1 2 3 4 The Honorable Douglass A. North 5 Noted for Hearing: October 26, 2022 Without Oral Argument 6 STATE OF WASHINGTON 7 KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT 8 STATE OF WASHINGTON, NO. 20-2-07774-7 SEA 9 Plaintiff, PLAINTIFF STATE OF WASHINGTON'S 10 MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT META PLATFORMS, INC. 11 META PLATFORMS, INC., formerly doing business as FACEBOOK, INC., 12 Defendant. 13 14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc. (Meta) has spent years blatantly disregarding 16 Washington's Commercial Advertiser Law and making empty promises of transparency. The 17 time has come to hold Meta accountable. 18 Throughout the conduct at issue in this case, Meta has demonstrated both a flouting of 19 Washington's interests in election transparency and a disdain of Meta's own legal obligations. 20 As the Court stated, the Commercial Advertiser Law "provid[es] the information that citizens 21 need in order to be able to make intelligent decisions about their self-government. And that is an 22 essential part of democracy." Tr. at 30:16-20.1 Yet this case demonstrates that Meta has no 23 regard for the important interests served by the Law; indeed, Meta argued as much. Instead, Meta 24 25 ¹The transcript to the September 2, 2022 Motion for Summary Judgment hearing and the Court's rulings 26 on parties' summary judgment motions is attached hereto as Exhibit B and is cited to as "Tr. at page:line" herein.

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opted for non-compliance over and over again, choosing to double-down *during this case* by instituting formalized policies and procedures that are wholly inconsistent with the law and that deter or frustrate those who seek the very information the law provides. This pattern of conduct supports imposing the maximum statutory penalty of \$10,000 per violation. In addition, given that Meta previously paid a significant penalty in Plaintiff State of Washington's (State) first enforcement action with no effect but Meta instituting further procedures to entrench its unlawful conduct, it is apparent that the maximum penalty is needed to compel Meta's compliance with Washington law. The State accordingly brings this Motion for Entry of Judgment for adjudication of the penalty amount and entry of all other relief and remedies set forth in the Court's October 6, 2022 Order.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On September 2, 2022, the Court granted the State's Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that Meta intentionally violated RCW 42.17A.345 and WAC 390-18-050 (collectively, the "Commercial Advertiser Law" or the "Law"). At the same time, the Court also denied Meta's Motion for Summary Judgment. On October 6, 2022, the Court entered a written order on its summary judgment ruling granting the State's motion for summary judgment (October 6 Order). The October 6 Order concluded that Meta had intentionally committed 822 violations of the Commercial Advertiser Law by failing to timely make available for inspection required information about requested political advertisements relating to Washington state and local elections (Washington Political Advertisements) between December 2018 and September 2021. See October 6 Order (Dkt. No. 267).

In its October 6 Order, the Court further determined that Meta intentionally violated the Commercial Advertiser Law under RCW 42.17A.780, based upon, among other factors: "(1) Meta's compliance history, which includes Meta's pattern of knowing and repeated violations of [the Commercial Advertiser Law] despite enforcement actions by the State related to Meta's conduct; (2) Meta's extensive experience with campaign finance law and procedures

and the substantial resources at Meta's disposal for compliance with such requirements; and (3) Meta's lack of good faith and failure to acknowledge and take responsibility for its violations." Id. at 6, ¶ 7. The October 6 Order also ordered injunctive relief directed to Meta's compliance with the Commercial Advertiser Law, reimbursement of the State's costs and attorneys' fees, and that the base judgment amount "consisting of the total of the civil penalty assessed against Meta and the amount of Meta's reimbursement of the State's costs and fees . . . be trebled as punitive damages." Id. at 6–8.

For purposes of this Motion, the State incorporates the Statements of Fact contained in: (1) the State's Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) the State's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; and (3) the State's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. The State also incorporates the Court's September 2, 2022, oral ruling and the Court's October 6 Order granting the State's Motion for Summary Judgment.

III. ARGUMENT

A. This Court Should Assess the Maximum Penalty Against Meta for Its Numerous Intentional Violations of Washington Law

RCW 42.17A.750 (Section 750) provides that this Court can assess a base civil penalty against Meta of up to \$10,000 for each of its violations of the Commercial Advertiser Law.² With regard to determining the specific amount to be assessed for each violation, Section 750 states that the Court may consider "the nature of the violation and any relevant circumstances" and lists several factors. RCW 42.17A.750(1)(d). The factors relevant to this case include: (1) Meta's history of lack of compliance; (2) Meta's experience and sophistication with campaign finance requirements; (3) the financial scope of Meta's campaign finance activity; (4) Meta's lack of good faith efforts to comply and lack of demonstrated desire to acknowledge and take responsibility for the violation; and (5) other factors unique to Meta and its unlawful

²Section 750 also authorizes this Court to enjoin any act prohibited, or compel any act required, by the Commercial Advertiser Law. RCW 42.17A.750(1)(h)(i). In its October 6 Order, the Court granted the State's request for this remedy, including adopting the text of the injunction to be entered against Meta.

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conduct in this case, detailed below. *Id.* In its October 6 Order, the Court already concluded that many of the factors identified in RCW 42.17A.750 exist in this case. *See* October 6 Order at 6, ¶ 7 (noting Meta's history of "knowing and repeated violations," "extensive experience with campaign finance law," resources, "lack of good faith," and failure to take responsibility).

1. Meta's history of lack of compliance

As detailed in the State's Motion for Summary Judgment, this is the second enforcement lawsuit against Meta related to the Commercial Advertiser Law, yet Meta has *never* fully complied. In 2018, the State filed its first lawsuit against Meta for having continuously failed to comply with RCW 42.17A.345's record keeping and inspection requirements since at least 2013 (the time-period permitted under the statute of limitations). First Decl. of S. Todd Sipe in Supp. of State's Mot. for Summ. J. (Sipe Decl.) (filed July 15, 2022), Exs. D, FF–HH. This first case was resolved with a stipulated judgment entered in December 2018 under which Meta paid the State \$200,000.00 as a civil penalty and an additional \$38,500.00 for the State's costs and fees, and "expressing their commitment to transparency in campaign finance and political advertising[.]" *Id.* at Ex. E; October 6 Order at 3, ¶ 4.

Despite this penalty, awareness of the Law's requirements, and having been given a clean slate, Meta continued intentionally violating the Law from the instant the judgment in the first case was entered. Soon thereafter, Meta was again the subject of multiple complaints and a Public Disclosure Commission (PDC) investigation relating to Commercial Advertiser Law violations. First Decl. of Phil Stutzman in Supp. of State's Mot. for Summ. J. (filed July 15, 2022), Exs. A, B. But this was just the start. As this Court determined, Meta failed to comply with every request it received from the time the first case ended though at least the date of the filing of the amended complaint in this second case. October 6 Order at 3, ¶ 7. Meta has never provided all required information in response to any request, and in the instances where Meta provided some information beyond what is publicly available in the Ad Library, Meta's response often took weeks or months and included redactions Meta intentionally made to obscure required

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information from its response to requests. *Id.* Meta engaged in this behavior even though it gathers and retains all of the required information in its regular course of business. October 6 Order at 2-3, ¶ 2; Tr. at 31:21-25.

Further exacerbating Meta's intentional pattern of non-compliance, during the course of this litigation Meta created and implemented a formalized process, which includes its attorneys in this enforcement action, for handling inspection requests that flagrantly disregards the requirements of our State's law. October 6 Order at 4–5, ¶¶ 11–13. Specifically, Meta provides an email link on its website for people to make inspection requests,³ and emails to that address are directed to Meta's Kirkland & Ellis LLP attorneys who represent Meta in this action. See Sipe Decl., Ex. Z at 9–10. Requestors then receive an auto-response directing them to the Ad Library and stating that the requestor will be sent a form to fill out if the requestor is seeking information not contained in the Ad Library. A Kirkland & Ellis attorney then sends the requestor a PDF form and directs the requestor to complete and return the Form. Id. Meta's formalized process for responding to requests violates the Commercial Advertiser Law in many ways, including the making of manual redactions of information that the Law expressly requires be made available and limiting requests to Washington residents and Washington political advertisements spanning a single year even though the Law requires availability for ads covering at least five years. October 6 Order at 4-5, ¶ 11-13. This is despite Meta's knowledge of the Law's requirements.

In sum, Meta has repeatedly and intentionally violated Washington law over many years rather than make any meaningful effort to comply. Meta has chosen to respond to citizen complaints, the PDC's referral, and the prosecution of this case by formalizing and expanding on its unlawful conduct.

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³As of the date of this filing, Meta continues to direct requesters to the email address. *See* Meta Business Help Center, Meta, https://www.facebook.com/business/help/935490686658151 (last visited Oct. 13, 2022).

2. Meta's experience and sophistication with campaign finance requirements

Meta is the largest social media company in the world. Meta boasts 3.64 billion users worldwide and \$117 billion in annual revenue, 97.5% of which (nearly \$115 billion) comes from digital advertising. First Decl. of Tony Perkins in Supp. of State's Mot. for Summ. J. (filed July 15, 2022) (Perkins Decl.), Ex. 1 at 50–51, 94; Decl. of Elana S. Matt in Supp. of State's Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (filed Aug. 16, 2022), Ex. JJ. A significant part of Meta's business provides platforms for political advertising across the United States and in more than 160 countries around the world. Perkins Decl., Exs. 1, 3. As such, Meta has substantial experience and capabilities for navigating transparency requirements for political advertising in a wide range of jurisdictions. For example, Meta has made changes and/or tailored its Ad Libraries in other countries, such as Canada, France, and India, to comply with the specific legal requirements of those countries, but has chosen not to do so for Washington. Sipe Decl., Exs. B at 332:1–10, 359:12–362:12; EE at 153:19–155:13. Despite its significant resources and capabilities, Meta, for its own business reasons, has simply made the decision not to comply with Washington's Commercial Advertiser Law.

3. Financial scope of Meta's campaign finance activity

As noted, Meta engages in extensive campaign finance activity by providing and facilitating the targeting of political advertisements intended to influence elections, including Washington state and local elections. Although Meta has trumpeted its purported ban on Washington Political Advertisements during the course of this litigation, Meta was aware that its ban would not and did not ban all Washington Political Advertisements from appearing on its platforms. October 6 Order at 3, ¶ 5. Indeed, Meta has displayed at least 1,600 Washington Political Advertisements since 2018. *Id.* at 4, ¶ 10; Sipe Decl., Exs. A at 4; B at 229:4–231:7; Perkins Decl. ¶ 22. PDC records evidence that Washington state and local campaigns and candidates have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on Washington political advertising on Meta since December 2018. *Id.* at Exs. 11, 12, 18, 20, 19, 21, 15, 17.

