would be satisfied by redacting the identity of the officer. The Washington Supreme Court has also held that records showing employees on administrative leave while their employer investigates allegations of misconduct, but which do not describe the allegations, do not implicate the privacy rights of the employees and must be disclosed. Predisik v. Spokane Sch. Dist. No. 81 (2015). In West v. Port of Olympia (2014), the Court of Appeals held that unsubstantiated allegations concerning accounting procedures, disposal of environmentally sensitive materials, and violation of port policies regarding working on holidays would not be highly offensive to the reasonable person and thus would be disclosed. Identities of high-ranking police officials was found to be of greater interest to the public and of legitimate public concern with fewer privacy rights attached even when misconduct was not established in City of Fife v. Hicks (2015).

e. Employee Whistleblowers: The identity of state employees filing complaints with an ethics board or making a whistleblower complaint to the state auditor or other public official is protected from disclosure under RCW 42.56.240(11).

f. Other Types of Employee Information:

Settlement Agreements. Settlement agreements between employees and their employer are of legitimate public concern and must be disclosed, even if they were intended to be confidential. But information in a settlement agreement is exempt from production under a public records request based on the right to privacy, if it concerns intimate details of employee’s personal and/or private life. Yakima Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Yakima (1995).

Salary and Benefit Information. Salary and benefit information of public employees is normally open to the public, Tacoma Pub. Library v. Woessner (1998), except that salary survey information collected from private employers used for state ferry employees is exempt under RCW 42.56.250(7).

Other Information. The extent to which information about employees can be considered to be private and of no legitimate concern to the public has not been fully defined but has been addressed as applying to intimate details of personal life that a person “does not expose to the public eye, but keeps entirely to himself or at most reveals only to his family or close personal friends.” Bellevue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. (2008). The discussion of
“invasion of privacy” is in Chapter 2.1B. Information that could be protected includes health information, marital status, disability, and reasonable accommodations. However, the ability to use a list of the names and ranks of law enforcement officers to locate other publicly available information that could reveal private information about the officers was not accepted as a basis to exempt that list under the PRA. *King County v. Sheehan* (2002).

2. Test and Exam Questions: **RCW 42.56.250(1)**

“Test questions, scoring keys, and other examination data used to administer a license, employment, or academic examination” are exempt because disclosure would give an undue advantage to applicants for licenses or jobs.

3. Applicants for Public Employment: **RCW 42.56.250(2)**

Names of applicants and their job applications and accompanying materials are exempt. See *Beltran v. Dep't Social & Health Services* (1999).

If an applicant is hired, some agencies do not consider this exemption to apply to that applicant’s records. Instead, the agencies look to exemptions such as RCW 42.56.230(3) and RCW 42.56.250(3) to decide whether or not to redact personal information from these records.

4. Public Employees’ Home Information and Identification: **RCW 42.56.250(3) and (8)**

For public employees, volunteers, and individual home health care workers, this section exempts their home addresses and telephone numbers, personal cell phone numbers and email addresses, social security and driver’s licenses or state identicard numbers, and emergency contact information. For their dependents, similar information is exempt except that dates of birth are added as exempt and driver’s license and identicard numbers are not listed as exempt. For employees of criminal justice agencies, their photographs and month and year of birth are also exempt, except if requested by the news media. This section is intended to protect these employees from the offender population, as shown by the exclusion from the definition of news media of persons held in custody of these agencies.

The statute provides that this exemption applies to information held in personnel and employment-related records. However, personal email addresses of city councilmembers used to conduct city business were found not to be exempt, because they were not part of personnel records or employment-related records. *Mechling v. City of Monroe* (2009).

5. Discrimination and Unfair Labor Practice Investigations: **RCW 42.56.250(4) and (5)**
Identification of employees seeking advice to determine their rights about possible claims of discrimination against them is exempt when employees ask that their names be withheld; no showing of a risk of harm is required as is required for criminal investigations. RCW 42.56.250(4). Additionally, all records compiled during investigations by employers into unfair labor practices or employment discrimination claims are specifically stated to be exempt while those investigations are in process. RCW 42.56.250(5).

D. Several Exemptions Relate to Law Enforcement Information

1. Investigative Records: RCW 42.56.240(1)

The PRA exempts “intelligence information” and “specific investigative records” compiled by investigative, law enforcement, penology, and professional disciplinary agencies if the information is “essential to effective law enforcement” or needed to protect a person’s privacy rights. "Specific . . . investigative records" are the result of an investigation focusing on a particular person, Laborers Int’l Union of North America, Local No. 374 v. City of Aberdeen (1982), or an investigation to ferret out criminal activity or to shed light on specific misconduct. Dawson v. Daly (1993); Columbian Publishing v. City of Vancouver (1983); City of Fife v. Hicks (2015). If a law enforcement agency maintains reports as part of a routine administrative procedure, and not as the result of a specific complaint or allegation of misconduct, the reports are not investigative records within the terms of this exemption. For example, "Use of Force Administrative Reports" prepared by police whenever there is contact between a K-9 unit dog and a person were held not within the investigative information exemption. Cowles Publishing v. City of Spokane (1993).

"Investigative, law enforcement, and penology agencies" are agencies having authority to investigate and penalize, such as the police, the police internal affairs investigation unit, the Public Disclosure Commission, medical disciplinary boards, or a local health department. An investigative agency may exempt only those records made in its investigative function. Columbian Publishing v. City of Vancouver (1983) (a general inquiry into agency personnel matters is not an "investigation" as contemplated by the PRA, even if it's performed by law enforcement officers).

Case law under this section has focused more on criminal and law enforcement agencies and less on professional disciplinary agencies. A personnel investigation by a criminal justice agency that is not acting in its law enforcement capacity will be scrutinized to determine the impact on any law enforcement activities of the agency. For example, Department of Corrections’ investigations of its medical staff’s conduct were held not to be “essential to effective law enforcement” and could not be exempted under the narrow application of RCW 42.56.240(1). Prison Legal News, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corrections (2005). However, while records of allegations involving “purely a personnel matter” would not be subject to the investigative exemption in RCW 42.56.240(1), allegations against police officials that go further in claiming malfeasance or violations of law qualify as investigative records under this exemption. City of Fife v. Hicks (2015).
For a civil law enforcement agency investigating violations of safety laws, the Washington Supreme Court found that the same risks of disclosing sensitive information in a criminal context does not exist in the civil context. *Wade’s Eastside Gun Shop v. Department of Labor and Industries* (2016). While the exemption may be able to be claimed under some circumstances, the Court found the agency could not rely on a categorical exemption for records of civil law enforcement activities such as safety violations under RCW 42.56.240(1). The employers knew that they were being investigated so the nondisclosure could not be claimed to be essential to effective law enforcement. See also *Brouillet v. Cowles Publishing Co.* (1990) (revocation of teacher certificates was not exempt).

The contents of an open, ongoing criminal investigation are generally exempt from production under a public records request because premature disclosure could jeopardize the investigation. *Newman v. King County* (1997); *Ashley v. Washington State Public Disclosure Comm’n* (1977). Because the categorical exemption applies only to open investigations, once the investigation is completed, available records must be produced unless another exemption applies. *Sargent v. Seattle Police Department* (2013). If an agency claims a categorical exemption to deny the records of a criminal investigation, the PRA statute of limitations may not be tolled if it is found that the investigation was not active and ongoing at the time of the denial. *White v. City of Lakewood* (2016). For more information on the application of the statute of limitations, see Chapter 1.8D above.

Once an investigation is complete, the records are no longer categorically exempt. After a criminal case is referred to a prosecutor for a charging decision, the investigation is considered complete and the records of the investigation are no longer categorically exempt even if the matter is later referred back for additional investigation. *Sargent v. Seattle Police Department* (2013). Instead, if the investigation is complete, the records cannot be withheld in their entirety under RCW 42.56.240(1) unless the law enforcement agency can prove that nondisclosure of the particular record is essential to effective law enforcement, or disclosure would violate a person’s right to privacy or another exemption applies. *Id.* Additionally, the exemption does not apply categorically to criminal investigation records that are part of a related internal investigation; the agency has the burden of proving any withheld parts of internal files are essential to effective law enforcement. *Id.*

An agency may withhold specific records of completed investigations if their disclosure would jeopardize witnesses or discourage potential sources of information from coming forward in the future. *Cowles Publ’g Co. v. State Patrol* (1988); *Tacoma News, Inc. v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Dep’t* (1989). The names of complainants, witnesses, and officers contained in police internal investigation unit (IIU) files of sustained complaints are exempt because the IIU process is vital to law enforcement, and officers would be reluctant to be candid if they thought their identities would be disclosed. *Cowles Publ’g Co. v. State Patrol* (1988). In *City of Fife v. Hicks* (2015), Court of Appeals found that a generalized statement that future witnesses may be reluctant to come forward is not sufficient to protect the identities of witnesses in the investigation. Instead, the agency must provide specifics about how disclosing these identities would impact effective law enforcement. However, identifying information of a witness who is requesting the records should not be redacted.
The substance of the completed investigative files is, however, not categorically exempt if another exemption does not apply. *Cowles Pub’g Co. v. State Patrol* (1988). When the identity of the officer who was the subject of the investigation is well known through other sources, exemption of the name is not essential to effective law enforcement. *Ames v. City of Fircrest* (1993). The Cowles court held that the redaction of officers’ names in the IIU files was not necessary to protect their privacy. In *City of Fife v. Hicks* (2015), the court held that the identity of high-ranking police officials who were the subject of an investigation is inherently a matter of greater interest to the public and that the names should be released even if the allegations were not substantiated.

Some agencies may have an investigative records exemption outside the PRA. See, for example, the exemption for investigative records of the Office of the Developmental Disabilities Ombuds, RCW 43.382.040; and of the Long Term Care Ombuds Program in RCW 43.190.110.

