### SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE -- 1

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As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and renders it without legal effect. *Lacey v. Maricopa County*, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, "[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived." *King v. Atiyeh*, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) *overruled in part by Lacey*, 693 F.3d at 928 (any claims voluntarily dismissed are considered to be waived if not re-pled). Liberally construing the Second Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that it does not cure the deficiencies of the prior complaints.

In Count I, Plaintiff asserts violations of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, interference with "legal access rights" and First Amendment violations. ECF No. 18 at 4. He states that unspecified "Defendants did hinder, delay access to legal law library. Plaintiff needing and asking for research and materials, for researching of case law for various court cases, needing case law and that of pleadings for Defendants did fail to perform a duty that he/she is required to do and which caused the constitutional violations." *Id.* at 4–5 (as written in original). Plaintiff contends that he was not given a "hearing or to be heard regarding such unlawful seizure of personal property when contested by plaintiff." *Id.* at 5 (as written in original).

In Count II, Plaintiff asserts "bad faith" retaliation under the First

Amendment. He claims unspecified Defendants "did violate cruel & unusual
punishment acting in bad faith by Arbitrarly refusing/Rejecting neglecting unto

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improper Grievance procedures – applications. Against prison officials . . ." Id. at 8 (as written in original). Plaintiff states that "Defendants Actions of bad faith saying watch callout and was not on call out is improper and denial of proper procedures and meaningful access to the law library." Id.

In Count III, Plaintiff asserts deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment, as well as "equal protection" and "conspiracy." He states, "Defendants did deny Plaintiff Redress of Grievances, in conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 & 1986 by their intentional collaboration with other Also in direct violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 "Deprivation of Rights under color of law," And various state Regulations. Defendants through a "code of silence & officials covering for each other's violation of prisoners rights & statutorial rights Plaintiff Sherrill was given sanctions & punitive measure." *Id.* at 10–11 (as written in original). Plaintiff has presented no factual allegations supporting these conclusory assertions.

#### PROPERTY DEPRIVATION

As the Court informed Plaintiff on numerous occasions, a claim of the negligent or intentional unauthorized deprivation of property by state officials does not state a federal cause of action under section 1983 if the plaintiff has an adequate post-deprivation state remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (holding that negligent loss of

property is not actionable under the Due Process Clause). Washington law provides that prisoners, who believe that property of value belonging to them has been lost or damaged due to staff negligence, may file a claim pursuant to RCW 4.92.100. *See also* WAC 137-36-060.

Because Washington State provides Plaintiff an adequate post-deprivation state remedy, regardless of whether he is satisfied with that remedy, his section 1983 personal property claim lacks an arguable basis in law. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim regarding his property upon which relief may be granted.

#### **GRIEVANCES**

The manner in which a grievance is processed is not a constitutional deprivation. Prisoners lack a constitutional right to a specific grievance procedure. *See Ramirez v. Galaza*, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); *Mann v. Adams*, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, mere dissatisfaction with the remedy process or its results cannot, without more, support a claim for relief for violation of a constitutional right.

The failure of prison officials to entertain a prisoner's administrative grievance does not violate his or her constitutional rights because the right to petition the government is the right of access to the courts, not the administrative process. *See Flick v. Alba*, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991); *see also Baltoski v. Pretorius*, 291 F. Supp. 2d 807, 811 (N.D. Ind. 2003) ("The right to petition the government for redress of grievances, however, does not guarantee a favorable

response, or indeed any response, from state officials."). Plaintiff's assertions regarding the processing of his grievances do not state a due process claim upon which relief may be granted.

# **ACCESS TO THE COURTS**

Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, state prisoners have a right of access to the courts. *Lewis v. Casey*, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right of access is limited to complaints in direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. *Id.* at 354; *Simmons v. Sacramento Cty. Super. Ct.*, 318 F.3d 1156, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that "a prisoner has no constitutional right of access to the courts to litigate an unrelated civil claim.").

To establish the denial of meaningful access to the courts, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered an "actual injury" as a result of the defendants' actions. *See Lewis v. Casey*, 518 U.S. 343, 351–52 (1996) (stating that an inmate bringing an access to the courts claim must establish that he or she has suffered an "actual injury"); *Vandelft v. Moses*, 31 F.3d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that an inmate must establish he or she has suffered an "actual injury" where he or she alleges that he or she was denied reasonable access to the law library). Further, "*Bounds* [v. *Smith*, 430 U.S. 817, 823 (1977)] 'guarantee[d] no particular methodology but rather the conferral of a capability—the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the

courts." *Phillips v. Hurst*, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009) (*quoting Lewis*, 518 U.S. at 356).

"Because *Bounds* did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense." *Lewis*, 518 U.S. at 351. "[A]n inmate must show that official acts or omissions 'hindered his efforts to pursue a [non-frivolous] legal claim." *Phillips*, 588 F.3d at 655 (*citing Lewis*, 518 U.S. at 351).

Plaintiff has presented no facts from which the Court could infer that he has suffered an actual injury to "contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim." *Lewis*, 518 U.S. at 348. Plaintiff does not explain why access to a law library would assist in attempting to cure the factual deficiencies identified in his complaint(s), especially when the Court provided him with the legal standards. Plaintiff has failed to state an access to court claim upon which relief may be granted.

# **RETALIATION**

"Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal," *Rhodes v*.

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff presents no facts from which the Court could infer that identified Defendants retaliated against him.

# **EIGHTH AMENDMENT**

Apart from his conclusory assertions of "deliberate indifference," Plaintiff has presented no facts from which the Court could infer that identified Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiff's health or safety. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). Deliberate indifference exists when the prison official "acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm." *Id.* at 842. Negligence is not actionable under section 1983. *Davidson v. Cannon*, 474 U.S. 344, 347–48 (1986). Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim upon which relief may be granted. In addition, his conclusory assertions of "equal protection" and "conspiracy," in the absence of any factual allegations against identified Defendants as to when or where any constitutional deprivation occurred, do not state a claim upon which the Court may grant relief.

Although granted the opportunity to do so, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, **IT IS ORDERED** that this action is **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE** for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) a prisoner who brings three or more civil actions or appeals which are dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a claim will be precluded from bringing any other civil action or appeal in forma pauperis "unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiff is advised to read the statutory provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint may count as one of the three dismissals allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and may adversely affect his ability to file future claims in forma pauperis.

IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Clerk is directed to enter this Order, enter Judgment, provide copies to Plaintiff, and CLOSE the file. The District Court Clerk is further directed to provide a copy of this Order to the Office of the Attorney General of Washington, Corrections Division. The Court certifies that any appeal of this dismissal would not be taken in good faith.

**DATED** March 11, 2022.

s/Rosanna Malouf Peterson ROSANNA MALOUF PETERSON Senior United States District Judge

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