4. Meta's lack of good faith efforts to comply and lack of demonstrated desire to acknowledge and take responsibility for its violations

As described above and in the State's Motion for Summary Judgment, Meta has been well aware of the Commercial Advertiser Law and its requirements since at least 2018. Despite receiving a clean slate in December 2018 and its public statements and testimony touting its commitment to transparency⁴, Meta chose time and time again to continue repeatedly violating the Commercial Advertiser Law. Meta knew that it was continuing to violate the Commercial Advertiser Law when it half-heartedly implemented a ban "you could drive a Mack Truck through," Tr. at 32:6–7, resulting in Washington Political Advertisements continuing to appear on Meta's platform in large numbers. Meta knew it was violating the Commercial Advertiser Law when it ignored requestors and instituted a process that made it more cumbersome (and unlawfully so) for requestors to obtain the required information for advertisements that were displayed. And Meta knew it was violating the Commercial Advertiser Law when it refused to respond to requests for weeks and months at a time, producing redacted and incomplete information when and if it ever responded. This pattern wreaks of bad faith.

5. Other factors unique to Meta and its unlawful conduct in this case

Other factors unique to Meta, including the brazenness of its behavior, also support assessing the maximum penalty in this case. Meta, due to its size and impact, is at the center of much discussion and controversy around election integrity and transparency. In an effort to deflect such controversy, Meta publicly touts the importance of transparency, but then chooses for business and profit reasons to violate the very laws that serve those purposes in Washington State. Further, unlike most businesses operating in Washington that strive to comply with this State's laws, Meta arrogantly "justified" its pattern of intentional violations by claiming—without any support—that its own business model and business decisions made

⁴Meta's CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, and former COO, Sheryl Sandberg, have gone as far as endorsing a proposed federal law, the Honest Ads Act, which has many of the same record keeping and inspection requirements for digital advertisers as those set forth by the Commercial Advertiser Law.

compliance "impossible." The Court correctly concluded that these assertions are both unsupported and inconsistent with common sense given Meta's need for, and use of, the very information covered by the Commercial Advertiser Law. Meta's actions at every turn have conveyed a sense of entitlement by Meta to set its own rules in the name of its own business interests and a perceived freedom to disregard those that have been enacted by the people and lawmakers of this State. Under these circumstances, unique to Meta and its behavior, the penalty assessed should not constitute a mere cost of doing business for Meta, but to the full extent the law allows should reflect the particularly egregious nature of Meta's continuing violations in this case.

B. The Requested Base Civil Penalty for Meta's Repeated and Intentional Violations of Washington Law

In accordance with the factors identified in Section 750(d), this Court should impose the maximum civil penalty against Meta for its intentional and repeated violations of the Commercial Advertiser Law. That Meta continued to intentionally commit the very same violations of the Commercial Advertiser Law after already making a substantial payment to resolve the State's first case underscores that the maximum penalty is needed to compel Meta, with its massive resources, to alter its conduct to come into compliance with Washington law. Accordingly, the State requests that the Court impose the maximum base penalty of \$10,000 for each of Meta's 822 violations of Washington's campaign finance law, for a total base civil penalty of \$8,220,000, which under the trebling already ordered by this Court in its October 6 Order would result in a total civil penalty assessed against Meta of \$24,660,000.

C. Separate Cost Bill Will Identify Amount of State's Fees and Costs Awarded to State

In accordance with RCW 42.17A.780 (Section 780), the Court has awarded the State "all reasonable costs of investigation and trial, including reasonable attorneys' fees" incurred in the prosecution of this case. *Id.* The State will identify the amount of such costs and fees in a separate cost bill.

1	IV. CONCLUSION
2	The State respectfully requests this Court enter the final judgment against Meta attached
3	as Exhibit A to this Motion and assess the trebled civil penalty on Meta set forth therein in the
4	amount of \$24,660,000.00, and enter all other relief provided under the Court's October 6 Order.
5	DATED this 13th day of October 2022.
6	ROBERT W. FERGUSON
7	Attorney General
8	/s/ S. Todd Sipe S. TODD SIPE, WSBA #23203
9	ELANA S. MATT, WSBA #37719 PAUL M. CRISALLI, WSBA #40681
10	JEFFREY C. GRANT, WSBA #11046 CRISTINA SEPE, WSBA #53609
11	Assistant Attorneys General Complex Litigation Division
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13	(206) 464-7744 todd.sipe@atg.wa.gov
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15	jeffrey.grant@atg.wa.gov cristina.sepe@atg.wa.gov Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Washington
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17	I certify that this memorandum contains 2,705 words, in compliance with the Local Civil Rules.
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1	<u>DECLARATION OF SERVICE</u>
2	I hereby declare that on this day I caused the foregoing document to be served,
3	via electronic mail, per agreement, on the following:
4	Robert M. McKenna Amanda M. McDowell
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17 18	gabi.belzil@kirkland.com
19	Attorneys for Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc., formerly doing business as Facebook, Inc.
20	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the
21	foregoing is true and correct.
22	DATED this 13th day of October 2022, at Seattle, Washington.
23	/s/ S. Todd Sipe S. TODD SIPE, WSBA #23203
24	Assistant Attorney General
25	
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Exhibit A

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5				The Honorable Douglass A. North Noted for Hearing: October 26, 2022 Without Oral Argument
7	STATE OF WASHINGTON KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT			
8	STAT	E OF WASHINGTON,		NO. 20-2-07774-7 SEA
9		Plaintiff,		[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT AGAINST
10	v.			META PLATFORMS, INC.
11	 META	A PLATFORMS, INC., former	lv doing	
12		ss as FACEBOOK, INC.,		
13		Defendant.		
14				
15		I. JUDGN	MENT SUM	MARY (RCW 4.64.030)
16	A.	JUDGMENT CREDITOR:	Plaintiff ST	CATE OF WASHINGTON
17	B.	JUDGMENT DEBTOR:		ATFORMS, INC., bing business as FACEBOOK, INC.
18	C.	PRINCIPAL JUDGMENT:		0.00 civil penalty
19			(\$8,220,000	0.00 penalty trebled)
20	D.	COSTS AND FEES:		mined by separate order following entry of lent (costs and fees amount trebled)
21	E.	INTEREST:	<i>y C</i>	ment interest is owed. Interest will accrue on
22	L. INTER		total judgm	ent amount (principal plus costs and fees) at ar starting from the date the payments are due.
23	F.	ATTORNEYS FOR		W. FERGUSON, Attorney General
24		JUDGMENT CREDITOR:	S. TODD S	CRISALLI, WSBA #40681
25			ELANA S.	MATT, WSBA #37719 SEPE, WSBA #53609
26				C. GRANT, WSBA #11046

[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT AGAINST META PLATFORMS, INC. – NO. 20-2-07774-7 SEA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON Complex Litigation Division 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744

1	Assistant Attorneys General
2 3 4	G. ATTORNEYS FOR JUDGMENT DEBTOR: ROBERT M. MCKENNA, WSBA #18327 AMANDA M. MCDOWELL, WSBA #52312 AARON P. BRECHER, WSBA #47212 MARK S. PARRIS, WSBA #13870 ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
5	K. WINN ALLEN, Pro Hac Vice
6	KATHERINE E. CANNING, <i>Pro Hac Vice</i> JULIE M.K. SIEGAL, <i>Pro Hac Vice</i>
7	ELIZABETH HEDGES, <i>Pro Hac Vice</i> ASHLEY E. LITTLEFIELD, <i>Pro Hac Vice</i>
	TRACIE BRYANT, Pro Hac Vice GABRIELLE BELZIL, Pro Hac Vice
8	KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
9	II. JUDGMENT
10	THIS MATTER came before the Court for hearing on cross-motions for summary
11	judgment on September 2, 2022. Plaintiff State of Washington (State) appeared by and through
12	its counsel, Assistant Attorneys General S. TODD SIPE, ELANA S. MATT, and PAUL M.
13	CRISALLI. Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc., formerly doing business as Facebook, Inc. (Meta),
14	appeared by and through its counsel K. WINN ALLEN, TRACIE BRYANT, and
15	GABRIELLE BELZIL, of Kirkland & Ellis LLP, and ROBERT M. MCKENNA and MARK S.
16	PARRIS, of Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP.
17	The Court, having considered the parties' briefing and arguments, along with the prior
18	records and files in this case, and having issued an oral ruling on September 2, 2022, and written
19	orders on October 6, 2022, granting the State's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying
20	Meta's Motion for Summary Judgment, and additionally having considered the State's Motion
21	for Entry of Judgment, Meta's Response, and the State's Reply, and being otherwise fully
22	advised in the premises, now therefore enters Judgment as follows:
23	A. Judgment Amount
24	1. Meta shall be assessed a civil penalty under RCW 42.17A in the amount of
25	\$24.660.000.00 for 822 violations of Washington's Commercial Advertiser Law, as set forth in

the Court's September 2, 2022 oral ruling and October 6, 2022 order, inclusive of trebling ordered by the Court as punitive damages in its October 6, 2022 order for Meta's intentional

- Meta shall pay the amount awarded in Paragraph 1 by wire transfer, pursuant to instructions that will be provided by the State of Washington, or by check or money order made payable to the Washington State Treasurer and sent to the Public Disclosure Commission, PO Box 40908, Olympia, WA 98504-0908 within 30 days from the date of the entry of this Judgment. Payment should reference/identify the case number and Defendant's name for
- Costs and attorneys' fees previously awarded to the State of Washington in the October 6, 2022 order shall be in an amount determined by separate order.
- Pursuant to the Court's October 6, 2022 order, the amount of costs and attorneys' fees awarded in Paragraph 3 of this Order shall also be trebled as punitive damages for Meta's
- Meta shall pay the amounts awarded for costs and attorneys' fees by wire transfer, pursuant to instructions that will be provided by the State of Washington, or by check or money order made payable to the Washington State Treasurer and sent to the Public Disclosure Commission, PO Box 40908, Olympia, WA 98504-0908 within 30 days from the date of the Court's order determining the amount of costs and attorneys' fees awarded to the State. Payment should reference/identify the case number and Defendant's name for reference.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that within 30 days of this final judgment and into the future that:

Meta shall come into full compliance with the requirements of RCW 42.17A.345 and WAC 390-18-050 for any and all political advertising and electioneering communications that pertain to Washington state or local elections and ballot measures (Washington Political

1	Advertisements) that have appeared or will appear on any of Meta's platforms. These
2	requirements, include, but are not limited to, (1) timely responding to all inspection requests
3	Meta receives from any member of the public for information about Washington Political
4	Advertisements that Meta is required to maintain under RCW 42.17A.345 and/or
5	WAC 390-18-050; and (2) timely making available for public inspection all information that
6	Meta is required to maintain under RCW 42.17A.345 and/or WAC 390-18-050.
7	Meta is permanently enjoined from conditioning, limiting, or otherwise restricting its
8	compliance with RCW 42.17A.345 and/or WAC 390-18-050 to requests that (a) identify the
9	requestor's citizenship or residency status; (b) that include a timeframe less than authorized by
10	RCW 42.17A.345 or WAC 390-18-050; (c) that limit the number or scope of advertisements to
11	less than authorized by RCW 42.17A.345 or WAC 390-18-050; or (d) are otherwise limited or
12	burdened in a manner not authorized by RCW 42.17A.345 or WAC 390-18-050.
13	Furthermore, 30 days after the entry of the final judgment, Meta shall file with this Court
14	a sworn certification signed by a person or persons authorized to attest for Meta that Meta has
15	come into full compliance with the terms of this injunction set forth herein.
16	A violation of the Court's injunction will constitute a violation of RCW 42.17A.345.
17	For the purposes of effectuating the injunction entered in this matter, the Court will retain
18	jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter herein after entry of final judgment, as well
19	as the implementation, enforcement, and performance of the terms included in this injunction.
20	IT IS SO ORDERED.
21	DATED this day of 2022.
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23	HONORABLE DOUGLASS A NORTH
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1	Presented by:	
2	ROBERT W. FERGUSON Attorney General	
3		
4	/s/ S. Todd Sipe S. TODD SIPE, WSBA #23203 PAUL M. CRISALLI, WSBA #40681	
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6	JEFFREY C. GRANT, WSBA #11046 Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Washington	
7	Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Washington	
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Exhibit B

Motion for Summary Judgment

State of Washington v. Meta Platforms, Inc. formerly dba Facebook, Inc.