2. Identity of Complainants, Witnesses, and Victims: RCW 42.56.240(2) and RCW 42.56.240(5)

The identity of victims and witnesses is potentially protected by different provisions in this part of the PRA. *Sargent v. Seattle Police Department* (2013). Under RCW 42.56.240(1), addressed above, disclosure can be prevented due to the chilling effect on other witnesses if their identity will be disclosed which would impair effective law enforcement. Also in RCW 42.56.240(1), there is a “privacy prong” when nondisclosure is “essential for the protection of any person’s right to privacy” which may allow an agency to exempt information about witnesses or victims when disclosure would be highly offensive and of no legitimate public interest as defined in RCW 42.56.050. *Does v. King County* (2015). Under RCW 42.56.240(2), witness and victim identities can be protected if “disclosure would endanger any person’s life, physical safety, or property.” Further, if the witness or victim requests nondisclosure of his or her identity, the identity can presumptively be withheld. Note, however, that when victims and witnesses request their identity be protected under RCW 42.56.240(2), the entire surveillance video cannot be withheld but only that information identifying the victim or witness can be redacted as held in *Does v. King County* (2015). Also in that case, the Court upheld the finding that redacting by “black boxes” overly obscured the non-exempt part of the videos and that pixelating faces was sufficient to prevent disclosure of identity.

The agency has the burden of showing that the requirements of these exemptions are met, and it cannot assert a categorical exemption for this information. A general allegation of the potential chilling effect on witnesses is not sufficient to support an exemption under RCW 42.56.240(1) based on the potential impact on effective law enforcement. To support an exemption under RCW 42.56.240(2), the agency must “make an affirmative showing that disclosure entails a potential threat to safety or property” or, alternatively, that there was a “specific request from a witness for nondisclosure of personal information.” *Sargent v. Seattle Police Department* (2013).

For child victims of sexual assault, RCW 42.56.240(5) lists specific items of identifying information that are to be redacted from records, including the relationship with the alleged perpetrator. In *Koenig v. City of Des Moines* (2006), the court held that this statute requires disclosure of victim
information with redaction only of the specified identifiers, even if the requester knows the identity of the child victim and requests the record by the victim’s name. Personal details of the assault cannot be redacted on the basis of embarrassment or violation of right to privacy.

3. Sex Offender Records: RCW 4.24.550, RCW 42.56.240(3), RCW 42.56.240(8), RCW 71.09.080

Law enforcement investigative reports on sex offenders that are transferred to the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs are exempt under RCW 42.56.240(3). The Association must refer requesters to local law enforcement agencies when it receives a request for these reports but has no further obligation to respond. Information submitted to the statewide sex offender and notification program by persons asking to be notified about the release of a registered sex offender is exempt under RCW 42.56.240(8).

In response to a class action by sex offenders, the Washington Supreme Court held that the community protection act in RCW 4.24.550 does not qualify as an “other statute” to prohibit disclosure of this information. Doe v. Washington State Patrol (2016). While this statute outlines what information agencies may or must disclose to notify the public about these offenders to promote community safety, the Court held that the statute did not create an exemption and did not explicitly prohibit release of other information about the offenders. The Court further found no legislative intent to protect confidentiality of the identities of these offenders. In RCW 70.48.100(4), booking photos and information in jail registers of persons convicted of sex offenders are also subject to disclosure, referencing what is permitted under RCW 4.24.550.

In Koenig v. Thurston County (2012), the Washington Supreme Court held that special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) evaluations and impact statements from victims of sex offenders were not exempt under the PRA as investigative records under RCW 42.56.240(1). Not all records held by a prosecutor are protected by this exemption. Victim impact statements and SSOSA evaluations are not designed or intended to uncover or investigate criminal activity but instead are used to determine an appropriate penalty for an offender and thus cannot be exempted under this statute.

The medical and treatment records of sexually violent predators who have been civilly confined to secure facilities at the end of criminal sentences are protected from disclosure except to the committed persons, their attorneys, and others involved in the system who have a need for the records. RCW 71.09.080(3). Additionally, these individuals are considered to be residents of state institutions whose personal information is subject to the exemption in RCW 42.56.230(1).

4. Criminal Records Privacy Act (Chapter 10.97 RCW)

This act deals with disclosure of "criminal history record information," which is defined as information contained in records collected on individuals by criminal justice agencies, other than courts. RCW 10.97.030(1). These documents include identifiable descriptions and records of arrests,
detentions, indictments, and criminal charges, and any dispositions, including sentences, correctional supervision, and release. The definition of “criminal history record information” excludes “intelligence, analytical or investigative reports and files,” which are covered by the exemptions in RCW 42.56.240(1), discussed in Chapter 2.2D1. RCW 10.97.030(1)(h). An agency may freely disclose criminal history record information which pertains to an incident that occurred within the last twelve months for which a person is currently being processed by the criminal justice system. RCW 10.97.050(2). Also, "conviction data" may be disseminated freely at any time. RCW 10.97.050(1). "Nonconviction data" may not be copied by the public, but may be inspected without copying if it is not subject to any PRA disclosure exemption. Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup (2011).

Additionally, the subject of the records can inspect and review the records and can obtain a copy of personal nonconviction data if the criminal justice agency has verified the person’s identity. RCW 10.97.080. This statute provides that the PRA must not be construed to allow any other copying of nonconviction data.

The Court of Appeals found an agency violated the PRA by denying an inmate copies of that inmate’s FBI and Washington State Patrol “rap sheets.” Adams v. Department of Corrections (2015). Denial to the inmate, the subject of the record, was not supported by RCW 10.97.050 and federal law including 28 U.S.C. § 534 and the agency erred in relying on its agreements with law enforcement agencies and past practices.

5. Video and Sound Recordings: RCW 9.73.090, RCW 42.56.240(14)

In Fisher Broadcasting Co. v. Seattle (2014), the Washington Supreme Court found RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) to be an “other statute” which temporarily exempts some dashboard camera recordings from production. The Court held that the law prohibited duplication of sound or video recordings until final resolution of any criminal or civil litigation arising from the recorded events.

In 2016, the Legislature acted to address the multiple issues arising out of the use of and the disclosure of the recordings of body worn cameras by law enforcement and correction agencies in RCW 42.56.240(14). For those agencies that have started a body camera program as of June 9, 2016, recordings are exempt from production under the PRA if nondisclosure is essential to protect any person’s right to privacy. If an agency has not deployed a body camera program by June 9, 2016, the new body camera exemption cannot be used.

Recordings are presumed to be highly offensive if they depict:

- Medical or counseling facilities where patients are treated or health care information is shared
- Health care information protected by state or federal laws
- Interiors of residences
- Intimate images
• Minors
• Bodies of deceased individuals
• Communications from and identifies of witnesses or victims of domestic violence or sexual assault
• Location of domestic violence programs or emergency shelters.

Note that, even if a recording is presumed to be highly offensive, the agency must still meet the second prong of the privacy test and show that the recording is not of legitimate concern to the public.

Public records requests for these recordings must:

• Identify the name of an individual involved in the incident
• Give the incident or case number
• State the date, time and location of the incident or
• Identify a law enforcement or correction officer involved in the incident.

Requesters must pay for the costs of redacting or obscuring the recording as needed to apply exemptions, with exceptions for persons involved in the incident, their attorneys, or where the recording is relevant to a criminal case or claim of denial of civil rights or if the request is made by certain Washington state commissions. Recoverable costs include time spent redacting but agencies must use the least costly available technology to the extent reasonable and possible. Requesters who sue a law enforcement agency under the PRA cannot receive fees, costs or penalties unless the agency acted in bad faith or with gross negligence.

6. Jail Register: RCW 70.48.100

The register containing the names of persons confined in jail, the reason for confinement, and dates of confinement, is open to the public, but other records of a person confined in jail are confidential. These records are to be made available only to criminal justice agencies or the courts, for inspections, in jail certification proceedings, to certain listed agencies for research, to government agencies to determine eligibility for and to provide medical treatment or veterans' services, or with the written permission of the confined individual. Booking photographs of an arrested person or person confined in jail, while confidential, may be used by law enforcement to assist in investigating crimes. RCW 70.48.100(3); Cowles Pub’g Co. v. Spokane Police Dep’t (1999).

7. Miscellaneous Law Enforcement-Related Exemptions

a. Concealed pistol licenses: RCW 42.56.240(4)
b. Statewide, local or regional gang database: RCW 42.56.240(6)
c. Electronic sales tracking system for ephedrine and related products: RCW 42.56.240(7)
d. Security alarm system and vacation crime watch program participants: RCW 42.56.240(9)
e. Felony firearm conviction database: RCW 42.56.240(10)
f. Security threat group information at DOC: RCW 42.56.240(12)
g. Global positioning data showing location of residence of criminal justice agency employees and workers: RCW 42.56.240(13)
h. Data and records in the statewide sexual assault kit tracking system: RCW 42.56.240(15)

E. Certain Business-Related Information is Exempt

1. Real Estate Appraisals and Certain Other Real Estate Lease or Purchase Records: RCW 42.56.260

Real estate appraisals for or by an agency to buy or sell real property are exempt under the PRA for no more than three years. Also exempt are: documents prepared for considering the selection of a site when public knowledge would cause a likelihood of increased price, and documents prepared for considering the minimum price for sale or lease of real estate when public knowledge would cause a likelihood of decreased price, unless disclosure is mandated under another statute, or certain other actions with respect to the property have occurred.

2. Research, Intellectual Property, and Proprietary Information; RCW 42.56.270, Other Laws

a. Valuable Formula, Designs, Drawings, Research: RCW 42.56.270(1)

As a general provision applying to any agency, this statute protects “valuable formulae, designs, drawings, and research” data for five years after obtained by the agency. However, withholding the records is permitted only if disclosure would “produce private gain and public loss.” The purpose of this exemption is to prevent the taking of potentially valuable intellectual property held by an agency. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. University of Wash. (1994) (PAWS II).

Valuable formula or research data may include, for example, material in an unfunded grant proposal, including raw data and guiding hypotheses that structure data (id.), and a cash flow analysis prepared by a consultant to assist an agency to negotiate lease rates for potential developers of agency properties. Servais v. Port of Bellingham (1995). In Servais, the court held the cash flow analysis to be exempt because private developers would benefit by insight into the port’s negotiating position to the detriment of the public if the record was disclosed.

Research data, which is not limited to scientific or technical information, means facts and information collected for a specific purpose and derived from close study or from scholarly or scientific investigation or inquiry. This information is exempt from production under the PRA, if the disclosure would result in private gain and public loss. Id., see also Evergreen Freedom Fdn. v. Locke
b. Trade Secrets: Ch. 19.108 RCW

Intellectual and proprietary information may be exempt under the Washington Trade Secrets Act, chapter 19.108 RCW. Servais v. Port of Bellingham (1995). This Act qualifies as an “other statute” that may exempt or prohibit disclosure under RCW 42.56.070(1). Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. UW (1994) (PAWS II). Information submitted by a law firm in response to the request for qualifications and quotations from the Washington State Investment Board was held not to be exempt as a trade secret under RCW 19.108.010(4) because it was not shown to be unique, innovative or novel. Further, the fee and costs proposal was not subject to protection as financial and commercial proprietary information under RCW 42.56.270(1), (6), or (11). Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd, LLP v. Office of Attorney General (2014).


Agencies may need to consider federal copyright laws when providing copies of materials that are subject to copyright protection under 17 U.S.C. § 106. This issue may arise where private entities have copyrighted their work, such as building plans provided under contract. But there are exceptions for “fair use” of copyrighted material to allow it to be reproduced or inspected without consent of the copyright holder under 17 U.S.C. 106. An agency may notify the holder of the copyright of the request. RCW 42.56.540. See, for example, Lindberg v. Kitsap Cy. (1996) for a discussion of this issue.

3. Financial and Proprietary Information Supplied to Specific Agencies: RCW 42.56.270(2) – (27)

Other subsections within RCW 42.56.270 apply to financial and commercial information in records submitted to agencies for specific purposes. Each exemption is worded slightly differently, and little case law interprets these exemptions. The kinds of records or agencies affected are listed below by subsection. The language of the specific subsection should be consulted for the scope of the exemption.

(2) Ferry and highway construction

(3) Export services and projects

(4) Economic development loans

(5) Business and industrial development corporations

(6) State Investment Board
(7) Department of Labor and Industries medical aid contractors

(8) Clean Washington Center programs

(9) Public stadium authority

(10) Applications for licenses for horse racing, gambling, liquor, lottery retail, or marijuana producer, processor, or retailer (See: Dragonslayer, Inc. v. Washington State Gambling Commission (2007)).

(11) State purchased health care

(12) Department of Commerce siting decisions

(13) Department of Ecology electronic product recycling program

(14) Life Sciences Discovery Fund Authority grants

(15) Department of Licensing special fuel license applications

(16) Department of Natural Resources mining permit applications

(17) Conservation district farm plans

(18) Health sciences and services authority grants

(19) Identifiable small business impact statements

(20) University of Washington endowment funds

(21) Market share data on electronic product recycling

(22) Registration of small securities offerings

(23) Unaggregated or individual notices of a transfer of crude oil that is financial, proprietary, or commercial information submitted to the Department of Ecology

(26) Financial investment information of city retirement boards

(24) (25) & (27) Marijuana information of the Liquor and Cannabis Board (see Chapter 2.2E7).

4. Public Utilities and Transportation Records: **RCW 42.56.330; RCW 42.56.335**

As summarized below, RCW 42.56.330 provides exemptions for:
(1) Commercial information filed with the Utilities and Transportation Commission or Attorney General – but these records may be disclosed after notice is provided to the subject and if they fail to obtain a court order to protect the records under RCW 80.04.095 or RCW 81.77.210;

(2) Addresses, telephone numbers, electronic contact information and billing information for less than a billing cycle held by a public utility;

(3) Individually identifiable records of members of a vanpool, carpool, or other ride-sharing program;

(4) Identifying information of participants or applicants in a paratransit or other transit service operated for persons with disabilities or the elderly;

(5) Identifying information of persons using transit passes or other fare payment media, except to an entity responsible for payment of any of the cost;

(6) Information collected by use of motor carrier intelligent transportation system or equipment;

(7) Identifying information of person using transponders to pay tolls; and

(8) Identifying information of users of driver’s licenses or identicards including radio frequency identification chip or similar technology for border crossing (“enhanced” licenses).

In RCW 42.56.335, law enforcement is restricted from obtaining records of customers of public utility districts or city utilities unless a written statement is provided stating the customer is suspected of committing a crime and that the records would help determine whether the suspicion is true. This exemption only applies to a specific requester, namely, a law enforcement agency. It was passed in response to the decision in In re Rosier (1986), which limited the ability of law enforcement to engage in “fishing expeditions” through utility records while investigating marijuana growing operations. A telephone request is not sufficient. State v. Maxwell (1990). Voluntary production of information about power consumption does not violate the statute. State v. Maxfield (1994). See also State v. Cole (1995).

5. Agriculture and Livestock Records: RCW 42.56.380; RCW 42.56.610

RCW 42.56.380 exempts various kinds of commercial and proprietary information gathered by regulatory agencies for: (1) organic products; (2) fertilizers and minerals; (3) various agriculture products and livestock commissions and boards; (4) phytosanitary (plant disease) certificates; (5) – (7) marketing activities; (8) financial statements of public livestock markets; (9) herd inventory management; (10) testing for animal diseases; and (11) – (12) import information of livestock exempt under homeland security or other federal law.
In addition, RCW 42.56.610 provides that records obtained by state and local agencies from dairies, animal feeding operations, and concentrated animal feeding operations about discharge elimination system permits can be disclosed only to provide meaningful information to the public, while ensuring confidentiality of business information.

6. Insurance and Financial Institution Records: **RCW 42.56.400**

RCW 42.56.400 exempts from production records to include the following records:

1. Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals records related to appeals of crime victims' compensation claims;

2. Health Care Authority records under RCW 41.05.026 transferred to another state purchased health care program, to a technical review committee created to acquire state purchased health care;

3. Identification of all owners or insureds received by the Insurance Commissioner under chapter 48.102 RCW;

4, 5 and 7 - 24) Information provided to the Insurance Commissioner under various legal requirements;

6. Examination reports and information obtained from regulated institutions by the Department of Financial Institutions;

Various other exemptions exist in this section for records filed with the Insurance Commissioner under the various regulated programs. This section and the cited references in the subsections should be consulted for more detailed information on these exemptions.

7. **Marijuana and Industrial Hemp Information: RCW 42.56.270; RCW 42.56.620; RCW 42.56.625; RCW 42.56.630**

The following information concerning the marijuana industry held by the Liquor and Cannabis Board has been categorized as exempt under the Public Records Act:

- **RCW 42.56.270(24):** Information submitted by licensees or applicants to produce, process, transport or sell marijuana that identifies financial institution, retirement account and building security plans.
- **RCW 42.56.270(25):** Information submitted for tracing of marijuana products consisting of transport information, vehicle and driver identification and account or unique access identifiers.
- **RCW 42.56.620 and RCW 42.56.270(27):** Data in applications and reports by licensed marijuana researchers containing proprietary information.
- **RCW 42.56.625:** Database records of names and personally identifiable information of medical marijuana patients and designated providers.
• **RCW 42.56.630**: Registration information including names and locations of members of medical marijuana cooperatives.

Applications and accompanying information for licenses to grow industrial hemp as part of the research program adopted to determine the feasibility and desirability of industrial hemp production are made exempt under **RCW 15.120.050**, adopted in 2016.

8. **Business Licensing Information: ** **RCW 19.02.115**

Licensing information created or obtained by the Department of Revenue in the business licensing process is confidential, privileged and exempt under **RCW 19.02.115(2)**. As with tax information addressed in Chapter 2.284, the information is not subject to redaction and is withheld in its entirety. Exceptions apply to allow production of records to the licensee and authorized representative, provide statistical information, and sharing with other agencies and law enforcement. Information is made public on the Department of Revenue website and otherwise, identifying information not associated with protected information consisting of the name of licensee, entity type, trade name, business and mailing address, unified business identifier and list of license held with dates of opening, issuance and expiration dates.

F. Health Information Exemptions

1. **Public Health and Health Professional Records: ** **RCW 42.56.350; RCW 42.56.360**

**RCW 42.56.350** exempts from production under the PRA the following records of the Department of Health for licensed health care providers:

(1) The federal Social Security number; and,

(2) The residential address and telephone number if the provider requests the information be withheld and provides a business address and business telephone number unless the provider requests the information be released or as allowed by **RCW 42.56.070(9)**.

**RCW 42.56.360(1)** contains numerous exemptions affecting health care providers and data collected by the Department of Health. Categories of exempt records include:

• (a) and (b) Information about drug samples, legend drugs, or nonresident pharmacies obtained by the pharmacy quality assurance commission.
• (c) Records created for or collected and maintained by a hospital quality improvement, or peer review or quality improvement committee and reports of adverse health events. See the referenced statutes for more information on what is exempt and the opinions in *Cornu-Labat v. Hospital Dist. No. 2 Grant County* (2013) and *Lowy v. PeaceHealth* (2012) for judicial interpretation of and limits on this exemption.
• (d) Proprietary financial and commercial information provided to the Department of Health with an application for an antitrust exemption sought by the entity. This subsection also contains procedures on notifying the affected entity and actions to compel disclosure.
• (e) Records of a provider obtained in an action under the impaired physician program.
• (f) Complaints filed under the Uniform Disciplinary Act for providers under chapter 18.130 RCW.
• Exemptions are also provided for records collected by the Department of Health under (g) prescription monitoring program, (h) Washington Death with Dignity Act, (i) cardiac and stroke system performance, and (k) state wide health care claims data reporting in chapter 43.371 RCW.
• For all public agencies, employee wellness program records except for statistics that do not identify individuals are exempted under RCW 42.56.360(1)(j).