September 2, 2022



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Page 1

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

STATE OF WASHINGTON,)
Plaintiff,) Cause No. 20-2-07774-7 SEA
v.)
META PLATFORMS, INC., formerly doing business as FACEBOOK, INC.,))))
Defendant.)

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Honorable Douglass A. North Presiding
September 2, 2022

TRANSCRIBED BY: Reed Jackson Watkins

Court-Certified Transcription

206.624.3005

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	Page 4
1	-000-
2	September 2, 2022
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4	THE BAILIFF: County Superior Court is now in session.
5	The Honorable Douglass North presiding.
6	THE COURT: Please be seated. Good morning.
7	Okay. So this is State of Washington versus Meta
8	Platforms Inc. It's King County Cause Number 20-2-07774-7
9	SEA.
10	We're here on cross motions for summary judgment. I
11	thought I might sort of set the stage a little bit before we
12	get started on the actual arguments. This case has been
13	pending before me for about two and a half years. Shortly
14	after it was originally filed, Meta, then known as Facebook,
15	filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to seek to have
16	me bar the State from enforcing the public disclosure law
17	and regulations against Meta, as, in essence, arguing a
18	facial challenge to the law under the First Amendment and
19	saying that it was obviously unconstitutional.
20	At that time, I heard the arguments on the preliminary
21	injunction and denied Meta's motion. At that implicitly,
22	though I don't know that I explicitly stated it at that
23	time, rejecting the idea of a facial challenge to the
24	constitutionality of the law of the statutes and
25	regulations and said we need to develop some facts here so

Page 5 that we could determine whether there was a basis for an 1 as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the statute 2 3 and regulations. 4 So we're back here now about two years later. The parties 5 have developed a substantial record, reams and reams of paper are in my office relating to declarations from 6 employees, corporate representatives, experts, deposition 7 excerpts that have been filed, lots of attached reports and 8 compilations and so on. Some of that is helpful to the 10 Court; some of it is not. But it only provides a record 11 from which we can then try to address the issue of whether 12 the statute and regulations are unconstitutional as applied. And so Meta has now renewed its motion to -- for the Court 13 14 to find the statute and regulations unconstitutional, and the State has brought a cross motion for enforcement of 15 16 those elements of the law and seeking to have -- get a Court 17 ruling on a number of violations and the intentionality of 18 the violations and so on. So we should probably take up first the -- Meta's motion 19 20 to find the statute unconstitutional, since obviously, if I 21 were to grant that, then we don't ever get to the point of 22 the enforcement. So I've asked the parties to limit 23 their -- I have read all the briefs. I'd ask the parties to

motion so that we're not here all -- all day.

limit their oral presentations to 15 minutes a side on each

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	Page 6
1	So, Mr. Allen, if you'd like to go ahead with Meta's
2	motion. And
3	THE CLERK: Could I have, Your Honor, appearances?
4	THE COURT: Okay. Sure. The clerk wants to know who
5	everybody is.
6	So perhaps, Mr. Allen, you could go ahead and let us know
7	who you are.
8	MR. ALLEN: Absolutely, Your Honor. My name is Winn Allen
9	from Kirkland Ellis on behalf of Meta.
10	Would the Court allow me to take my mask off or you prefer
11	for me to keep it on?
12	THE COURT: That's fine. I usually allow the attorneys
13	who are making principal presentations to remove their mask
14	because it does greatly aid clarity in doing that.
15	Let's finish the presentation getting the clerk's list
16	of who is speaking now. So my understanding is Ms. Matt is
17	going to be responding to this part of the motion. Is that
18	correct?
19	MS. MATT: Yes, Your Honor. Elana Matt on behalf of the
20	Washington Attorney General's, State of Washington.
21	THE COURT: Okay. And then assuming we get to the State's
22	motion, my understanding is Mr. Sipe is doing that. Is that
23	correct?
24	MR. SIPE: Yes, Your Honor. I'll be representing the
25	State on the State's motion for summary judgment.

	Page 7
1	THE COURT: Okay. And you're responding to that motion,
2	Mr. Allen, if we get to it?
3	MR. ALLEN: I am.
4	THE COURT: Okay. So okay. Now and do you need
5	anything else at this point, Tonja?
6	THE CLERK: Just make sure I have defense appearance, both
7	sides of appearances.
8	THE COURT: Okay. So well, I think that Mr. Allen is
9	doing I guess I'm not sure
10	THE CLERK: I just need to make sure I have appearances
11	for the record, Your Honor.
12	THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. So I think we're set. So okay.
13	MR. ALLEN: And, Your Honor, you mentioned 15 minutes.
14	THE COURT: Uh-huh.
15	MR. ALLEN: Will there be any time for rebuttal on the
16	motion or would you prefer 15 and 15 on our motion and 15
17	and 15 on their motion? I just I don't want to save
18	anything for rebuttal if I'm not going to get
19	THE COURT: Sure, sure. Yeah, I mean, if you want to save
20	a couple minutes for rebuttal, that's fine.
21	MR. ALLEN: Okay.
22	THE COURT: Okay. Sure.
23	MR. ALLEN: So I'll shoot for about 13 minutes and try to
24	save 2 minutes for rebuttal.
25	THE COURT: Okay. That sounds fine.

Page 8

MR. ALLEN: Your Honor, first of all, it's a pleasure to be in front of Your Honor. I do want to address the First Amendment argument. I also would like to spend about a minute on the CDA 230 argument because I also think there's a very substantial question of whether the law is pre-empted by Section 230 in addition to the First Amendment argument.

I do believe the record that's been adduced in summary judgment shows that there is a very, very strong First Amendment as-applied argument here and that the law is unconstitutional as applied to Meta as the Fourth Circuit found in a very similar law in Maryland was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs in that case.

Your Honor, in 49 other states, interests of electoral transparency and integrity are typically served by imposing disclosure requirements on the political speakers, not on the platforms that those speakers use. Washington has taken a different approach and it has imposed a sweeping and burdensome disclosure requirement on neutral platforms that host political advertising. Those unique requirements, the record shows, the undisputed record shows, has had the direct and predictable consequence of reducing the amount of political speech in the state and depriving candidates and campaigns with a valuable avenue for reaching their constituents.

Facebook, Google, and other digital platforms, because of

Page 9 1 the burdensome and unworkable requirements of the platform disclosure law, have banned state and local political 2 advertisements in Washington. This is the only state in 4 which those platforms ban political ads. There is, therefore, as a result, and I think the record shows this 5 clearly, less political speech in Washington today than 6 7 there was before the disclosure law was expanded in 2018 to include digital platforms and less political speech in 8 9 Washington than there is in any other state. 10 It's hard to imagine, Your Honor, a law that has more 11 serious First Amendment consequences. After all, protecting 12 the amount and vitality of political speech is at the very heart of the First Amendment, and laws that effect a 13 14 shutting down of entire platforms to political speech warrant particularly close First Amendment scrutiny. 15 16 I do believe the leading case on this issue that either side has cited, Your Honor, is the Fourth Circuit's decision 17 18 in McManus, which I'm sure you're familiar with. involved -- and a few points about that case that I think 19 20 are very important. McManus involved a Maryland law that also sought to impose political speech disclosure 21 22 obligations on platforms for speech, but that law was much 23 less burdensome than the platform disclosure law in

Washington that's at issue here. Nonetheless, the Fourth

Circuit struck it down on an as-applied basis under the

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Page 10

First Amendment. And the Fourth Circuit recognized two very important things that I also think apply equally in this case, Your Honor.

First, laws that impose disclosure requirements on platforms for speech rather than on political speakers pose special First Amendment concerns because they raise the cost of hosting that speech in a way that threatens to shut the platforms off. And, two, the Maryland law at issue there, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, was not nearly tailored to serve the State's interest.

Now, as the Court's aware from our briefing, there's a disagreement among the parties about what level of scrutiny applies. We believe strict scrutiny should apply. They cite a number of disclosure requirements applying exacting scrut- -- cases applying exacting scrutiny to political speech disclosure laws. The key point I would make on that, Your Honor, is all of the cases cited by the State are imposing political speech disclosure requirements on political speakers, not on platforms.

For the reasons we've set forth in our briefing, we think strict scrutiny is warranted when a state purports to impose political speech disclosure requirements on platforms. But, ultimately, I don't think the Court needs to resolve that question because I think the platform disclosure law, as applied to Meta in this case, fails even intermediate

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Page 11
          scrutiny, and so the Court doesn't need to decide the
 1
 2
          question of what level of scrutiny applies because I think
          the law is so clearly insufficient even under intermediate
          scrutiny.
 4
 5
            Now, the under intermediate scrutiny, as the Court knows,
 6
          the law must be narrowly tailored to serve a sufficiently
 7
          important governmental interest. That's -- the Supreme
          Court of the United States just recently said that in the
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 9
          Bonta decision.
            THE COURT: And you're equating exacting scrutiny with
10
11
          intermediate scrutiny? I'm just trying to make sure --
                        Mean the same thing, Your Honor.
12
            MR. ALLEN:
                        -- (inaudible). Okay. Yeah.
13
            THE COURT:
14
            MR. ALLEN:
                        Strict scrutiny, exacting slash intermediate
15
          scrutiny.
16
            THE COURT:
                        Right. Okay.
17
            MR. ALLEN:
                        I think even the Supreme Court sometimes has
18
          used different words.
19
            THE COURT:
                        Okay. Yeah. I just -- because I wanted to
20
          make sure --
21
            MR. ALLEN:
                        Yes.
22
            THE COURT:
                        -- we weren't thinking of different things.
23
            MR. ALLEN:
                        Correct. No.
2.4
            THE COURT:
                        (Inaudible).
25
                        When I say "exacting" or "intermediate"
            MR. ALLEN:
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Page 12 1 scrutiny, it's the same thing. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. ALLEN: And then the key question is the law has to be 4 narrowly tailored to serve a sufficiently important governmental interest. 5 Now, for the most part, we don't take issue with most of 6 7 the governmental interest the State has asserted in terms of providing information to the electorate about the source of 8 9 the political spending. However, we do not believe this law 10 is narrowly tailored to serve those interests, and I think there's a number of reasons for that. 11 12 First of all, the information the state is seeking to be disclosed pursuant to the disclosure law can be obtained 13 from political speakers themselves, either under current 14 Washington law -- there's a number of disclosure 15 16 requirements in the state that are imposed on political 17 speakers, including electioneering communications and 18 political advertising -- or that law could be updated to include those disclosures. And, frankly, that's the way 19 these interests are served in 49 other states in this 20 21 country. 22 Secondly, and I think this is a very important point that 23 I want to draw the Court's attention to, this law imposes 24 more burdens on platforms for speech than it does on 25 political speakers in Washington. And here's why I say