Records of child mortality reviews by local health departments are exempted under RCW 42.56.350(3) and RCW 70.05.170(3). In 2016, an exemption was added as RCW 42.56.360(4) to protect records of maternal mortality reviews conducted by panels appointed by the Department of Health.

2. Health Care Records of Individuals: RCW 42.56.360(2); Chapter 70.02 RCW; Chapter 70.96A RCW; Chapter 68.50 RCW; Federal Laws and Rules

In RCW 42.56.360(2), the PRA provides that chapter 70.02 RCW applies to the inspection and copying of health care information of individuals, incorporating that law as an “other statute” exemption to the PRA. Chapter 70.02 RCW is the state Health Care Information Act (HCIA), adopted in 1991. That law provides standards for when entities and individuals can access medical records of patients when held by providers or facilities and establishes that health care information is “personal and sensitive information” that can harm individuals if improperly disclosed. Planned Parenthood v. Bloedow (2015).

The HCIA mirrors in many aspects the federal HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. 160 – 164, adopted by authority of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 USC §1320d, which applies in all states. That law applies to government agencies that provide or pay for health care and those entities that obtain health information when doing business with covered agencies.

The HCIA establishes standards and obligations for government entities that serve as health care providers, facilities or payors to protect records and to disclose as authorized. In addition, it requires that all agencies that are not health care facilities or providers but obtain health care information under the exceptions to confidentiality in that chapter must have rules and policies for the acquisition, retention, destruction, and security of health care records, consistent with the HCIA. RCW 70.02.290. Entities which receive records to provide services must not disclose records in violation of the HCIA. RCW 70.02.270.
As an exception to the confidentiality of these records, **RCW 70.02.060** creates a process to allow disclosure of health care information, without authorization, in court proceedings. The attorney seeking access to individual health care information must give the health care provider and the patient or his or her attorney at least 14 days' notice before service of a discovery request or compulsory process. The patient can seek a protective order to prohibit or restrict the provider from producing these records. However, the HCIA does not restrict providers, payors or insurers from complying with obligations imposed by federal or state health care payment programs or federal or state laws. **RCW 70.02.900(1)**. In addition, the HCIA does not modify disclosure under laws applying to worker's compensation, juvenile records, and chemical dependency provisions. **RCW 70.02.900(2)**.

Special standards are provided in the HCIA for records of mental health treatment and services for adults and minors. **RCW 70.02.230-.260**. Restrictions on the disclosure of records of sexually transmitted diseases are also contained in the HCIA in **RCW 70.02.220** and **70.02.300**. Records of persons treated for chemical dependence issues are strictly protected by **RCW 70.96A.150** and by federal regulations contained at **42 C.F.R. Part 2**.

Information in the medical marijuana authorization database containing names and other personally identifiable information of patients and providers is exempted under **RCW 42.56.625**. Reports from autopsies or postmortems are confidential except to personal representatives, family members, attending physicians, and others involved in investigations. **RCW 68.50.105**. However, a coroner or medical examiner is not prohibited from publicly discussing findings on deaths caused by a law enforcement or corrections officers. **RCW 68.50.105(2)**. Records of child mortality reviews by local health departments are exempted under **RCW 70.05.170(3)**.

### G. Government Services and Benefits

#### 1. Juvenile Offender and Child Welfare Records: **Chapter 13.50 RCW**

Records relating to the offenses committed by juveniles are governed by **RCW 13.50.050, 13.50.260, and 13.50.270**. The official juvenile court file is open to the public unless sealed under **RCW 13.50.260**. Juvenile Court judges must hold sealing hearings to address whether the records should be sealed from public inspection. Records are presumed to be sealed unless they relate to the commission of a more serious offense, a later offense is committed, or an objection is filed. If the court records are sealed, those records, along with the social file and other related records, are confidential wherever held. If any agency holds these records, it can only respond that the records are confidential and the agency can not reveal the existence of any records. **RCW 13.50.260(6)**. Agencies holding such sealed records can communicate with the juvenile respondent. **RCW 13.50.260(11)**.

Child welfare records are made confidential and exempted from the PRA under **RCW 13.50.100**. The records can only be disclosed to the individuals authorized under that statute, which include the
child and his or her parents, and their attorneys. In a line of cases arising under chapter 13.50 RCW, appellate courts have held that, although these records meet the definition of public records under the PRA, these laws are “other statute” exemptions that exempt or prohibit disclosure. The courts determined that these statutes supplement the PRA unless they conflict, and that the process set by these statutes is the “exclusive means” of obtaining these records and for challenging any denial of records. See Deer v. Dep’t of Social & Health Servs. (2004), and Wright v. State (2013).

As an exception to confidentiality of child welfare records, the Department of Social and Health Services must, under RCW 74.13.500, disclose information about the abuse or neglect of a child, investigations of abuse or neglect, and services provided with regard to the abuse or neglect, if there is a child death or near fatality as a result of the abuse or neglect or if the child was receiving services within 12 months before the death. Identifying information can be redacted from these records if determined not to be in the best interest of the child or is medical information of others under the standards in RCW 74.13.515 and .520.

2. Adoption Records: Chapter 26.33 RCW

Adoption records are confidential. Information that does not identify the parties can be provided to others involved in the process. RCW 26.33.340. A confidential intermediary may be appointed by the court to determine if the identity can be revealed if requested by birth parents or adopted children to find each other. RCW 26.33.343. Adults adopted after October 1, 1993, can receive noncertified copies of their original birth certificates unless the birth parents have filed an affidavit of nondisclosure or a contact preference form.

3. Public Assistance Records: RCW 74.04.060

In addition to the PRA exemption in RCW 42.56.230(1), the contents of records and communications for public assistance programs under Title 74 RCW are deemed privileged and confidential and exempted by RCW 74.04.060(1)(a). Information may be disclosed for purposes related to the administration of these programs. As a general exception to confidentiality, any person can ask whether someone is a current recipient of public assistance and receive a “yes or no” answer. Other entities receiving public assistance information to administer, regulate, or investigate the public assistance program must maintain the same degree of confidentiality. RCW 74.04.060(3). It is a gross misdemeanor to use a list of names for commercial or political purposes. RCW 74.04.060(4).

4. Child Support Records: RCW 26.23.120

Child support enforcement records are confidential and may only be released with authorization of the parties or for defined program purposes, except that information can be disclosed to the parents about each other as needed to conduct the support enforcement action. A request for address information of the other parent is subject to limitations designed to protect the safety of that parent.
5. Domestic Violence and Rape Crisis Center Records: **RCW 42.56.370; RCW 26.04.175**

Client records held by agency domestic violence or sexual assault programs are exempt from production under the PRA by **RCW 42.56.370**. In addition, chapter 40.24 RCW establishes an address confidentiality program at the office of the Secretary of State to protect the residential information of victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking, with this program’s records exempted from production under **RCW 40.24.070**. Victim address information is also protected in applications for marriage licenses under **RCW 26.04.175**.

6. Employment Security Department Records: **RCW 42.56.410** and **Chapter 50.13 RCW**

Under the PRA, records of the Department of Employment Security that are confidential under **chapter 50.13 RCW** remain exempt under the PRA when provided to another individual or organization for operational, research, or evaluation purposes. **RCW 42.56.410**.

Under **RCW 50.13.020**, information or records concerning an individual or employing unit obtained by the Department of Employment Security pursuant to the administration of its unemployment compensation program are private and confidential. **Chapter 50.13 RCW** contains exceptions to that confidentiality for various purposes. Individuals and employers have access to their own information and those related to the awarding of benefits. **RCW 50.13.040**. Decisions entered by the commissioner appeal process are public. **RCW 50.13.050**. Other government agencies that obtain records due to their need for official purposes must maintain the confidentiality of the records received. **RCW 50.13.060**.

7. Workers’ Compensation Records: **Title 51 RCW**

Several laws make various records in the industrial insurance program exempt. Records about individual claims resolution structural settlement agreements provided to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals are exempt under **RCW 51.04.063** and in the PRA under **RCW 42.56.230(8)**. Information obtained from employers records by the Department of Labor and Industries is exempt under **RCW 51.16.070(2)**. Claim files of workers are exempt by **RCW 51.28.070**. For health care providers involved in workers compensation cases, records of audits are exempt under **RCW 51.36.110** and their proprietary information is exempt under **RCW 51.36.120**. Records of crime victims’ compensation claimants held by the Department of Labor and Industries are also confidential under **RCW 7.68.140**.

8. Educational Records: **RCW 42.56.230; Other Laws and Rules**

Exemptions for some student information are found in **RCW 42.56.230(1)**, the child program exemption in **RCW 42.56.230(2)**, and the **Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA, 20 U.S.C.**
§ 1232g. RCW 42.56.320 also applies in this area to exempt: (1) financial disclosures by private vocational schools; (2) financial and commercial information relating to purchase and sale of tuition units; (3) identifiable information received for research or evaluation by the workforce training and education coordinating board; (4) nonpublic records received relating to gifts and grants; and (5) annual declarations of intent by parents who home-school children. Student education records may also be addressed in other laws, for example, records of students in common schools are also addressed in Title 28A RCW. See, for example, RCW 28A.605.030 (parental or guardian access to records).

9. Library Records: RCW 42.56.310

The PRA in RCW 42.56.310 protects from disclosure library records kept to track use of libraries and their resources and that identify or could be used to identify a library user.