Page 13 that. Political speakers in Washington are sometimes 1 2 required to make disclosures on a 24-hour or short basis 3 about electioneering communications or political 4 advertisements that they run. However, under State law, those obligations only apply within short windows 5 immediately before an election. I believe it's 60 days for 6 7 electioneering communications; 21 days for political 8 speakers. 9 This law, however, purports to require platforms to make 10 these disclosures 365 days a year. And I think that gets 11 the burdens exactly backwards. If anything, the burdens on 12 mutual platforms for speech should be much less than they are on political speakers for reasons the Fourth Circuit 13 14 articulated in McManus. Here, in Washington, it's currently backwards. 15 16 There's a number of other reasons I think the law is not 17 narrowly tailored. The production time is far, far too 18 The law originally required 24 hours. Now it's two 19 days. Either way, it's much too short when you're dealing 20 with requests that could ask for ad information going back as far as five years. There are various substantive 21 22 disclosures required by the law that don't serve the State's 23 interests in identifying the source of the political 24 advertising, including things like the method of payment, 25 the number of impressions, demographic information of

Page 14

audiences targeted and reached, and that's information that
doesn't serve the State's interest, Your Honor.

There's another example, Your Honor, of why the law is not narrowly tailored, and that's that political speakers aren't required under this law to disclose to platforms that they're running political ads or provide the platforms with the information they need to comply. Now, that was something the state legislature considered and did not enact. I believe it's something the Washington Public Disclosure Commission has considered from time to time but has not implemented pursuant to regulation. It was something that was a feature of the Maryland law that was struck down by McManus, that the speakers actually had to provide the platforms with notice that they're running these ads and information needed to comply. But, again, that's not a feature of this law.

And the reason why that's important is you have to remember in the digital advertising context, Your Honor, these ads are all self-service. It's not like a -- like a newspaper or a broadcasting station where you go engage with someone and ask them if you can run their ad. On Facebook and Google, anyone can go on, using an automated tool, and just run their own ad at their discretion. They don't interact with a human being.

In addition, there's a number of other reasons,

Page 15 1 Your Honor, why we don't think the law is narrowly tailored. 2 The State is not permitting platforms to use reasonable compliance processes, like as detailed in the record here. 4 Facebook developed a process to respond to some of the ads 5 requested it might get, that asked for very basic The State says that violates the law. 6 information. 7 State says the law is not limited to Washington citizens. Anyone in the world can ask for information about the law. 8 9 And so the long and short of it is, Your Honor, under the 10 First Amendment, we believe there's a number of other much 11 more narrowly tailored ways in which the State could serve 12 its interest in electoral transparency and integrity that don't involve imposing burdens on platforms and threatening 13 14 to shut those platforms down for speech, Your Honor. The State -- I'm not sure how long I've been going. 15 Ι think about 10 minutes. 16 17 THE COURT: About that, yes. Yeah. 18 MR. ALLEN: So two more minutes and then I'll sit 19 down, Your Honor. 20 The State makes the point that the law has been around since the '70s and now we're only complaining about it. 21 22 the point I would make there, Your Honor, is the law was 23 updated in June of 2018 in a way that increased its burdens 24 dramatically. It was then that the state legislature 25 amended the law to make clear the law applied to digital

Page 16 1 platforms. It was in 2018 that the PDC implemented its 2 regulations requiring disclosures to be made in 24 hours and 3 requiring digital platforms to produce a lot more 4 information. And sweeping in digital platforms in 2018 is 5 why we're here today. That made the law much, much more burdensome because digital platforms -- because of the 6 7 volume of political ads on digital platforms. Just the burdens on producing information under the law became much 8 9 more significant in 2018, and so there was -- a material change began, Your Honor. 10 11 And the last point I'd leave on the First Amendment, 12 before I spend one minute on the CDA, is, Your Honor, 13 invalidating the disclosure law as applied in this case will 14 not deprive the electorate of information about the political process. Numerous other laws in Washington 15 16 require political speakers to make robust disclosures about 17 political funding and spending. Those laws will remain in 18 place. And the speaker-focused disclosure laws work to serve the interests of electoral information and integrity 19 20 in many other states, and we're just asking that Washington be brought in line with that. 21 22 Now, I do think, Your Honor, that there's a very, very, 23 very significant defense under the CDA 230 here -- CDA 230 24 in this case for two reasons. One is the duty that the 25 State claims Facebook violates derives from Facebook's

Page 17 1 status as a publisher. And if you look at the Barnes v. Yahoo! case from the Ninth Circuit, that case says that 2 CDA 230, quote, precludes liability when the duty that plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derived from its 4 5 status as a -- or conduct as a publisher or speaker. 6 Here the duty the State alleges attach only once Facebook 7 publishes a political ad. The requirements under the law that they identify, to produce information upon request and 8 9 maintain records in certain ways, according to them, that only applies if we run a political ad, if we publish a 10 11 political ad, and that's right in the heart of CDA 230. And, frankly, Congress enacted CDA 230 for the exact reason 12 we have here, because it recognized that monitoring the 13 14 amount of information on digital advertising -- on digital platforms was just infeasible for these platforms given the 15 amount of that content. And that gave Facebook a choice of 16 17 liability or leaving that content up, platforms would 18 respond by shutting their platforms down for speech. 19 do think there's a very viable CDA 230 defense. 20 I think I've gone about a minute above my time. I'd save a few minutes from rebuttal, if the Court will indulge me. 21 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 But thank you for your time. MR. ALLEN: 2.4 THE COURT: Thank you. 25 Okay. So Ms. Matt.

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MS. MATT: Good morning, Your Honor. For decades newspapers, television stations, and other media companies in Washington have complied with the campaign finance disclosure law Meta challenges here and for good reason. The statute serves vitally important purposes of informing the public about efforts to influence Washington's elections. And this purpose is even more important today given the digital and ephemeral nature of the digital media like -- excuse me -- direct and ephemeral nature of digital media, like Facebook. And this is a tool which undeniably has been used to spread mis- and disinformation.

But today we're here because the largest social media company in the world, with 3.64 billion users worldwide and \$117 billion in revenue decided, and it was a choice, that its own priorities were more important than the integrity of Washington's elections. Meta makes a host of arguments about burden, all of which are inconsistent with the facts and not grounded in the law.

Meta's refusal to comply with Washington's law is intentional and nothing in its defenses suggest otherwise. The Court should reject Meta's defenses because under well established precedent, Washington's commercial advertiser law serves vitally important interests. The law is narrowly tailored to serve those interests. And Meta's burden arguments and immunity defense are fully inconsistent with

the testimony of Meta's employees, Meta's own documents, and other evidence.

Regarding Meta's First Amendment defense. Exacting scrutiny is the proper legal standard, Your Honor. It is black letter law that disclosure laws are subject to exacting scrutiny. We provided a long list of precedent in case -- in our response, both in federal and state courts, that confirm this legal standard. And, in fact, this very legal standard, exacting scrutiny, was applied by the United States Supreme Court to uphold recordkeeping and disclosure obligations imposed on third-party broadcasters to post political advertising. That's from the Khan [phonetic] case. The appropriate legal standard is well established and not controversial.

Meta points to two cases in an attempt to avoid this clear precedent, McManus and NIFLA, neither of which change this Court's analysis. In McManus, the Fourth Circuit expressly distinguished its holding from social media, in any event, did not breach the appropriate legal standard. And the facts of NIFLA could not be more different than the present case. In NIFLA, a California law mandated pregnancy centers to disseminate a government-drafted notice about services the pregnancy centers opposed, namely abortion and contraception.

In contrast, several recent cases have applied exacting

Page 20 1 scrutiny to disclosure requirements. Those include Smith v. 2 Helzer, which upheld an Alaska campaign finance disclosure law in July of 2022, and Gaspee Project v. Mederos, 3 4 upholding a Rhode Island campaign finance disclosure law in 5 2020 and also expressly declining to apply NIFLA to disclosure requirements. 6 7 Meta makes passing references to what it claims are decisions by other digital media companies relating to 8 9 political advertising in Washington, but these passing 10 references don't save the day either. Meta provides no 11 competent evidence about the decisions and reasons of these 12 other companies, offering nothing other than its own sheer conjecture. 13 14 In argument today, counsel also argued that there is undeniably less speech. And, respectfully, the State 15 16 disagrees. To support that contention, Meta relies on the expert disclosures of Dr. Steven Weber. Dr. Steven Weber 17 18 looked only at Facebook advertising. And then, even in that, the declaration of -- second declaration of Tony 19 20 Perkins demonstrating that such counting was drastically undercounting, as evidenced by the fact that PDC disclosures 21 22 don't always include the term "Facebook" or "social media" 23 or "digital advertising" in the description.

So there is not unquestionably or indisputably less speech. And, in this case, there -- the appropriate legal

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1 standard is exacting scrutiny.

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The law is also narrowly tailored to serve sufficiently important government interests. As set forth in the State's response, the law serves several important interests, proposing transparency, informing the electorate about who is spending money to influence elections, how that money is being spent, combatting interference, and facilitating enforcement of Washington's campaign finance laws. again, the importance of these government interests have been confirmed by both federal and Washington courts and, as demonstrated by the State's experts and the facts in all of the information required, the law satisfies these -- the information required by the law satisfies these standards. And to be clear, even if compelling -- excuse me -- even if strict scrutiny were to apply, many of the interests articulated in the State's briefing have been found to be compelling interests in cases like Brumsickle, Buckley, McConnell, and McIntyre, and in this Court's decision on OneAmerica.

And it is, of course, the case that the information required by the law serves these interests. Washington's law provides transparency into the who, what, and when of money spent to influence Washington's elections. The who, the name of the sponsor; the what, the specific ad and the demographic information related to targeting, reached

Page 22

impressions, as well as the amount; the when, the dates that the ads were displayed. And Washington law also provides a mechanism for following the money, particularly important for both the informational and enforcement interests by providing payment details, which includes amount, method, and timing of payment, and contact information.

The importance of this information, Your Honor, is illustrated by the second declaration of Tony Perkins, which uses both campaign and Facebook-disclosed information to track a payment made by a campaign through an intermediary to purchase Facebook ads.