H. Miscellaneous Exemptions

1. Emergency or Transitional Housing: RCW 42.56.390

2. Traffic Accident Reports: RCW 46.52.080

3. Communications Made to a Public Officer in Official Confidence, When the Public Interest Would Suffer by Disclosure: RCW 5.60.060(5)

4. Timeshare and Condominium Owners Lists: RCW 42.56.340

5. Archaeological Sites: RCW 42.56.300

6. Fish and Wildlife: RCW 42.56.430

7. Veterans’ Discharge Papers: RCW 42.56.440

8. Check Cashers and Sellers Licensing Applications: RCW 42.56.450

9. Fireworks: RCW 42.56.460

10. Enumeration Data used by the Office of Financial Management for Population Estimates: RCW 42.56.615

11. Correctional Industry Workers: RCW 42.56.470
3.1 Introduction

The Open Public Meetings Act ("OPMA"), chapter 42.30 RCW, was passed by the Legislature in 1971 as a part of a nationwide effort to make government affairs more open, accessible and responsive. It was modeled on a California law known as the "Brown Act" and a similar Florida statute. The OPMA and the Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56 RCW, create important and powerful tools enabling the people to inform themselves about their government, both state and local.

3.2 The Courts Will Interpret the OPMA to Accomplish Its Stated Intent

As with all laws, the courts will interpret the OPMA to accomplish the Legislature's intent. RCW 42.30.010 declares the OPMA’s purpose in a strongly worded statement:

The legislature finds and declares that all public commissions, boards, councils, committees, subcommittees, departments, divisions, offices, and all other public agencies of this state and subdivisions thereof exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business. It is the intent of this chapter that their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly. The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created.

The OPMA also provides that, “The purposes of this chapter are hereby declared remedial and shall be liberally construed.” RCW 42.30.910. Exceptions to the openness requirements of the OPMA (such as the grounds for executive sessions) are narrowly construed. Miller v. City of Tacoma (1999).

3.3 Entities Subject to the OPMA

The OPMA requires that meetings of the “governing body” of a "public agency" be open to the public. RCW 42.30.030.

A. “Public Agency”

A “public agency” is defined in RCW 42.30.020(1) to include:

- Any state board, commission, committee, department, educational institution, or other state agency that is created by statute;
• Any county, city, school district, special purpose district, or other municipal corporation or political subdivision of the state;
• Any “subagency” of a public agency that is created by statute, ordinance, or other legislative act, such as planning commissions and library or park boards.

A “public agency” for purposes of the OPMA does not include:

• Any court;
• The Legislature.

RCW 42.30.020(1)(a).

B. “Subagency”

The OPMA also applies to the governing bodies of any “subagency” of state and local government agencies. Although a “subagency” is not defined in the OPMA, a subagency must be “created by a statute, ordinance, or other legislative act.” RCW 42.30.020(1)(c). Case law and attorney general opinions suggest that, to be a subagency, the entity established by legislative act must have some policy or rule making authority. See Loeffelholz v. Citizens for Leaders with Ethics & Accountability Now (2004); 1983 Att’y Gen. Op. No. 1; 1971 Att’y Gen. Op. No. 33.

C. Other Entities

The courts have interpreted the OPMA to apply to “an association or organization created by or pursuant to statute which serves a statewide public function.” West v. Wash. Ass’n of Cnty. Officials (2011).

The OPMA may also apply to the “functional equivalent” of a public agency, though the courts have yet to address that issue squarely. In a 1991 opinion, the Attorney General suggested a four-part test to be used in determining whether an entity is a “public agency” and subject to the OPMA: “(1) whether the organization performs a governmental function; (2) the level of government funding; (3) the extent of government involvement or regulation; and (4) whether the organization was created by the government.” 1991 Att’y Gen. Op. No. 5. The courts have applied these factors to determine whether an entity is the “functional equivalent” of a public agency for purposes of the Public Records Act. Telford v. Thurston County Board of Commissioners (1999); Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter (2008); Woodland Park Zoo v. Fortgang (2016). However, the courts have yet to apply this test to that question for purposes of the OPMA.

3.4 “Governing Body”

A. Definition
A “governing body” is defined in the OPMA as “the multimember board, commission, committee, council, or other policy or rule-making body of a public agency, or any committee thereof when the committee acts on behalf of the governing body, conducts hearings, or takes testimony or public comment.” RCW 42.30.020(2).

All local public agencies and some state agencies have governing bodies and those governing bodies are subject to the OPMA. Examples of governing bodies of local public agencies include the city council, county council, port commission and school board; examples of governing bodies of state agencies include the Gambling Commission, the Utilities and Transportation Commission and the Public Disclosure Commission.

Some agencies do not have governing bodies. For example, many state agencies, such as the Department of Labor and Industries, the Department of Licensing, the Department of Social and Health Services, the Department of Employment Security, and the Washington State Patrol are governed by an individual, not a multimember body, and thus are not subject to the OPMA. See Salmon for All v. Department of Fisheries (1992), in which the Court held that the Department of Fisheries was not subject to the OPMA because it was governed by an individual, the director.

With subagencies, the governing body of the subagency is often the subagency itself, as in the example of a county planning commission or city parks board.

B. Committees of a Governing Body

The definition of governing body includes “any committee thereof when the committee acts on behalf of the governing body, conducts hearings, or takes testimony or public comment.” RCW 42.30.020(2). In 2015, the State Supreme Court concluded that: (1) “committee thereof” means committees created by a governing body pursuant to its executive authority, regardless of whether the committee includes members of the governing body; and (2) a committee acts on behalf of the governing body “when it exercises actual or de facto decision-making authority for the governing body.” Citizens Alliance v. San Juan County (2015). A committee is not exercising such authority when it is simply conducting internal discussions or providing advice or information to the governing body. Id.; see also Clark v. City of Lakewood (2001).

It is not clear whether a committee of a governing body is required to give notice for all of its meetings when it is only at some of its meetings that it is acting so as to come within the definition of “governing body.” Nevertheless, it would be pragmatic for such committees that sometimes engage in such activities - acting on behalf of the governing body, conducting hearings, or taking testimony or public comment - to conduct all their business in open meetings.

Case Example: The seven-member city council is considering the purchase of public art. The council agrees that public input would assist the selection process. Some councilmembers believe that the creation of an arts commission that would adopt policies for the city’s acquisition of public art would “get politics out of the world of art.” Other councilmembers express concern that an arts commission
will control too much of the process without significant council input. Three resolutions are drafted for council consideration:

The first establishes a city arts commission and details the method of selecting the members, including three city councilmembers and two citizen members, who would serve specific terms. The commission is directed to establish policies for the selection and placement of public art in the city. Its recommended policies will be subject to city council approval. It is directed to obtain public input before the adoption of the recommended policies. As funding becomes available, it will make recommendations to the city council regarding the purchase of works of public art and their location in the city.

The second resolution establishes a public arts committee of the city council consisting of three members of the council. Five interested citizens will be asked to participate in its determination of worthy projects. The citizens would serve at the pleasure of the council. The public arts committee is directed to develop a list of citizens who have expressed interest in public art and to hold hearings seeking public comment regarding any recommendations that the committee might make to the full city council.

The third resolution recognizes the existence of a citizen’s committee known as “Public Art Now!” that was formed by a councilmember. The committee would be authorized to use city’s meeting rooms. The council would welcome the committee’s advice regarding the selection and placement of public art and its recommendations would be considered at any public hearing when the council decided to purchase works of art.

What would be the consequences under the OPMA of the adoption of each resolution?

**Resolution:** The city arts commission is probably a “subagency” under the OPMA. It has been created by legislative act and its governing body is directed to develop policy for the city. As such, all of its meetings would be subject to the OPMA’s requirements.

The public arts committee is probably a “committee” of the governing body, the city council. It is not a separate entity (subagency). Since it will be obtaining public input, at least some of its meetings would be subject to the OPMA. However, it is advisable that it hold all its meetings in open session.

“Public Art Now!” is not subject to the OPMA. The city council did not establish it or grant it any authority.

### 3.5 OPMA Meeting Procedures

**A. “Action,” “Final Action” and “Meeting”**

In its definition section, the OPMA first defines “action” before defining a “meeting” as a meeting “at which action is taken.” RCW 42.30.020(4). “Action” is defined to mean “the transaction of the
official business of a public agency by a governing body including but not limited to receipt of public testimony, deliberations, discussions, considerations, reviews, evaluations, and final actions.” RCW 42.30.020(3). “Final action” is defined as “a collective positive or negative decision, or an actual vote by a majority of the members of a governing body when sitting as a body or entity, upon a motion, proposal, resolution, order, or ordinance.” Id. It is not necessary for a governing body to take “final action” for there to be a “meeting” that is subject to the requirements of the OPMA; mere “action,” such as a discussion of agency business, is sufficient. However, it is not "action" for members of a governing body to individually review material in advance of a meeting at which a public contract was awarded. Equitable Shipyards, Inc. v. State (1980).

A “meeting” occurs when, with a collective intent to meet, a majority of the members of a governing body collectively transact the governing body’s official business. Citizens Alliance v. San Juan County (2015).

Ordinarily, a quorum (majority) of the members of a governing body must be present at a meeting for the governing body to be able to transact agency business. Citizens Alliance v. San Juan County (2015). As such, a meeting that would be subject to the OPMA occurs if a majority of the members of a governing body were to discuss or consider agency business, no matter where that discussion or consideration might occur. “Action” by less than a quorum is generally not subject to the OPMA. Eugster v. City of Spokane (2005); Citizens Alliance v. San Juan County (2015). However, as discussed above, a committee of a governing body that includes less than a quorum of the body may be subject to the OPMA in certain circumstances.

Physical presence by the members of a governing body is not necessary for there to be a “meeting.” For example, an email exchange among a quorum of a governing body in which “action” takes place is a “meeting” under the OPMA. Wood v. Battle Ground School Dist. (2001). Since an email exchange among a quorum of the members of a governing body is not open to the public, such an exchange in which “action” takes place would violate the OPMA. In contrast, mere passive receipt of emails does not constitute participation in a meeting. Wood v. Battle Ground School Dist. (2001); Citizens Alliance v. San Juan County (2015).