With respect to the demographic information for targeting, reach, and impressions. First, targeting is the primary service sold by Meta. This is the case because social science tells us, as confirmed by the expert testimony of the political scientists submitted by the State, that a message can have different meaning to different people. This is not controversial. Meta has premised its entire business on this very notion. And the examples provided by the State's experts illustrate this point. For example, an advertisement for women's gun classes that's targeted only to men. Or an advertisement about increasing black home ownership targeted only to white neighborhoods. This information, targeting, reach, and impressions, provides important context to understand whether an ad is intended to

or, in fact, did mobilize or demobilize. Was it used to garner support or for mere mongering? To understand a political advertisement, one needs to know the intended audience, the targeting, and the reached one, which resulted.

Now, Meta makes much of the timing requirement, but the nature of the digital platforms makes timing both critically important and not at all burdensome. Timing matters here, as articulated in the Honest Ads Act, which Meta has very publicly supported, timely disclosure is — is critical with digital media. And I quote, social media platforms, quote, can target portions of the electorate with direct, ephemeral advertisements, often on the basis of private information the platform has on individuals, enabling political advertisements that are contradictory, racially or socially inflammatory, or materially false.

Now, this differs from the strong incentives for these issues to occur -- strong disincentives for these issues to occur on television, radio, and satellite, because the access those platforms provide to press, fact-checkers, and political opponents.

Now, Meta makes much of the fact that the law is not limited to Washington residents. But social science tells us that people learn about issues in politics through intermediaries like press, like fact-checkers, like

Page 24

community leaders, like political opponents. And to just give an example, there's no reason why the Washington Post, for example, can't have access to the fact-checking in the same way that the Seattle Times can.

So to be clear, digital advertising is direct and ephemeral, and that means that it can be specifically targeted to a group of people at any time for any duration with little to no transparency. Washington law makes this advertising transparent, close in time to when the ad is displayed, so that's important for the informational interest. If I see an ad, I can then go look at the information I need in order to understand the ad, close in time to when I see it, where I see it, as opposed to having to remember months later that I want to go find out more information about that ad and then potentially trying to find that information in a different source.

In addition, the timing is particularly important with Washington's vote by mail, which means Washington state and local elections occur over a period of days or weeks rather than on a date certain, the election day.

And to be clear, Meta's corporate witnesses testified that they collect all of the information in the course of its regular business. And, of course, they do so because the information that is required is required to run the ad in the first place, and the rest is used to calculate and

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process payments. Meta has the information. They use that information. And they do so in near real time or, even crediting Meta's own statements, at the very latest, within 24 hours of first display, when Meta places all ads and the related information, which, again, give credit to Meta's statements, Meta claims is almost everything required by the law in the ad library.

So when faced with the clear value of the required information, Meta shifts to aggrandizing burden. But these arguments are belied by the facts. Meta claims that it must sift through the ads. Yet, it says today, it does that when it applies its own definition of political advertising to place ads in the interests, elections, or politics section of the ad library. Meta claims that others could report, yet advertisers, including Facebook's own political witnesses, would either have to request the information from Facebook, request it from an intermediary, who would then request it from Facebook. And then, even if they get it, that information could not be disclosed with the immediacy required, particularly to serve the informational interests.

Meta claims that it is too difficult to make a
Washington-specific ad library. Yet Meta can and does
modify the ad library based on the legal requirements of
various jurisdictions and based on the type of ad. And, in
any event, nothing in the law requires Meta to use the ad

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library to comply. The State's expert, technical expert who obtained a Ph.D. in computer science based on her extensive study of Facebook, opined that Meta could easily and inexpensively comply through a variety of paths.

The undisputed evidence is that Meta collects the required information as part of its regular course of business but simply made the choice not to provide it because doing so is inconsistent with Meta's political ad strategy and would require it to divert some of its \$117 billion in revenue from other projects. But lack of interest does not equate to excessive burden, especially here when the evidence actually shows that the burden to Meta is minimal.

Now, quickly, counsel referenced Meta's reasonable compliance processes. It referenced to a form. And as described in the State's briefing, the form includes requirements and restrictions that are not consistent with the law. It includes overrestriction that limits the requests to only Washington residents who identify themselves. And it also includes a limitation of one year where the law requires -- allows for a request to be much broader than that, up to five. So that's not a reasonable compliance process under any definition, Your Honor.

So, again, the Court should reject Meta's First Amendment defense. I believe I am approaching the end of my time,
Your Honor. I will just say very quickly that the cases

Page 27 that Meta has provided in support of the Section 230 defense 1 2 are distinguishable. They relate to the content of the ad rather than an obligation to disclose information about the 4 ad. 5 Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 6 So if you want to respond, Mr. Allen. 7 MR. ALLEN: Yes, Your Honor. I will endeavor to be brief. 8 9 Counsel mentioned the McConnell decision as an example of 10 requirements imposed on platforms. McManus distinguished 11 the McConnell decision because it involves broadcasters, 12 which historically have been subject to unique requirements given the scarcity rationale and the limited bandwidth of 13 14 broadcasting spectrum and the licensing, it's very, very 15 different. 16 On targeting, there was a lot of discussion of targeting. 17 That information can be obtained from political speakers 18 themselves, who select the targeting criteria they would 19 like to run. That is a more narrowly tailored way for the State to obtain that information it would like to obtain. 20 Thirdly, the State offered no explanation and never has, 21 22 as far as I can tell, as to why these requirements must be 23 imposed on platforms 365 days a year as opposed to in narrow 24 windows, immediately before elections, as they are for 25 political speakers. I've heard no response from the State

on that point, and that's certainly a more narrowly tailored
way in which the law could be -- could be written to
minimize the burdens on platforms.

There was discussion by counsel for the State that suggested effectively the burdens aren't that significant.

Meta could really apply -- could really comply if they wanted to. That's incorrect, both factually and legally.

Factually, as a practical matter, the record in this case shows that compliance is virtually impossible for digital platforms given the number and nature of the political ads, the number and nature of elections and campaigns in this state. That's why Congress enacted CDA 230. It's because it recognized the difficulties in monitoring so much content on platforms.

But even setting that aside, as a legal matter, the legal question on the First Amendment is not theoretically whether Meta could comply if it just put more money or more resources. The fact that the law requires a platform to devote more money and more resources is the First Amendment harm because it raises the cause of hosting political speech and it puts those platforms to the choice of do they bear those — bear those costs or do they — or do they remove political content from their platform. That is the exact First Amendment concern that is raised by imposing disclosure requirements on platforms, and it's the exact

Page 29 1 First Amendment concern the Supreme Court recognized in 2 Tornillo. 3 Just two quick points I'll leave the Court with. One is, 4 again, it's undisputed from the record that this law has deprived citizens in Washington of the benefits in digital 5 advertising, which are cheaper. Digital advertising is 6 7 It allows for interaction for voters. for more efficient testing of ads. And it's incumbent 8 9 entrenching because digital ads are cheaper. 10 particularly beneficial for small-dollar campaigns, 11 third-party challengers, upstart campaigns. There's several 12 declarations in the record about that. And so the law is actually having the effect of favoring incumbents in 13 14 big-dollar campaigns over small-dollar campaigns. And then, finally, I'll just leave the Court with this 15 16 quote from McManus which said, [As read], because political 17 actors and neutral third-party platforms operate under 18 markedly different incentives, the consequences of a disclosure law vary starkly, depending on where its burdens 19 20 are placed. And when the onus is placed on platforms, we 21 hazard giving government the ability to accomplish 22 indirectly via market manipulation, which it cannot do 23 through direct regulation, control the available channels 24 for political discussions. 25 For those reasons, we submit, Your Honor, that the First

Page 30 1 Amendment as-applied defense is valid here, the CDA 230 2 as-applied defense is valid here, and the Court should grant 3 Meta's motion for summary judgment. 4 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 5 So I will deny Meta's motion for summary judgment. think the law is clearly constitutional under the exacting 6 7 scrutiny standard. It is appropriately the exacting scrutiny standard that applies here. There was some 8 9 confusion about the standards some time back. But in a trilogy of cases in 2010, the Washington -- the U.S. Supreme 10 11 Court made it clear that exacting scrutiny is the 12 appropriate standard for challenges to public disclosure 13 laws. And the reason for that is clear because public 14 disclosure laws serve one of the fundamental interests protected by the First Amendment, which is transparency. 15 16 This is not just somebody trying to regulate speech. 17 is the State providing the information that citizens need in 18 order to be able to make intelligent decisions about their 19 self-government. And that is an essential part of 20 democracy. And as under exacting scrutiny, the U.S. Supreme Court has 21 22 recognized that some small burdens can be placed upon 23 speakers and platforms, when necessary, in order to further 24 that standard of -- in order to further the transparency 25 goals of public disclosure; therefore, it's not simply a

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matter of is -- there can't be any burden placed on speech at all. That would be true if you were simply talking about some law that outright bans a particular category of speech. But when we're talking about public disclosure, which the Court has recognized has a significant role to play in furthering the goals of the First Amendment, in terms of creating greater transparency, some minimal burdens can be imposed.

Meta has not demonstrated in this record any issue relating to burden upon them. All of the information that Meta has provided, whether it's experts or anyone else, starts out with the thing that we can't comply with this, and, therefore, that's their given to begin with. And there is no attempt to analyze whether, in fact, they really could comply with it.

The only evidence that's presented in this record relating to whether it's reasonable that Meta could comply with it is provided by the State. Their information from the experts and -- that they provided indicates that it would be perfectly reasonable for Meta to be able to comply with this. The only thing that the law requires that has to be -- information that has to be made available is the information that Meta is already collecting. They necessarily collect it in order to be able to run the ads that they're running. So they -- all they have to do in

1 order to display it is essentially press a button. 2 there may be some small additional effort in sorting through 3 special cases as to whether something is or isn't a digital 4 ad, but they're already doing that in what they've done in 5 setting up an ad library and banning political ads in Washington, which is kind of a -- you know, a ban you could 6 7 drive a Mack Truck through since they're not really trying to enforce it in any way. It's -- clearly is applicable. 8 9 The targeting information that is essential here is not, 10 as Meta suggests, available always from the actual political 11 speaker because frequently, as is pointed out in State's 12 materials, the targeting is done through intermediaries and in consultation with the platform, with Meta. It's not done 13 14 by the political speaker, him or herself, and so the political speaker wouldn't be able to tell you how it's 15 16 targeted. It's the intermediaries and Meta that determine 17 how -- what demographics they're shooting for, whether 18 people are being picked out because they visited certain websites, they've expressed an interest in certain kinds of 19 20 things. As the State points out, the targeting is, of course, the whole point of digital ads. 21 22 distinguishes ads in the digital form from all other kinds 23 of advertising. You know, you can't do that kind of 24 targeting through ads in the newspaper or on radio or TV. 25 They're simply sent out to the public at large. The digital

Page 33

medium allows it to be targeted to specifically those folks that might be interested in it. And, as pointed out by the State, that can be done both for purposes of actually trying to target the people that will be interested in the ad and also being used in a negative way to try and discourage people who would otherwise not, in terms of the interest in the ads. And it's -- often, it is the targeting that tells you what the point of the ad is. Without the targeting information, you simply don't know what it is that's trying to be accomplished with the ad.