It is generally agreed that an agency may authorize one or more of its members to attend a meeting by telephone or video-conferencing, using technologies such as Skype or WebEx, when a speaker phone or video screen is available at the official location of the meeting so the governing body and the public can hear the member’s input and the member can hear what is said at the meeting. See also Wood v. Battle Ground School Dist. (2001) (physical presence not required in order for meeting to occur); 2014 Att’y Gen. Op. No. 7 (discussion of videoconferencing)

A quorum of members of a governing body may attend a meeting of another organization’s provided that the body takes no “action.” 2006 Att’y Gen. Op. No. 6. For example, a majority of a city council could attend a meeting of a regional chamber of commerce or a county commission meeting provided that the council members did not discuss city business or do anything else that constitutes an “action.”
The OPMA expressly permits the members of the governing body to travel together or engage in other activity, such as attending social functions, so long as they do not take “action.” RCW 42.30.070.

**Case example:** The five-member school board attends the annual convention of the State School Association. Over dinner, three members discuss some of the ideas presented during the convention, but refrain from any conversation about how they might apply them to the school district. All five travel together to and from the convention and the only discussion is over whether they are lost.

**Resolution:** No violation occurred but the board members must be careful. The example is offered to highlight the level of awareness members of a governing body must have. It is not unusual for such situations to arise. For instance, the dinner discussion was among a majority of the members so a discussion about school district business would have been "action" and, without the required notice, would be in violation of the OPMA.

**B. Types of Meetings Not Covered by the OPMA**

The OPMA does not apply to certain types of meetings. RCW 42.30.140 provides that the OPMA does not apply to:

- Meetings involved with the issuing, denying, suspending, or revoking business, professional, and certain other licenses, including disciplinary proceedings
- Quasi-judicial proceedings
- Meetings involving matters subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 34.05 RCW
- Collective bargaining negotiations and related discussions, and meetings involved with planning for such negotiations and for grievance and mediation proceedings

The exact wording of RCW 42.30.140 should be consulted to determine whether an exemption applies.

When a governing body engages in any of these exempt activities, it is not required to comply with the OPMA, although other public notice requirements may apply. Some exempt activities, such as quasi-judicial matters or hearings governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (chapter 34.05 RCW), have their own notice requirements. Quasi-judicial matters are those where the governing body is required to determine the rights of individuals based on legal principles. Common examples of quasi-judicial proceedings are certain local land use decisions, such as site-specific rezones, conditional use permits, and variances.

**Case example:** During a break in the regular meeting, the city council gets together in the chambers to decide what they should do with regard to the union’s latest offer. They authorize the negotiator to accept the offer on wages if the union will accept the seniority amendments. When they return to the meeting, nothing is said about the discussion or decision.
**Answer:** The OPMA specifically exempts the discussion and decisions about the collective bargaining strategy or position from its requirements. Since it was exempt, the discussion was not required to be open.

The OPMA does not provide grounds for exempting public records from disclosure. See *Am. Civil Liberties Union v. City of Seattle* (2004). An independent exemption under the Public Records Act or other statute must exist to exempt records from disclosure. See Chapter 2.1. Therefore, even though collective bargaining matters can be discussed in a closed session, this is not a basis for withholding public records reviewed in the executive session relating to that topic.

**C. Public Notice of Meetings**

Under the OPMA, public agencies must give notice of regular and special meetings. See Chapter 3.6 for details.

**D. Secret Votes Prohibited**

"Secret" votes - where individual votes are not divulged - are prohibited, and any votes taken in violation of the OPMA are null and void. RCW 42.30.060(2). The votes of the members of a governing body should be publicly announced at the time the vote is taken.

**E. Attendance at Meetings**

The OPMA provides that any member of the public may attend the meetings of the governing body of a public agency. The agency may not require people to sign in, complete questionnaires, or establish other conditions to attendance. RCW 42.30.040. For instance, an agency could not limit attendance to those persons subject to its jurisdiction. The OPMA does not address whether an agency is required to hold its meeting at a location that would permit every person to attend. However, it seems clear that the courts would discourage any attempt to deliberately schedule a meeting at a location that was too small to permit full attendance or that was locked. RCW 42.30.050.

A person may record (audio or video) a meeting provided that it does not disrupt the meeting. 1998 Att’y Gen. Op. No. 15. A stationary audio or video recording device would not normally disrupt a meeting.

If those in attendance are disruptive and make further conduct of the meeting unfeasible, those creating the disruption may be removed. RCW 42.30.050; *In re Recall of Kast* (2001). If order cannot be restored to the meeting by the removal of persons disrupting the meeting, the meeting room may be cleared and the meeting continued, or the meeting may be reconvened in another location. However, members of the media are entitled to attend the adjourned meeting and the governing body is limited to act only on those matters on the agenda. The governing body may also authorize readmitting persons not responsible for disrupting the meeting. Id.
Case example: The school board schedules a special meeting to discuss a controversial policy question. It becomes obvious that the regular meeting room is too small for all of those trying to attend the meeting. The board announces that the meeting will be adjourned to an auditorium in the same building. The chair announces that those who wish to speak should sign in on the sheet on the table. She states that given the available time, speakers will be limited to three minutes each. At one point, the meeting is adjourned to remove an apparently intoxicated person who had been interrupting the comments of speakers.

Resolution: While the OPMA allows the public to attend all meetings, it does not allow for the possibility of insufficient space. Presumably, if a nearby location is available, the governing body should move there to allow attendance by adjourning the meeting to that location and posting a notice on the door (RCW 42.30.090). The chair can require those who wish to speak (but not all attendees) to sign in. The sign-in requirement for speaking does not restrict attendance, only participation. Since the OPMA does not require the governing body to allow public participation, the time for each speaker can also be limited. The governing body can maintain order by removing those who are disruptive.

F. Right to Speak at Meetings

The OPMA does not require a governing body to allow public comment at a public meeting. If a governing body does allow public comment, it has authority to limit the time of speakers to a uniform amount (such as three minutes) and the topics speakers may address.

3.6 The OPMA Requires Notice of Meetings

A “meeting” under the OPMA is either a “regular” meeting or a “special” meeting, with different notice requirements for each. So, for example, a meeting designated as a “retreat,” “study session,” or “workshop” is, for OPMA purposes, either a regular or a special meeting, depending on how it is held.

A. Regular Meetings

The OPMA requires agencies to identify the time and place their governing bodies will hold regular meetings, which are defined as "recurring meetings held in accordance with a periodic schedule declared by statute or rule." RCW 42.30.075. State agencies subject to the OPMA must publish their schedule in the Washington State Register, while local agencies (such as cities and counties) must adopt the schedule “by ordinance, resolution, bylaws, or by whatever other rule is required for the conduct of business by that body.” RCW 42.30.075; RCW 42.30.070. Although the OPMA does not require local agency governing bodies to meet inside the boundaries of their jurisdiction, there is general agreement that agencies should not schedule meetings at locations that effectively exclude the public. Other statutes may require certain entities to hold their meetings at particular locations, such as RCW 36.32.080, which requires a board of county commissioners to hold regular meetings at the county seat, or at the alternate locations specified in that statute.
If a scheduled regular meeting falls on a holiday, it must be held on the next business day. **RCW 42.30.070.**

The OPMA requires agencies with governing bodies to make the agenda of regular meetings available online at least 24 hours in advance of the meeting. **RCW 42.30.077.** This requirement does not apply if the agency does not have a website or if it employs fewer than 10 full-time equivalent employees. Also, an agency can modify the agenda after it is posted online. A failure to comply with the notice requirement with respect to a regular meeting will not invalidate an otherwise legal action taken at the meeting.

Other laws and local governing body rules may require additional regular meeting notice and publication and/or posting of a preliminary agenda. See, e.g., **RCW 35.23.221, RCW 35A.12.160.**

**B. Special Meetings**

Whenever an agency has a meeting at a time other than a scheduled regular meeting, it is conducting a "special meeting." **RCW 42.30.080.** For each special meeting, the OPMA requires at least 24 hours’ written notice to:

- the members of the governing body, delivered personally, or by mail, fax, or email;
- media representatives (newspaper, radio, and television) who have filed a written request for notices of a particular special meeting or of all special meetings, delivered personally, or by mail, fax, or email; and
- the public, by posting on the agency website and by prominently posting it at the main entrance of the agency’s principal location and at the meeting site if the meeting will not be held at the agency’s principal location.

An agency is not required to post the public notice on its website if it does not have one, if it has fewer than 10 full-time equivalent employees, or if doesn’t employ personnel whose job it is to maintain the website.

The OPMA does not provide any guidance as to whether the media's written request for notice must be renewed; it is advisable, however, to periodically renew such requests to ensure that they contain the proper contact information for the notice and have not been misplaced or inadvertently overlooked due to changes in agency personnel.

The notice of a special meeting must specify the time and place of the meeting and "the business to be transacted," which would normally be an agenda. At a special meeting, final disposition by the agency is limited to the matters identified as the business to be conducted in the notice. The statutory language suggests that the governing body could discuss, but not finally dispose of, matters not included in the notice of the special meeting.
A member of the governing body may waive the required notice by filing a written waiver or by simply appearing at the special meeting.  *Estey v. Dempsey* (1985). The failure to provide notice to a member of the governing body can only be asserted by the person who should have received the notice, not by any person affected by action at the meeting.  *Kirk v. Pierce County Fire Protection Dist. No. 21* (1981).

**C. Emergency Meetings**

The OPMA provides that, in the event of an emergency such as a fire, flood, or earthquake, meetings may be held at a site other than the regular meeting site, and the notice requirements of the OPMA are suspended during the emergency.  *RCW 42.30.070*. An agency should, however, provide special-meeting notice of an emergency meeting, if practicable.  *RCW 42.30.080(4)*.

The courts have found that an agency must be confronted with a true emergency that requires immediate action, such as a natural disaster, for its governing body to hold an emergency meeting that does not comply with the OPMA. It has been held that a strike by teachers did not justify an "emergency" meeting by the school board.  *Mead School Dist. No. 354 v. Mead Education Ass'n* (1975).

**D. Adjournments, Cancellations and Continuances**

The OPMA establishes procedures for a governing body to adjourn a regular or special meeting and continue that meeting to a time and place identified in an order of adjournment.  *RCW 42.30.090*. Less than a quorum of a governing body may adjourn and continue a meeting under these procedures, or the clerk or secretary of the body may do so if no members are present. Notice of the meeting adjournment must be the same that is required for special meetings in *RCW 42.30.080*, and a copy of the order or notice of adjournment must be posted on or near the door of the place where the meeting was held. Although the OPMA does not address cancellations, presumably the same process could be followed in cancelling a meeting.

Public hearings held by a governing body may be continued to a subsequent meeting of the governing body following the procedures for adjournment in *RCW 42.30.090*.  *RCW 42.30.100*.

*See also* adjournment discussion in MRSC’s Open Public Meetings Act publication.

**3.7 Executive Sessions Are Allowed for Specific Topics, Following OPMA Procedures**

"Executive session" is not expressly defined in the OPMA, but the term is commonly understood to mean that part of a regular or special meeting of a governing body that is closed to the public. A governing body may hold an executive session only for specified purposes, which are identified in *RCW 42.30.110(1)(a)-(m)*, and only during a regular or special meeting. Nothing, however, prevents
a governing body from holding a meeting, which complies with the OPMA's procedural requirements, for the sole purpose of having an executive session.

Attendance at an executive session need not be limited to the members of the governing body. Persons other than the members of the governing body may attend the executive session at the invitation of that body. Those invited should have some relationship to the matter being addressed in the closed session, or they should be in attendance to otherwise provide assistance to the governing body. For example, staff of the governing body or of the governmental entity may be needed to present information or to take notes or minutes. However, minutes are not required to be taken at an executive session. RCW 42.32.030.

Because an executive session is an exception to the OPMA’s overall provisions requiring open meetings, a court will narrowly construe the grounds for an executive session in favor of requiring an open meeting. *Miller v. City of Tacoma* (1999).

A. Procedures for Holding an Executive Session

To convene an executive session, the governing body’s presiding officer must announce: (1) the purpose of the executive session, and (2) the time when the executive session will end. The announcement is to be given to those in attendance at the meeting. RCW 42.30.110(2).

The announced purpose of the executive session must be one of the statutorily identified purposes for which an executive session may be held. The announcement therefore must contain enough information to identify the purpose as falling within one of those identified in RCW 42.30.110(1). It would not be sufficient, for example, for a mayor to declare simply that the council will now meet in executive session to discuss "personnel matters." Discussion of personnel matters, in general, is not an authorized purpose for holding an executive session; only certain specific issues relating to personnel may be addressed in executive session. See RCW 42.30.110(1)(f), (g).

Another issue that may arise concerning these procedural requirements for holding an executive session involves the estimated length of the session. If the governing body concludes the executive session before the time that was stated it would conclude, it should not reconvene in open session until the time stated. Otherwise, the public may, in effect, be excluded from that part of the open meeting that occurs between the close of the executive session and the time when the presiding officer announced the executive session would conclude.

If the executive session is not over at the stated time, it may be extended only if the presiding officer announces to the public at the meeting place that it will be extended to a stated time.

Case Example: Three members of a five-member school board meet privately, without calling a meeting, to exchange opinions of candidates for the school superintendent position. They justify this private meeting on the ground that the board may meet in executive session to discuss the qualifications of applicants for the superintendent position, under RCW 42.30.110(1)(g). Have these school board members complied with RCW 42.30.110?
Resolution: Clearly, they have not. Although a governing body may discuss certain matters in closed session under this statute, that closed session must occur during an open regular or special meeting and it may be commenced only by following the procedures in RCW 42.30.110(2). The public must know the board is meeting in executive session and why. Although, as discussed above, some matters are not subject to the Open Public Meetings Act under RCW 42.30.140; however, the above example is not one of them.

B. Grounds for Holding an Executive Session

An executive session may be held only for one of the purposes identified in RCW 42.30.110(1), as follows:

(a) Matters Affecting National Security

After September 11, 2001, state and local agencies have an increased role in national security. Therefore, discussions by agency governing bodies of security matters relating to possible terrorist activity should come within the scope of this executive session provision.

(b) Acquisition of Real Estate by Lease or Purchase

This provision has two elements: (1) the governing body must be considering either selecting real property for purchase or lease or it must be considering purchasing or leasing specific property; and (2) public knowledge of the governing body's consideration would likely cause an increase in the price of the real property.

For the purposes of this provision, the consideration of the purchase of real property can involve condemnation of the property, including the amount of compensation to be offered for the property. Port of Seattle v. Rio (1977).

However, it remains unclear exactly what the scope is of “considering” the acquisition of real property. Since this subsection recognizes that the process of purchasing or leasing real property or selecting real property to purchase or lease may, in some circumstances, justify an executive session, it implies that the governing body may need to reach some consensus in closed session as to the price to be offered or the particular property to be selected. See Port of Seattle (1977). However, the Washington Supreme Court in Miller v. City of Tacoma (1999) emphasized that “only the action explicitly specified by the exemption [“consider”] may take place in executive session.” See also Feature Realty, Inc. v. City of Spokane (2003). Taken literally, this limitation would preclude a governing body in executive session from actually selecting a piece of property to acquire or setting a price at which the body would be willing to purchase property, because such action would be beyond the power to merely “consider.” Yet, the purpose of an executive session under this subsection would be defeated if the governing body would be required to vote in open session to select the property or to decide how much it would be willing to pay for the property, where public knowledge of these matters would likely increase its price.
(c) Sale or Lease of Agency Property

This subsection, the reverse of the previous one, also has two elements: (1) the governing body must be considering the minimum price at which real property belonging to the agency will be offered for sale or lease; and (2) public knowledge of the governing body’s consideration will likely cause a decrease in the price of the property.

This provision also states that final action selling or leasing public property must be taken in an open meeting. That statement may seem unnecessary, since all final actions must be taken in a meeting open to the public. However, its possible purpose may be to indicate that, although the decision to sell or lease the property must be in open session, the governing body may decide in executive session the minimum price at which it will do so. A contrary interpretation would seemingly defeat the purpose of this subsection. But see Miller v. City of Tacoma (1999) and discussion in Chapter 3.9B(b) above.

Governing bodies should exercise caution when meeting in closed session under this and the preceding provision so that they are not doing so when there would be no likelihood of increased price if the matter were considered in open session.

(d) Performance of Publicly Bid Contracts

This subsection indicates that when a public agency and a contractor performing a publicly bid contract are negotiating concerning how the contract is being performed, the governing body may "review" those negotiations in executive session if public knowledge of the review would likely cause an increase in contract costs.

(e) Consideration of Certain Information by an Export Trading Company

This provision, which authorizes consideration in executive session of financial and commercial information supplied by private persons to an export trading company, applies to export trading companies that can be created by port districts under chapter 53.31 RCW. Under RCW 53.31.050, financial and commercial information supplied by private persons to an export trading company must be kept confidential.

(f) Complaints or Charges Against Public Officer or Employee

This provision authorizes executive sessions to receive and evaluate complaints or charges brought against a public officer or employee. It should be distinguished from subsection (g), discussed below, concerning reviewing the performance of a public employee in executive session. For purposes of meeting in executive session under this provision, a charge or complaint must have been brought against a public officer or employee. The complaint or charge could come from within the agency or from the public. Bringing the complaint or charge triggers the opportunity for the officer or
employee to request that a public hearing or open meeting be held regarding the complaint or charge.

(g) Evaluating Qualifications or Performance of a Public Employee/Official

There are two different purposes under this provision for which a governing body may meet in executive session. For both purposes, the references to "public employment" and to "public employee" include within their scope public offices and public officials, so that a governing body may evaluate in executive sessions persons who apply for appointive office positions, such as state university president or city manager, as well as for employee positions.

The first purpose involves evaluating the qualifications of applicants for public employment. This could include personal interviews with an applicant, discussions concerning an applicant's qualifications for a position, and discussions concerning salaries, wages, and other conditions of employment personal to the applicant. The authority to "evaluate" applicants in closed session allows a governing body to discuss the qualifications of applicants, not to choose which one to hire. Although this subsection expressly mandates that "final action hiring" an applicant for employment be taken in open session, this does not mean that the governing body may take preliminary votes in an executive session that eliminate candidates from consideration. *Miller v. City of Tacoma* (1999).

The second part of this provision concerns reviewing the performance of a public employee. This provision would be used typically either where the governing body is considering a promotion or a salary or wage increase for an individual employee or where it may be considering disciplinary action based on an employee's performance. It should be distinguished from subsection (f), which concerns specific complaints or charges brought against an employee and which, at the request of the employee, must be discussed in open session.

The result of a governing body's closed session review of the performance of an employee may be that the body will take some action either beneficial or adverse to the officer or employee. That action, whether raising a salary of or disciplining an officer or employee, must be made in open session.

When a discussion involves salaries, wages, or conditions of employment to be "generally applied" in the agency, it must take place in open session. However, if that discussion involves collective bargaining negotiations or strategies, it is not subject to the OPMA and may be held in closed session without being subject to the procedural requirements for an executive session in RCW 42.30.110(2). See RCW 42.30.140(4).

*Case Example:* A school board selecting a superintendent may evaluate qualifications of applicants in an executive session under this provision. Under this provision, the board must confine its executive session discussion to applicant evaluations only, and must make decisions in a meeting open to the public. For more information, see the Attorney General’s Office “Open Public Meetings”

(h) Evaluating Candidates for Elective Office

This provision applies when an elected governing body is filling a vacant position on that body. Examples of such bodies include a board of county commissioners, a city council, a school board, and the boards of special purpose districts, such as fire protection and water-sewer districts. Under this provision, an elected governing body may evaluate the qualifications of an applicant for a vacant position on that body in executive session. However, unlike when it is filling other positions, the governing body may interview an applicant for a vacancy in an elective office only in open session. As with all other appointments, the vote to fill the position must also be in open session.