The Washington law is narrowly tailored to get exactly the information that is needed to serve the purpose of public disclosure, providing the information to the public that is needed to be -- for the public to be able to judge what is happening with these political ads.

In essence, the only reason why Meta refuses to comply with the law is, to put it colloquially, they don't want to let the public see how the sausage is made. They don't want the public to be able to judge the targeting that's being done. They don't want the public to know what kind of ads people are running that encourage or discourage people from participating in various events because it's a very lucrative business for Meta. And without the -- and if they've got to reveal that information, they may -- there may be less of it. And so they make -- make less money if

Page 34 1 people have to tell -- to know what it is that's going on 2 here. 3 This is clearly an appropriate subject for public 4 disclosure, and the law is clearly constitutional. 5 So that brings us to the second part of the case, which is the State's motion for summary judgment. And I believe, 6 Mr. Sipe, you're presenting that? 7 MR. SIPE: Yes, Your Honor. 8 9 Good morning, Your Honor. I'm assistant attorney general 10 Todd Sipe. I'm representing the State on the State's 11 summary judgment motion. This case is about a large and 12 powerful company that believes it's entitled to ignore 13 Washington law, even one that's existed for decades before 14 the company was formed. And I want to just quickly address something that was raised earlier. Meta has always been 15 16 subject to this law. It was not changed in any way in 2018 17 to make Meta subject to it at that time. And it was not expanded in 2018. The definition of commercial advertiser 18 has always included entities that sell the service of 19 20 communicating messages to the general public or segments of the public for the purpose of appealing directly or 21 22 indirectly to votes for financial or other support in any 23 election campaign. That fits Facebook to the tee, and 24 that's always been the definition. 25 The PDC rules that were enacted in that time were --

provided some additional details. They provided some more
flexibility in the way that this information could be
disseminated. But they didn't expand the law. And they
didn't become duly appliant [phonetic] to Facebook in 2018.
And, in fact, the violations that Facebook has committed
apply equally to the statute that's always been there as to
the rules that were put in place in 2018.

2.4

So Meta is arrogantly justifying its decision to just flatly ignore Washington's law by complaining it does not comport with its priorities or strategies. But the priorities of the people of the state that overwhelmingly enacted our campaign finance law via initiative, the priorities of the legislature, the priorities of the regulators charged with enacting rules and enforcing the campaign transparency laws of the state appear to mean little, if anything, to Meta.

Summary judgment is appropriate here because the undisputed facts confirm that Meta's numerous violations of the law and because, as my co-counsel has addressed, Meta has failed to demonstrate a legal and factual basis for its defenses. Indeed, the undisputed facts show more than mere violations. They confirm that Meta has chosen to deliberately defy the express requirements of Washington law. Meta is not above the law and should be held accountable.

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The material facts demonstrating Meta's intentional violations of Washington law are not disputed. In light of all the obfuscation, it's important to catalog what is not being disputed here, which provides a clearer picture of Meta's unlawful conduct. It is not disputed that Meta received and acknowledged inspection requests made under Washington laws by Eli Sanders and Tallman Trask in 2019 and a second inspection request from Mr. Sanders in the summer of 2021. It is undisputed that Meta did not respond with the required information to the 2019 request beyond what's contained in the ad library for months. And even then provided incomplete information and did not provide that information to the requester's themselves.

Clearly, Meta did not promptly respond, as required, to those requests under any reasonable definition based on the undisputed facts.

With regard to Mr. Sanders's 2021 request, despite having more than two years to update and enhance its compliance process, it's not disputed that Meta once again provided the information in response to this request over a period of weeks and months. The last batch of information was provided in December 2021, five months after the request was made.

It's not disputed that even these records redacted required targeting information and were missing other

Page 37 required data. In fact, the State has identified 41 ads 1 2 covered by that request in which no data was provided at all. Clearly, once again, Meta did not promptly respond as 4 required under any reasonable definition. There's also no dispute of the facts set out in Zach 5 Wurtz's declaration, about his requests. There could not be 6 7 since the Wurtz's correspondence with Meta, including his written inspection requests, are all attached to the 8 9 declaration itself so the Court can see what -- what the 10 requests were. And they've been admitted as authentic by 11 Meta. 12 Rather, what Meta looks to ignore is the legal obligations arising from those facts. For example, Meta claims that 13 14 it's entitled to ignore most of Wurtz's requests because he purportedly didn't identify himself by his given name. 15 16 there's no requirement anywhere under the law that Wurtz needed to do that. Meta justifies substituting its own rule 17 18 because it claims the information to be, quote, not public, 19 unquote, or sensitive, unquote. 20 It also arbitrarily presumes that it can limit requests to

It also arbitrarily presumes that it can limit requests to
just confirmed Washingtonians for that same reason.

However, the people of the state, the legislature, the state
regulators, have already determined that this -- that the
public, whether you're a journalist, whether you're an
activist, whether you're an academic or anyone else, is

Page 38

entitled to this very information that Meta -- regardless of how Meta labels it. And they have decided not to set the limits that Meta has chosen to impose on its own, based on its own priorities.

Meta also doesn't dispute that it instituted a formulized process -- a formalized process in early 2020, around the time that this case was filed, for responding to inspection requests made under Washington law. This process was instituted by Meta in an open, intentional defiance of Washington law. Meta does not dispute that this process includes sending requesters a Meta-created form to complete that, among other things, instructs the requester that the inspection request must be limited to ads spanning a single year. So Meta is telling them you can only make a request for a single year. The law itself requires Meta to have the information available for five years.

Clearly, Meta believes it's entitled to set its own rules and disregards those of the State.

Meta doesn't dispute that, as another part of this formalized process, that they institute a policy to redact all location-targeting information more specific than the entire state for all responses, even though Washington law expressly requires Meta to provide that location-targeting information, quote, to the extent such is collected, unquote.

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Once again, Meta sets its own rules and disregards those of the State.

In addition, although Meta admits that it collects all the data required under Washington law in its ordinary course of business, the undisputed facts also show that Meta has chosen not to maintain the data in a manner so that all of it is available to be promptly provided to members of the public if requested. This is important because Washington's law not only requires Meta to promptly respond to requests, it also imposes a separate legal duty for Meta to maintain the required data for a Washington political ad so that data is available to be inspected by the public within 24 hours after that ad is displayed.

Significantly, this duty is triggered for a Washington political ad when the ad is displayed, not when the request is made. This recordkeeping requirement is similar to others that impose legal obligations on entities to timely keep records on their activities, such as mandates on businesses to keep up-to-date employment and transaction records. In those instances, as here, a legal duty exists to have those records current and available, even if they're not ultimately sought by a third party or auditing.

In this case, the State has identified 782 instances, 782 separate ads for which Meta failed to timely and have all the required data available for inspection in the manner

Page 40

provided by law. 782 separate violations. This includes 411 ads that were covered by Sanders' and Trask's requests. The undisputed facts reveal that Meta did not have all the required data available for those ads available to be promptly provided to the members of the public if requested. Indeed, Meta was unable to provide all the required data even months after Sanders' and Trask's requests were made.

Meta has also failed to have all the required information available for potential requests for the 371 additional Washington political ads that fell under Meta's unlawful policy to conceal location-targeting data. These are violations that could be determined without even requests being made because Meta freely admits to implementing this policy to not make particular -- not to make required data available for inspection requests, for any inspection request, not even within 24 hours after the ad is displayed but any time.

It's important to note that the undisputed facts not only demonstrate that Meta committed these violations but confirm that these violations were intentional. Not only did Meta not take any steps to fully comply, as evidenced by the fact that it egregiously failed to timely provide required data for any of the requests it received, but, most shockingly, it doubled down on this violating conduct by affirmatively instituting a formalized process it must have known to be

1 unlawful.

Finally, Meta claims that it was not provided notice that the State is seeking summary judgment on the whole case, including the affirmative defenses. That claim is baseless. The summary judgment motion that the State filed and the proposed order expressly requested relief that included the imposition of several penalties, an award of fees and costs, an injunction, and a finding that the judgment amount against Meta be subject to treble. None of those requests are consistent or even possible with a limited motion that does not cover the entire case, including the affirmative defenses.

Furthermore, parties were aware that there were going to be cross motions specifically addressing the affirmative defenses in this case, which is what's happened and has been fully briefed before Your Honor.

The same summary judgment motion there is distinguished from the cases that Meta cites because the motion for summary judgment in those cases only sought rulings on discrete issues. It is Meta's burden to show that there's a legal basis or a fact issue relating to its affirmative defenses that would preclude summary judgment for the State, and they have failed to do so.

In summary, the State requests that the Court enter its proposed order with its conclusions of law, that Meta

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Page 42
          committed the violations set out in the State's motion.
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                                                                    The
 2
          undisputed facts demonstrate that Meta committed these
 3
          violations and did so intentionally. In addition, the State
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          requests that the Court impose a civil penalty against Meta
 5
          in an amount to be determined by the parties briefing, award
 6
          the State its fees and costs, and enter an injunction
          compelling Meta to take actions needed to comply and rule
 7
          that Meta's violations were intentional and that the
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 9
          judgment amount is, therefore, subject to treble.
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            Thank you.
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            THE COURT:
                        Okay. So Mr. Allen?
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                        Yes, Your Honor.
            MR. ALLEN:
            Your Honor, briefly, obviously the Court has ruled on the
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          First Amendment, but we obviously disagree with that, but I
          believe those disagreements are preserved with the record.
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16
            The Court did not issue a ruling on our CDA 230 defense.
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          I'm not sure if you want to do that orally or written.
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            THE COURT:
                        Sure.
19
            MR. ALLEN:
                        I just -- I just --
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            THE COURT:
                        I mean, I -- I --
                        -- want to make sure that there's a record on
21
            MR. ALLEN:
22
          that.
23
            THE COURT:
                        I don't find the -- Meta's argument on CDA 230
24
          is persuasive. CDA 230 is directed at something different.
25
          It's directing -- it's directed at preventing platforms from
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Page 43 being liable, you know, civil liability, defamation, for 1 2 something that somebody publishes on that. That's not what this is about. This is -- this is a different matter that 3 4 has to do with disclosure, and it's clearly not governed by 5 CDA 230. That's a misapplication of the law, to try and apply CDA 230 to it. 6 Thank you, Your Honor. Obviously, we disagree 7 MR. ALLEN: with that, but I'm not going to --8 9 THE COURT: Sure. 10 MR. ALLEN: -- engage in a back and forth with the Court 11 about it, unless you'd like me to. Instead, I'll turn to 12 the State's motion. 13 THE COURT: Sure. 14 Your Honor, the State's motion should be denied, and there's a number of reasons for that and I'll 15 16 take them in order. But the first one is the State's 17 briefing here and oral argument here was full of -- I guess 18 what I would call ad hominem attacks about Meta and its 19 conduct. Meta was described as arrogant, as laws mean 20 nothing to Meta, as deliberating defying requirements, and 21 engaging in egregious and intentional violations. I just 22 think that's inappropriate, and it's not at all supported by 23 the record in this case. 24 Here is what the facts show that Meta does with respect to 25 political advertising, both in Washington and nationwide.