For more information, see the Attorney General’s Office “Open Public Meetings Act Guidance on Frequently Asked Questions About Processes to Fill Vacant Positions by Public Agency Governing Boards and Some Suggested Practice Tips” (June 1, 2016).

(i) Litigation, Potential Litigation, or Enforcement Actions

An agency must meet three basic requirements before it can invoke this provision to meet in closed session. First, "legal counsel representing the agency" must attend the executive session to discuss the enforcement action, or the litigation or potential litigation. This is the only executive session provision that requires the attendance of someone other than the members of the governing body. The legal counsel may be the "regular" legal counsel for the agency, such as a city attorney or the county prosecutor, or it may be legal counsel hired specifically to represent the agency in particular litigation.

Second, the discussion with the legal counsel either must concern an agency enforcement action or it must concern litigation or “potential litigation” to which the agency, the governing body, or one of its members acting in an official capacity is or is likely to become a party. Discussions concerning enforcement actions or existing litigation could, for example, involve matters such as strategy or settlement.

This provision for an executive session defines “potential litigation” as matters that are protected by attorney-client privilege concerning:

- Litigation that has been specifically threatened to which the agency, the governing body, or a member acting in an official capacity is, or is likely to become, a party;
- Litigation that the agency reasonably believes may be commenced by or against the agency, the governing body, or a member acting in an official capacity; or
- Litigation or legal risks of a proposed action or current practice that the agency has identified when public discussion of the litigation or legal risks is likely to result in an adverse legal or financial consequence to the agency.
This definition permits discussions by an agency governing body of actions that involve a genuine legal risk to the agency. This allows a governing body to freely consider the legal implications of a proposed decision without the concern that it might be jeopardizing some future litigation position.

The third requirement for meeting in closed session under this subsection is that public knowledge of the discussion would likely result in adverse legal or financial consequence to the agency. In *Port of Seattle v. Rio* (1977), the Court of Appeals stated that a closed executive session with legal counsel to discuss settlement or avoidance of litigation is proper because “A public agency should neither be given an advantage, nor placed at a disadvantage in litigation.” The Washington Supreme Court, in *Recall of Lakewood City Council* (2001), held that a governing body is not required to determine beforehand whether disclosure of the discussion with legal counsel would likely have adverse consequences; it is sufficient if the agency, from an objective standard, should know that the discussion is not benign and will likely result in adverse consequences.

Since the purpose of this executive session provision is only to allow the governing body to discuss litigation or enforcement matters with legal counsel, the governing body is not authorized to take final action regarding such matters in an executive session. Case law suggests that a governing body may do no more than discuss litigation or enforcement matters and may therefore be precluded from decisions in the context of such a discussion in order to advance the litigation or enforcement action. In *Feature Realty, Inc. v. City of Spokane* (2003), the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a “collective positive decision” of a governing body in executive session to approve a settlement agreement. The *Feature Realty* court relied on the Washington Supreme Court’s holding in *Miller v. City of Tacoma* (1999) that a governing body can only take an action in executive session “explicitly specified” in an exemption to the OPMA.

This provision is, in practice, often used as a justification for executive sessions, particularly because "potential litigation" is susceptible to a broad reading. Indeed, many things a public agency does will subject it to the possibility of a lawsuit. However, a court will construe “potential litigation” or any other grounds for an executive session narrowly and in favor of requiring open meetings. *Miller v. City of Tacoma* (1999). To avoid a reading of this subsection that may be broader than that intended by the Legislature — and to avoid a suit alleging a violation of the OPMA — it is important for a governing body to look at the facts of each situation in the context of all the requirements of this subsection.

**Case Example:** A board of county commissioners is considering adopting a stringent adult entertainment ordinance, and a company that had announced its intention to locate a nude dancing establishment in the county states that it will sue the county if it passes this ordinance. The commissioners call an executive session to discuss with the prosecuting attorney this "potential litigation." Specifically, they intend to discuss with the prosecuting attorney his opinion as to the proposed ordinance’s constitutionality. May the commissioners meet in executive session to discuss this?
Resolution: The county commissioners may discuss with their legal counsel in executive session the constitutionality of the proposed ordinance, particularly in light of the threatened legal challenge. They want to have a strong position coming into the litigation. The company's knowledge of their discussion would give it an unfair advantage in framing the constitutional theories in support of its threatened suit against the county. Also, the prosecuting attorney may not feel he can be totally candid with the commissioners in open session.

The company, on the other hand, may argue that the commissioners are not discussing the potential litigation, but rather are only discussing the ordinance. The commissioners should always be aware of the constitutionality of the actions they take. But, that does not mean the commissioners have the authority to meet in executive session any time they are proposing legislation that may implicate constitutional issues. However, given the circumstances here — specifically that the company threatened to sue - the commissioners' position should prevail. Consistent with the definition of “potential litigation” added by the Legislature in 2001, the county commissioners may discuss the “legal risks of a proposed action,” in this case, the legal risks of adopting a stringent adult entertainment ordinance, particularly when the company has threatened litigation if the county adopts the ordinance.

(j) Western Library Network Prices, Products, Equipment, and Services

This provision for executive session no longer has any applicability, as the State Library Commission has been abolished and the Western Library Network statutes have been repealed. See RCW 27.04.900 and former chapter 27.26 RCW.

(k) State Investment Board Consideration of Financial and Commercial information

This provision allows the State Investment Board, established and governed by chapter 43.33A RCW, to consider commercial and financial information relating to the investment of public trust or retirement funds in closed session, if discussion in open session would result in loss to those funds or to the private providers of the information.

(l) Information Related to State Purchased Health Care Services

This provision allows executive sessions to consider proprietary or confidential nonpublished information related to the development, acquisition, or implementation of state purchased health care services as provided in RCW 41.05.026.
(m) Life Sciences Discovery Fund Authority Grant Applications and Grant Awards

(n) Health Sciences and Services Authority Grant Applications and Grant Awards

The above two provisions allow executive sessions to “consider...the substance of grant applications and grant awards” related to the Life Sciences Discovery Fund Authority and the Health Sciences and Services Authority “when public knowledge regarding the discussion would reasonably be expected to result in private loss to the providers of this information.”

3.8 The OPMA Provides Remedies/Penalties for Violations

The OPMA’s standing requirements are very broad; any person may challenge an action based on a violation of the OPMA through a suit in superior court as provided in RCW 42.30.120 and RCW 42.30.130. See also West v. Seattle Port Commission, et al. (2016) (holding that West, a “person,” had standing to bring an OPMA challenge related to a series of confidential meetings between Port of Seattle and Port of Tacoma commissioners). Four distinct remedies are available to persons under the OPMA:

- Nullification of actions taken in illegal meetings (RCW 42.30.060(1))
- Civil penalties of $500 per member of the governing body for the first knowing violation of the OPMA and $1000 per member for any successive knowing violation (RCW 42.30.120(1) and (2))
- An award of costs and reasonable attorney fees for any person prevailing in an action alleging an OPMA violation (RCW 42.30.120(2))
- Mandamus or injunction to stop OPMA violations or prevent threatened violations (RCW 42.30.130)

If the court determines that a public agency has taken action in violation of the OPMA, that action is null and void. RCW 42.30.060(1). If an agency’s action is null and void as a result of an OPMA violation, the agency must re-trace its steps by taking the action in accordance with the OPMA in order to make that action valid. See Henry v. Town of Oakville (1981); Feature Realty v. City of Spokane (2003) (agency re-tracing of steps must be done in public). But if the OPMA violation occurs early in the governing body’s consideration of a matter, subsequent actions taken in compliance with the OPMA, including the final action, are valid. OPAL v. Adams County (1996); see also 1971 Att’y Gen. Op. No. 33 at 40.

If a court determines that a governing body violated the OPMA, each member of the governing body who attended the meeting with knowledge that the meeting was in violation of the OPMA is subject to a $500 civil penalty. RCW 42.30.120. A violation of the OPMA is not a criminal offense.
A court must award all costs, including attorney fees, to a party who is successful in asserting an OPMA violation against an agency. RCW 42.30.120(2). If the court finds that the lawsuit against the agency is frivolous, the agency may recover its attorney fees and expenses. The only statutory remedy is an action filed in superior court. RCW 42.30.120(2).

Also, an OPMA violation may provide a sufficient legal basis for a recall effort against a local elected official. See, e.g., In re Recall of Lakewood City Council Members (2001); In re Recall of Kast (2001).

**Case example:** In July 2016 and prior to a regular meeting, two members of a three-member board of county commissioners communicate by email about an ordinance to be considered at the upcoming regular meeting. At that meeting, the board discusses and then adopts the ordinance the two commissioners had discussed by email. After making a PRA request for the commissioners’ emails, a county resident challenges the validity of the ordinance based on an alleged violation of the OPMA when the two commissioners discussed the ordinance by email.

**Answer:** The email discussion by the two commissioners was “action” under the OPMA, and, since it did not occur in a meeting open to the public, it was a violation of the OPMA. The two commissioners are personally liable for the $500 penalty if they knew the email discussion was in violation of the OPMA. It seems unlikely that the commissioners would not have known that their email discussion was in violation of the OPMA, and so they will likely be subject to that penalty.

The ordinance adopted by the commissioners after discussion in an open meeting should not be invalidated based on the improper email discussion. The board discussed the ordinance and voted on it in open session, in compliance with the OPMA. So, despite the earlier OPMA violation, the board subsequently complied with the OPMA in adopting the ordinance.

**3.9 The OPMA Requires Training**

All members of state and local governing bodies must receive training on the requirements of the OPMA. RCW 42.30.205. The training must be completed within 90 days after a governing body member takes the oath of office or otherwise assumes the duties of the position. The training must be repeated at intervals of no longer than four years, as long as an individual is a member of the governing body. The law does not specify the training that must be received or the manner in which it is to be received, other than to state that it may be taken online. For information on the training requirement and for access to training developed by the Office of the Attorney General, see the Attorney General’s Open Government Training Web page.