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It has an ad library that is available 24/7 to the public that is robust, is easy to use. It is a free tool. It can be accessed by anyone, whether they're a Facebook user or not, that provides significant information to any member of the public on demand about political ads. No other digital platform has something comparable, in my view. I think Google has something similar, but I submit the Meta one is much better. And that's a very significant investment of time, money, resources, and efforts to provide information to the public about the political advertisements that are run on Meta nationally and in the state of Washington.

So you can't just ignore the fact that Meta has spent the time, money, and resources to develop an industry-leading tool about the ad library. And even in discovery in this case, I believe there's record evidence where the State Public Disclosure Commission is complimenting Meta on its ad library and saying they'd be interested in the State doing something similar. So this is a very powerful tool for people to understand information about political ads that Meta developed on its own, without being asked to do so, and it spent time, money, and resources to do it.

That's not the only thing Meta has done. It also has an ad library report, which is a separate but related tool to the ad library, that allows folks to conduct analytics on the information in the ad library and obtain additional

Page 45

information presented in additional ways so folks can better understand the information that's in the ad library report.

Meta requires "paid for by" disclosures on the political ads that are run in its platform so that, when folks see political ads, they can see right on the face of the ad here's who is paying for the ad, providing direct disclosure to folks about sources of political spending.

And Meta implemented an ad verification process for political ads where we actually go out of our way to verify the identity of folks running political ads on our platform, to make sure those folks are who they say they are, to serve interests in making sure that folks can identify the sources of political funding, and also avoid, you know, other -- other things about political spending.

So the idea that Meta has just thrown its hands up about political advertising, whether in Washington or nationally, is just not right and it's not consistent with the record developed in this case during summary judgment, including a number of employees who testified, Your Honor, that's how they spend their days at Meta, all day every day, working on these tools. And they are proud of the work they do. They are proud of the election integrity and the political information they're able to disclose. They view it as a civic duty to do this, and I don't think it's fair for the State to impugn the integrity and the motives of these

Page 46 1 employees who spend their time working on this to promote 2 the same interests that the State says it's promoting here. So that's my first point, Your Honor. And I do want to 4 make clear that it's -- there are people who spend their jobs at Meta 24/7 doing these jobs, and there's a lot. 5 With regard to the specific requests that the State 6 7 mentions, from Mr. Sanders, Mr. Trask, and Mr. Wurtz. short answer to that is Meta did everything it could to 8 9 comply with what it believes the record supports here as an 10 unworkable, very burdensome law that imposes -- is almost 11 impossible to comply with. And, again, there is extensive 12 evidence in the record about the burdens involved in complying with the law. And you can see that at Exhibit 94, 13 14 pages 325 to 328; Exhibit 25, which is a deposition transcript, page 95; Exhibit 56, page 62; the Bryant 15 16 declaration, Exhibit 9, which is a long interrogatory 17 response. There's extensive information in the record about why it 18 is burdensome and difficult for Meta or any other digital 19 20 platform to comply with this law. And there's also an expert report on it from Steven Weber, who is a 21 22 machine-learning AI political science expert who testifies 23 about that; that there are very real, significant

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difficulties with compliance -- you know, complying with

this law. It's not just a matter of pressing a button.

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1 Despite all that, Meta has done everything it could to 2 provide these requesters with the information they asked for. So Mr. Sanders, he -- I think he has two or three 3 4 requests that are issued in the State's motion -- he has two requests that are issued in the State's motion. 5 6 times, he had access to the ad library, to the ad library 7 report, to the political -- the "paid for by" disclosures. So he wasn't -- it's not like he had no information about 8 political ads run on Meta. He had a wealth of information on political ads run on Meta. And, in addition to that, 10 11 Meta got the information to Mr. Sanders as fast as it could. 12 Now, with respect to his request that was on July 12, 13 2021, Meta provided three prompt productions of documents in 14 response to that request, in addition to the information that's in the ad library, including on 7/19, 7/25, and 15 16 August 2nd. 17 So Meta -- even though it's working within a regime that 18 it doesn't think is practically possible to comply with, nor does Google or the other entities that are banned ads, it 19 did everything it could. The hard, good working people at 20 Meta did everything they could to provide him with this 21 22 information. 23 The State mentions a follow-on request that happened a few 24 months later. That was because Meta became aware of 25 additional ads that were responsive to his request and out

Page 48 of good faith said, oh, Mr. Sanders, these ads that we've 1 2 recently discovered also fall within Mr. Sanders' request. We should produce those to him. And so we did. 4 And so I think it's odd for the State to try to fault us for that when we're acting in good faith to get Mr. Sanders 5 the information he'd requested. 6 With Mr. Trask, again, he had access to the ad library and 7 the ad library report at all times. He made a request, I 8 9 think it was on July 23, 2019, and Meta produced information on September 3, 2019, and then made another production on 10 11 September 10th. 12 Now, I know these productions aren't as fast as the State believes they should be, but I'm submitting to the Court 13 14 that there's testimony in the record here about us working as hard as we could to produce that information and why we 15 16 needed that amount of time to put it together. And, again, 17 he -- Mr. Trask had access to the ad library and the 18 information there throughout the whole period. Mr. Wurtz is a much different story. He has a number of 19 20 requests, alleged requests, that we do not believe are valid 21 requests, and we believe the record supports they're not 22 valid requests. We didn't ignore Mr. Wurtz. I believe 23 counsel for the State said we ignored his requests. not true. First of all, there were a number of requests 24

that came from anonymous sources that we learned after the

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fact that were Mr. Wurtz's apparently. One is Joe Public and another is Public Filing Service.

So, you know, we're not in the -- as a company that has proprietary information about its users, about advertisers, we take the protection of that information very seriously. And we're just not in the business of sending that protected information out the door to anonymous people who might contact us, who, as far as we know, could be Russian or Chinese or North Korean operatives. Sounds crazy. But in the modern world, it's frankly not.

And, again, in a company that's under the scrutiny of federal and state regulators about the disclosure of information that we should be protecting, and we take the protection of that information very seriously. And so, no, we weren't inclined to disclose information to an anonymous user that didn't identify themselves. Nonetheless, we didn't ignore it. We sent that individual a form, which I'll talk about in a second. Asked that unknown individual at the time to please complete the form. It has very basic pieces of information: Name, email address, are you a Washington resident? And please give us the URLs of the ads you would like information about.

It's a form that's designed to make compliance more efficient, not to hinder anybody from getting information.

It's trying to help speed the process along. Mr. Wurtz's,

in each instance, which we later found out was Mr. Wurtz in each instance, refused to complete the form.

So, again, because it was an anonymous person who wouldn't identify themselves and wouldn't complete a very basic form asking for the information, we didn't provide it.

Also, the record is very clear that Mr. Wurtz himself engaged in quite erratic and sometimes threatening behavior. He threatened lawyers from my firm to file bar complaints against them, even though we were just acting to try to facilitate the information for him. He told Kirkland & Ellis lawyers not to contact him anymore. He said we had sent him documents containing hidden malware. And, frankly, the associates on my team felt uncomfortable communicating with him. Nonetheless, we sent him the form. We tried to get the information from these anonymous websites to try to comply. He never returned the form, and that's why he did not get the information that was requested.

Another point I'd make, Your Honor, is Mr. Sanders,
Mr. Trask, and Mr. Wurtz, none of them -- they all testified
in this case they were not seeking information for the
purposes for which the law was enacted. These are not folks
who have questions about political spending or political ads
and are trying to figure that out. They're -- they were all
doing it, apparently, to test Meta's processes.

Mr. Sanders, I believe, was a journalist at the time.

1 Mr. Trask was trying to test our processes for compliance.

These weren't folks who were trying to figure out critically needed information about specific candidates or specific

4 spending in light of an upcoming election.

Your Honor, the State mentioned some things about us purportedly concealing location-targeting information. We do, under our protections that we -- you know, I think the record is very clear, we have a three-pronged approach for complying in Washington. It's the ad library, combined with the ad ban, which I know the Court mentioned earlier, that it doesn't think Meta is enforcing it. It is enforcing it. There are people -- there's extensive testimony in the record about the efforts we make to enforce the ad ban, both machine learning, both individuals working manually. There's time, resources, money, and effort in processes that go into enforcing that ban. I don't want the Court to think we don't enforce it. There is a substantial -- substantial record evidence that we do.

And then thirdly is the productions we make even after we get these requests. We do redact information lower than State-level targeting. Now, the reason for that is because some of this targeting can be quite precise, and we think there's a significant privacy interest from -- we have to protect the privacy of our users, the people that are engaging with these ads, and we think there are very serious

privacy threats that can be reverse engineered if we produce granular-level targeting information.

I also don't believe it violates the law or the regulation, Your Honor, for us to produce information in that manner. Nothing in the regulations, and it is WAC 390.18.050 at paragraph 6, requires that ZIP Code-level or street-level targeting information be produced. It says, quote, a description of the demographic information, e.g., age, gender, race, location, et cetera, of the audiences targeting reached to the extent such information is collected by the commercial advertiser.

I don't think that "to the extent" language means, oh, you have to give us every last piece of targeting information. I think what that's in there for is, oh, well, obviously if you don't collect the targeting information, you don't have to disclose it. But, again, we do disclose location information at the state level, and I don't think there's anything in the PDC's regulation that says, oh, you also have to disclose ZIP Codes or addresses, if you have those. Finally, Your Honor, close to finally, there is a very

important point that the State's counsel brought up that I want to spend a little bit of time talking about. They are trying to say that we're not liable for the around 10 requests they think we got. We're liable for 782 separate violations. And I believe counsel said 371 additional ones.

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That is an attempt to hold us -- to equate a violation to each ad that was run on Facebook, not each request. That is legally the incorrect way to look at it, and there's a number of reasons for that.

The violation under the statute and regulation is a failure to respond to a request, not a running of an ad or an alleged failure to maintain information about an ad. the reason we know that is because that's how agency experts from the State Attorney General's office itself interpreted this law in the investigation phase in this case. If you look at Exhibit 70 to the second Bryant declaration, that is a submission made by an assistant attorney general, signed under the name of the attorney general himself, saying that the violation in this case is request-based, not ad-based. It says very clearly that the PDC was charging Meta with only two violations of law at the time because it failed to respond to two requests. And they were not -- they were explicitly not charging Meta with a violation for each ad it They said, quote, lack of access to Facebook's information upon request was the core issue to be addressed, not the amount of information Facebook has to date made available prior to requests being made. They also recognized that, quote, it would quickly lead to a penalty amount grossly disproportionate to other violations of the law to assess a violation on an ad-level basis as opposed to

1 a request violation.

So the State's position now is a complete 180 from what they said before, and that for interpretation in my view finds no support in the statute or the regulatory text. The regulatory text says one of the ways you can comply with this law is by producing information promptly upon request. Well, if you don't get a request, you don't have an opportunity to comply.

And also, Your Honor, based on the State's logic, it could bring a lawsuit against a platform that never received a request for information at all merely because the State didn't like the way that that entity was maintaining their records. I believe that's unprecedented. I think that would be a dangerous, dangerous intrusion on the internal recordkeeping practices of platforms, and it would be unprecedented, in my view, for the State to purport to penalize a platform for the way in which it maintains its internal records.

And I know the Court has already ruled on the First

Amendment issue, but I think that might only exacerbate the

very real First Amendment concerns here. It will create

serious due process, fundamental fairness concerns because

the State would be purporting to regulate how we maintain

our internal records. So I don't think it's consistent with

the statute, the regulation. There are certainly no

Page 55 explicit statute or regulations saying, oh, if you run a 1 2 political ad, you can be liable in this state, even if you never get a request. In fact, I think below the State took 4 the exact opposite position. 5 Then the other point I'd make, Your Honor, is the record is very clear that Meta does not maintain this information. 6 7 All right? There's evidence in the record on that. the Vanesyan 30(b)(6) deposition at page 248 and 251, and 8 the Schiff, Sarah Schiff 30(b)(6) deposition at pages 52, 61, 65, 67, talking --10 11 THE COURT: Can I -- sorry. Maintains what information? 12 I kind of lost you on --13 MR. ALLEN: The information that the law -- that the 14 statute and regulation require Meta to disclose upon request. And so the State -- I believe I heard the State's 15 16 counsel say, well, Meta doesn't even maintain this information. We didn't. There is evidence in the record 17 18 that we do maintain it. Now, there obviously -- we talked about extensively before 19 20 burdens about compiling and producing that information on the quick timeline that the law requires. The record is 21 22 clear, the evidence in this record, that that information is 23 maintained by Meta. And so if the State is saying we should 24 be liable for each of these ads because we don't maintain 25 the information, we do.

And then finally, Your Honor, the State has taken the 1 2 position that if -- if the Court were to grant its motion for summary judgment, it should find these violations intentional. And I just have to address that. Again, for 4 reasons I said earlier, it's certainly not intentional. 5 Meta is not trying to just ignore Washington law. 6 7 trying to work as best it can with a regime that it thinks is very, very difficult for digital political advertisers. 8 9 It has invested significantly in political ads transparency, 10 including its ad verification process and its ad library. 11 It has people that work on this 24/7. That's not the stuff 12 of an intentional violation of campaign finance laws, Your Honor. Meta has tried to comply through its ad library 13 14 and its ad ban. Even when ads slip through that ban, Meta gets the information and tries to produce it as best it can. 15 16 It's -- you know, this is not a law that has a long track record in the United States. Frankly, it's not a law that 17 18 even has a long track record in 2018 because I know counsel for the State said, well, the law didn't really change in 19 20 2018. The reality is it changed significantly in 2018. the PDC itself says it hasn't historically enforced the law. 21 22 PDC testified in this case that it's only aware of one 23 enforcement action before 2018. 24 THE COURT: Well, but the law does have a long history 25 outside of digital platforms.

1 MR. ALLEN: It does.

2 THE COURT: I mean, we've been doing this for 50 years 3 with radio, TV, newspapers, et cetera.

MR. ALLEN: It does, outside of digital platforms. I would submit, however, Your Honor, that the burdens on digital platforms are much, much different than they are on radio and TV and things like that because of the volume of digital political advertising on the platforms and because of the self-serve nature of the ads, where people can just run these ads on their own. It's a very, very different perspect- -- animal from a burden perspective. And don't just take my word for it. You can take Google's word for it and Yahoo's word for it, because they also left the market for these reasons.

So, you know, for all those reasons, I don't think the State's motion should be granted. I very, very much do not think that there's any basis for an intentional violation, any violation. I don't think that the State is correct to try to impose a violation for 782 different ads when really what this is about is a handful of requests. Now, we think a lot of those weren't legitimate requests because they were anonymous, and we think there's a factual disagreement on that. But the key point for that argument is it's a request-based law, not an ad-based law. There's no prohibition on running political ads on Facebook in this

Page 58 1 That would clearly be a First Amendment problem. I think even the Court would agree with that. And so for 2 those reasons, we think the State's motion should be denied. 4 Unless the Court has any questions, I'm happy to sit down. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. 6 MR. ALLEN: 7 THE COURT: Uh-huh. So, Mr. Sipe, do you have anything you want to say by way 8 9 of rebuttal? 10 MR. SIPE: Your Honor, just two minutes. Is that okay? 11 Sure. Yeah. I mean, I -- by my count, you THE COURT: 12 got four minutes left, so yeah. MR. SIPE: Okay. Very good. I just want to raise just --13 14 address just a few points. So there was quite a lot of discussion about the ad 15 library, but it's -- it's undisputed that the ad library 16 17 doesn't fully comply with Washington law. So it's great 18 that they do it, but it's not compliant. There's a lot of discussion about the burdens on Meta. 19 20 just want to just take an overall view of that. This is a law that existed before Meta. And when Meta formed and 21 22 started doing business in Washington, it's up to them to set 23 up their business so it complies with our laws, not the 24 other way around; not to change our laws because Meta formed 25 a business in a certain way. And so it's just a -- very

Page 59 1 much of a philosophical difference, I think, we have in the 2 way this should be viewed. 3 I want to talk about the form. I think -- I don't really 4 see a dispute in the facts -- or I mean the request. But I want to talk about this formalized process just for a 5 second. And what was not addressed is -- they talk about 6 7 the form that is filled out, but what was not addressed is that it specifically says, for instance, date range 8 9 requested cannot exceed one year. That -- that's clearly 10 not compliant with the law. And there's no response you 11 really can give to that. Same with the "if you are a 12 resident of Washington." There's nothing in our law that says it's limited to people in Washington. That's something 13 14 that Meta made up. But about the violations -- oh, about the redactions, just 15 16 for a second as well. So the redactions that were done are anything less than state level. So just to give a clear 17 18 image is that all they'll see is that -- let's say a race for Seattle council, they'll just see Washington state. 19 20 They won't see Seattle or they won't even see a ZIP Code. It's not the only thing that's redacted is like an address 21 22 or anything like that. It was anything less than state 23 level. Clearly not compliant (inaudible). 24 The last point I want to make is about the violations. 25 We've based it just plainly on the language of the rule.

Page 60 1 The language of the rule says the information needs to be 2 available within 24 hours after the ad is run. 3 disputing --4 THE COURT: But doesn't --MR. SIPE: -- that they maintain -- oh. 5 6 THE COURT: But I guess the thing that concerns me about 7 this, Mr. Sipe, the way you're doing it, is that the law gives, I believe, three different ways for them to make the 8 9 information available. I mean, in the old fashion thing, 10 newspaper runs an ad. You can -- one of the things a 11 newspaper can do is just, at their office, have a -- the 12 information available so somebody can come in and walk in 13 and look at it. 14 If one of those ways of making it available is by request, how -- how do we determine that there's a violation until 15 16 somebody makes a request to look at the information? 17 MR. SIPE: Sure. So I'm happy to address that. So what 18 the rule says is that if it's by request and it's electronically transmitted, which is the way Facebook does 19 20 it for the information not in the ad library, is that it has to be sent promptly. So what I look at is the 21 22 information -- I mean, not that they have it. I don't 23 dispute they have information. But is it -- is it 24 maintained in a way that it is available to be promptly 25 transmitted if a request is made?

Page 61 1 And there's a couple ways to determine whether that is 2 true. One, you can see an actual request. That's what we're talking about Sanders and Trask. That he made a 4 request and the information was not provided for months. 5 So, clearly, it was not available to be promptly sent to 6 those people. 7 The other way of looking at it is what we talked about with this policy. So they have a policy to not provide 8 9 certain information. So regardless, if there's a request or 10 not, that information is not available. It's as if a radio 11 station took certain information and locked it away so that 12 nobody could see it. That information is clearly not available to anybody that requests it. So it's almost like 13 14 a -- somebody just admitting they don't have it. So that's -- that's the way we've approached it. 15 believe our argument is grounded in the plain language of 16 the rule. 17 18 And so if there's no more questions, thank you, 19 Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. So I -- I will grant the State's motion to enforce. 21 22 think that Meta is clearly in violation of the rule. I do 23 think, however, that it has to be limited to -- for any 24 enforcement penalties and so on -- have to be limited to the 25 requests that are actually made of Meta because how else,

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otherwise, given that there are different ways that the statutory scheme allows for somebody to comply with the disclosure requirement, we don't know for sure that there is a violation until somebody actually requests it and doesn't get the information in accordance with what Washington law provides for.

So I do think that Meta is in violation with regard to the request that it actually received is intentional. They didn't really make a significant effort to try and comply, either in terms of providing any targeting information, which is clearly required by the law, or in terms of making a serious attempt to comply in a timely fashion with -- to provide the information available.

I know it's claiming that it did everything it could, but the fact is that if it were actually keeping the information in a way -- I mean, it digitizes everything. It would be very easy for them to simply organize the information in a way that would make it readily available if somebody makes the request, because they had to take it all in digitally in the first place in order to get the ad.

But I think that it has to be based upon requests that have actually been received, so I -- I think that the -- although I find that there is -- that the State has established a basis for saying there's a violation for the actual requests that have been received from Trask and

Page 63 1 Sanders and Wurtz, I don't think that there's a basis on 2 which to enforce the law simply because they didn't keep the information on the ads in the -- in the fashion that they 3 4 should have. So I would suggest that the State submit a new order 5 that's restricted to it being based on requests, and I'll 6 obviously see what Meta's response to that is, and then we 7 can decide whether there's any further hearing needed. 8 9 MR. SIPE: Your Honor, can I ask a question about the 10 ruling? 11 THE COURT: Sure. 12 MR. SIPE: Regard to the alleged violations based on the number of ads, are you ruling -- is that issue disposed of 13 14 or -- or is that an issue -- a fact issue or --THE COURT: I -- I think it's -- unless you can -- I mean, 15 maybe I'm missing something that you can -- but I don't see 16 17 how where there are several different ways of complying with 18 the law, in terms of making the information available, that 19 we can establish that they haven't complied with the law 20 until somebody makes a request. And so, I mean, obviously 21 when somebody makes a request and they don't produce it, 22 then they're not complying with the law. But before --23 although I understand your point about they're not keeping 24 it in a way that makes it readily available, I don't think 25 that's something I can enforce against them with -- absent

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          somebody making a request.
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            MR. SIPE: Okay.
 3
            THE COURT: Okay?
            MR. SIPE: Thank you, Your Honor.
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            THE COURT: So thank you.
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            THE BAILIFF: All rise. Court is in recess.
                (September 2, 2022, proceedings concluded)
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                            CERTIFICATE
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     STATE OF WASHINGTON
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     COUNTY OF KING
                  I, the undersigned, do hereby certify under penalty
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      of perjury that the foregoing court proceedings or legal
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      format; that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or
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      counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially
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      interested in its outcome.
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                  IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this
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      6th day of September, 2022.
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     s/ Debra Riggs Torres, RPR, CCR No. 20122368
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